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ABSTRACT
DYNAMIC ADVERSARIAL MINING - EFFECTIVELY APPLYING MACHINE
LEARNING IN ADVERSARIAL NON-STATIONARY ENVIRONMENTS
Tegjyot Singh Sethi
June 19, 2017
While understanding of machine learning and data mining is still in its budding
stages, the engineering applications of the same has found immense acceptance and suc-
cess. Cybersecurity applications such as intrusion detection systems, spam filtering, and
CAPTCHA authentication, have all begun adopting machine learning as a viable technique
to deal with large scale adversarial activity. However, the naive usage of machine learning in
an adversarial setting is prone to reverse engineering and evasion attacks, as most of these
techniques were designed primarily for a static setting. The security domain is a dynamic
landscape, with an ongoing never ending arms race between the system designer and the
attackers. Any solution designed for such a domain needs to take into account an active
adversary and needs to evolve over time, in the face of emerging threats. We term this
as the Dynamic Adversarial Mining problem, and the presented work provides the founda-
tion for this new interdisciplinary area of research, at the crossroads of Machine Learning,
Cybersecurity, and Streaming Data Mining.
We start with a white hat analysis of the vulnerabilities of classification systems to
exploratory attack. The proposed Seed-Explore-Exploit framework provides characteriza-
tion and modeling of attacks, ranging from simple random evasion attacks to sophisticated
reverse engineering. It is observed that, even systems having prediction accuracy close to
v
100%, can be easily evaded with more than 90% precision. This evasion can be performed
without any information about the underlying classifier, training dataset, or the domain of
application.
Attacks on machine learning systems cause the data to exhibit non stationarity (i.e.,
the training and the testing data have different distributions). It is necessary to detect these
changes in distribution, called concept drift, as they could cause the prediction performance
of the model to degrade over time. However, the detection cannot overly rely on labeled
data to compute performance explicitly and monitor a drop, as labeling is expensive and
time consuming, and at times may not be a possibility altogether. As such, we propose
the Margin Density Drift Detection (MD3) algorithm, which can reliably detect concept
drift from unlabeled data only. MD3 provides high detection accuracy with a low false
alarm rate, making it suitable for cybersecurity applications; where excessive false alarms
are expensive and can lead to loss of trust in the warning system. Additionally, MD3
is designed as a classifier independent and streaming algorithm for usage in a variety of
continuous never-ending learning systems.
We then propose a Dynamic Adversarial Mining based learning framework, for learn-
ing in non stationary and adversarial environments, which provides ‘security by design’. The
proposed Predict-Detect classifier framework, aims to provide: robustness against attacks,
ease of attack detection using unlabeled data, and swift recovery from attacks. Ideas of
feature hiding and obfuscation of feature importance are proposed as strategies to enhance
the learning framework’s security. Metrics for evaluating the dynamic security of a system
and recover-ability after an attack are introduced to provide a practical way of measuring
efficacy of dynamic security strategies. The framework is developed as a streaming data
methodology, capable of continually functioning with limited supervision and effectively
responding to adversarial dynamics.
The developed ideas, methodology, algorithms, and experimental analysis, aim to
provide a foundation for future work in the area of Dynamic Adversarial Mining, wherein
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Living in a ‘always-on’ world, where more than 40% of the population is reachable
at the click of a button1, has provided us with immense economic and social opportunities.
Whether it be for accessing the wealth of information available on the web using Google2,
for building an encyclopedia of the human knowledge base using Wikipedia3, for funding
your next business/art project via Kickstarter4, or for making your voice heard to over
half a billion people on Facebook5/Twitter6, the internet has changed the scale at which
we humans think and operate. The growing scale and reachability of modern day web
applications, has also made it vulnerable to cyberattacks, which threaten to affect the
entire globe. While application developers intend to touch the lives of billions by making
their services available everywhere, it leaves the arena open to adversarial activity, where
the attacks can originate from anywhere, anytime and can take any shape, unseen before.
Conventional methods of security mechanisms, such as passwords, firewalls, authentication
tools and signature based black and white lists, cannot effectively thwart evolving attacks
at this scale [12]. Signature based and rule based systems, summarize existing malicious
activities and trigger an alarm when a similar event is repeated [13, 14]. However, their
inability to extrapolate from previously seen data about attacks, make them ineffective in
case of zero-day exploits and anomalies, which have no precedent analogues. On the other
hand, when these traditional security tools do detect a potential breach, they are one of the








Figure 1.1: Recent large scale data breaches2.
makes the diligent analysis of each of these alarms an intractable task, often causing attacks
to go unnoticed. Current reported statistics show that attackers go unnoticed for more than
200 days and cost businesses over $300B, every single year1.
The immediate need to learn from observed data has been met by the development
of various machine learning techniques [15, 16], which are capable of learning from the
known data and generalizing to the unknown realm. The Big Data revolution has fueled
the development of scalable and practical machine learning system, which has led to its
wide spread adaptation and popularity. The domain of cybersecurity has also recognized
the need for a data driven solution [17–20], owing to the increased scale and sophistication
of attacks in recent times (Figure 1.12). It is impossible to rely solely on human expertise
to curate these attacks, as the process is laborious, expensive and is made impractical in
current times, owing to the shortage in skilled security analysts3. Machine learning systems
provide a semi-automated approach, by integrating knowledge learned from previously seen
data with budgeted human expertise, to provide a scalable solution with human in the loop.
Use of machine learning has found success in several security applications [17–20].





Figure 1.2: Illustration of the Perspective API1, which leverages machine learning to assess
toxicity of online comments, to prevent harassment of users.
tion [21–26]. Supervised techniques of classification are used for Spam filtering [27–30].
Biometric authentication using mouse movement patterns and keystroke dynamics, are also
using supervised learning techniques [31]. N-gram analysis of executables is being used for
distinguishing malware from regular programs [32], and also for identifying infected pdf
documents [33]. Unsupervised clustering of clicks is being used for identifying new click
frauds [34]. Search poisoning [35], phishing detection [36], malicious ad campaigns [3],
hate speech detection1(Figure 1.2) and crowdturfing [37], are some of the other security
applications which are also immensely benefiting from the use of data driven methodolo-
gies. Machine learning allows scalable and swift learning from large amount of streaming
environment data, and also provides generalization to improve longevity of the security
mechanisms. With a barrage of algorithms and benchmark datasets developed in litera-
ture [25, 30, 31], the use of machine learning has shown promise in its applicability to this
field. Table 1.1, shows results of some popular techniques on standard benchmark datasets,
with a high classification prediction performance seen as a general trend across different
applications.
Although the usage of machine learning in cybersecurity has found early success, its
own vulnerabilities have mostly been overlooked. Machine learning was not designed with
security in mind, and traditionally its goal has been to provide good generalization from the
data it is presented with [39]. Operating in a nonstationary and adversarial environment,
as is the dynamic world of cybersecurity, requires a new paradigm in the application of




Machine learning systems used for cybersecurity, with reported performance.
Application domain Reported performance
Network intrusion detection [21] True Positive: 95%
Malicious executable detection [32] Area Under ROC: 0.996
Spam email detection [29] Accuracy: 97.6%
Mouse based behavioral biometrics for CAPTCHA [31] Accuracy: 99%
Phishing websites detection (Google) [3] False positive rate: 0.1%
Malicious Pdf file classification [33] False positive rate: 0.2%
Android malicious apps detection [38] False positive rate: 5.7%
borrowed from other domains, where it has shown early success. Machine learning is a
tool available to both the system attacker and the defender. While, it has been used for
defending systems, its usage by an adversary to reverse engineer and evade the system, has
only recently started to be considered [40]. This dissertation aims to further bridge the
gap between machine learning and cybersecurity, by integrating the actual needs of security
applications (i.e., to provide security), in the design of the data driven models.
1.1 Learning in adversarial environments
With the introduction of machine learning at the core of cybersecurity systems, a
new gamut of vulnerabilities have been introduced, which need further analysis and un-
derstanding [1, 5, 41, 42]. These attacks are themselves machine learning driven, as they
rely on probing the system in an attempt to reverse engineer it, and as a result pose new
threats to the system [43]. We particularly consider the task of binary classification, where
the defender tries to separate instance of the Legitimate and the Malicious type. This is
a common setting in many cybersecurity applications, which are interested in keeping all
malicious activity out, while allowing Legitimate benign traffic to enter the system. In such
settings, the defender tries to generalize from the provided data D = {(x, y)|x ∈ X, y ∈ Y },
where x is a d-dimensional vector and y ∈ {Legitimate,Malicious}, is the class label of the






l(y, f(x)) + λ O(f) (1.1)
where, foptimal is the learned model, l(.) is the loss function which penalizes incor-
rectly classified samples, and O(.) captures hypothesis complexity, which is controlled by
the regularization parameter λ, to prevent overfitting. In a non-adversarial setting, the op-
timization function of Equation 1.1 should result in good prediction performance over the
data, under the assumption of Stationarity, which states that the training and the test data
are drawn from the same distribution (i.e., are Independent and Identically Distributed
(IID)) [41]. However, in an adversarial setting (particularly), this assumption is violated.
An attacker aiming to evade the system, will generate data different from what is being
blocked by the defender’s classifier. The adversary’s goal is to increase the false negative
rate of the classifiers (i.e., increase samples which are Malicious but classified as Legiti-
mate). In [44] it was shown that once an attack has been detected and blacklisted, its usage
itself drops, making static counter measures less useful for the long run. This observation
makes the naive application of machine learning to cybersecurity, a futile effort.
Traditional metrics of model performance, such as: accuracy, precision, recall and
f-score [45]; have little meaning, if the trained model can be easily evaded at test time. An
adversary, also equipped with machine learning, can query the current deployed model to
gain information, in an attempt to reverse engineer it, and then generate malicious samples
which will result in a high evasion rate [5]. Table 1.2 shows our initial adversary experi-
mentation on three popular cybersecurity datasets: CAPTCHA [31] - Dataset containing
mouse movement data to distinguish malicious bots from humans, KDD99 [24]- Intrusion
detection dataset containing information about malicious and benign network connections,
and SPAMBASE [30]- Email spam dataset. These datasets have shown to benefit from the
naive application of classification models, as shown by the initial perceived accuracy. All
three datasets show a good accuracy (>80%), when considered as a static machine learning
model fitting task. However, it takes less than 30 random probes to evade these models
and obtain an evasion accuracy of over 75%. This evasion attack was done by probing
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TABLE 1.2
Initial experiments showing vulnerability of machine learning systems to evasion attacks.
Analysis / Dataset CAPTCHA KDD99 SPAMBASE
Initial perceived accuracy
(10 fold - linear SVM)
100% 99.03% 80.8%
Probes needed to get a legitimate attack
(Avg over 30 runs)
3.6 8 29.4
% of attack samples misclassified
by the initial SVM
92.9% 87.9% 77.1%
the classifier (by randomly generated data points, upto 100 points), to get initial samples
classified as type- Legitimate; and then generating 100 attack points, by mutating (adding
small numerical perturbations) these initial legitimate samples, to exploit the new found
vulnerability. An evasion rate of over 75% on these 3 diverse and high dimensional datasets,
while using a simple random probing based approach, indicates the innate vulnerabilities of
machine learning. The trained classifier model is like a Swiss cheese barrier to the attackers,
who can easily percolate the system, over time. The accuracy of machine learning provides
a false sense of security, as seen in Table 1.2 for CAPTCHA, where a 100% accurate model
was easily evaded by ∼4 random probes, and a misclassification rate of 92.9% was obtained
with just 100 probes, in total. This experiment was conducted to highlight the need for
a different set of metrics, modeling and paradigm, when applying machine learning in the
domain of cybersecurity.
The issue of adversarial manipulation of learning models has gained attention in
recent times, with researchers trying to characterize the attacks and defenses on popu-
lar machine learning models [1, 40, 41, 46, 47]. This has led to the development of the
new field of ‘Adversarial Machine Learning’, at the intersection of machine learning and
cybersecurity [48]. This field aims to study and enable the safe application of machine
learning, when adversarial activity is expected, and to develop proactive robust machine
learning models which are resistant to attacks. Google’s framework for adversarial adver-
tisement detection [3], Facebook’s phishing protection system [49], Sandia National Lab’s
report on their Counter-adversarial data analytics project [50], and work done by several
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TABLE 1.3
Categorization of attacks against machine learning systems.
Influence
Causative - Influences training data, to mislead learning
Exploratory - Affects data at test time, to evade detection
Specificity
Targeted - Attack is on a particular instance
Indiscriminate - Attack irrespective of any particular instance
Security violation
Integrity - Results in increased false negatives for the defender
Availability - Causes increased errors of prediction (DOS attack)
researchers [37,41,51–53], all indicate a pressing need for security analysis and robust design
of learning systems.
Categorization of attacks against machine learning systems
One of the earliest works on machine learning security was presented in [1], where
a taxonomy of attacks based on the principles of information security, was defined. This
taxonomy categorized attacks along the three axis of: Specificity, Influence and the Se-
curity violation, as shown in Table 1.3. Causative and Exploratory attacks are the two
broad categorizations of attacks on machine learning, based on their influence on the data,
and are widely studied in literature [52]. Causative attacks affect the training data, while
Exploratory attacks affect the test data, on which the learning model operates [52]. Based
on the Specificity of attack, an adversary could either affect a particular targeted subset of
samples or could generate attacks indiscriminately, without starting with a preset instance.
Based on the security violation, attacks can be used to violate integrity, by gaining unsanc-
tioned access to the system, or can be used to launch a denial of service availability attack
on the machine learning based system.
Causative attacks aim to mislead training, by poisoning the training set, so that
future attacks are caused easily [54, 55]. An example of causative attacks in the real world
is the incident with Microsoft’s AI driven chat bot, called Tay1, which got trained to become
racist within 24 hours of being deployed into the real world. Causative attacks are severe
1http://fortune.com/2016/03/24/chat-bot-racism/
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Figure 1.3: Illustration of exploratory attacks on a machine learning based spam filtering
system.
in effect, but can be prevented by careful curation of the training data and by keeping
the training data secure- using database security measures, authentication and encryption.
Exploratory attacks are more commonplace, less moderated and can be launched remotely
without raising suspicion. These attacks affect the testing time data and are aimed at
reducing the classifier’s performance [52]. This is done by means of crafting the attack
samples, so as to evade detection by the defender’s model [5,51]. Exploratory attacks start
with some level of reverse engineering, where the attacker performs a reconnaissance of the
system to understand its behavior, and then leveraging of the learned information to modify
the attack payload and escape detection. As an example, consider the good words and bad
words attacks on spam detection systems [56], as illustrated in Figure 1.3. By launching
two spam emails, each differing in only one word ‘Sale’, it can be ascertained that this
word is important to the classification, if the email containing that word is flagged as spam.
Knowing this information, the adversary modifies the word to be ‘Sa1e’, which looks visually
similar but avoids detection. Similarly, to evade a behavioral keystroke biometric systems
[31], an attacker can make bots having different keypress speeds across the spectrum, and
then choose the bot parameters for which the biometric classifier does not flag suspicious
behavior.
Exploratory attacks are unrestricted and commonplace, for any deployed web based
system. These attacks are non-intrusive in nature and originate from the client side, as data
which is blended with the other system inputs [37]. As such, they are harder to detect and
prevent. In web based application relying on ad revenue, the goal is to make the service freely
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available to a large number of users across the world, to increase value. In order to do so,
the applications have to keep the system open to new users joining and using the system, in
large volumes. Having a system out in the open makes it a target for attacks by adversaries,
who can pose as users, gain information about the classifier providing security, and then
launch a distributed attack which goes unnoticed for a long time. Stringent verification
techniques, like two step verification, are not widely used for these applications, as they can
cause the user experience to degrade and consequently lead to loss in revenue. Consider for
example, a click ads system wanting to detect click fraud [57]. Users hate advertisements,
and if they are forced to authenticate every time they need to see an advertisement, it would
lead to attrition. Most decision on malicious intent is made on latent signals, such as- click
time, text content, propagation rate across users, and mouse movement [27, 31, 57]. All
of which can be reverse engineered by carefully crafted attack samples. Machine learning
models naively used in these environments do not consider this vulnerability innate to them.
This defeats the goals of security, which is the primary purpose of the cybersecurity systems
in which these models are employed. In this dissertation, exploratory integrity attacks are
studied, and strategies to secure against such attacks are proposed, as these attacks occur
frequently at test time and can affect any machine learning based system deployed in the
wild.
1.2 Learning in non-stationary environments
As most real world data tends to be dynamic and ever changing, the training data,
on which the machine learning models were built, is different from the test data, seen by
the system once it is deployed. This change in the underlying data distribution is called
Concept Drift [58, 59]. Concept drift can cause the model’s generalization performance to
drop, and as such warrants an adaptive learning scheme capable of learning from new data,
as it becomes available [60]. Concept drift is a result of the dynamics of the world, which
causes static models - trained on earlier obtained training data, to grow old and stale. For
example, consider a model trained to predict the demand for battery powered cars. Before
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the release of Tesla1, this demand was from a select group of early adopters only. But new
technologies and changing markets, led to a previously unforeseen demand, and the need
for a new model to predict it. The old model of demand was no longer usable, as the new
data arrived. This phenomenon is exacerbated in cybersecurity domains, as changes are
not only plausible but infact expected, due to adversarial activity. There is a need to detect
data shifts and adapt to them, in real world machine learning systems, to ensure continued
efficacy of the system.
Detecting concept drift is a challenging task, as it requires human expertise in the
form of labeled data. In a streaming environment, where data is constantly flowing in,
labeling all samples is not practical. Labeling requires human intervention, and is therefore
expensive and time consuming [61]. Consider for example, a large scale spam filter, using
classifier at its core and facing the worldwide email traffic (estimated at 205.6B [62]). If
even 0.01% of the emails are asked to be labeled, by use of crowdsourcing websites like
Mechanical Turk2, this would imply an expenditure of $200K (each worker paid 1 cent),
and an available workforce of 10K workers (assuming each worker reads 100 emails/hour
and work 20 hours/day), every single day. This makes the over-dependence on labeled
samples a practical and economic limitation. Streaming data applications need to be able
to operate and detect drifts from unlabeled data, or atmost sparsely labeled data, to be of
any real use.
Drift can be formalized as a change in the joint probability distribution of samples
X and their labels Y, over time , as shown in Equation 1.2 and 1.3.
P (X,Y ) = P (X|Y ).P (Y ) = P (Y |X).P (X) (1.2)
Pt1(X,Y ) 6= Pt2(X,Y ),=⇒ Concept Drift (1.3)
where, change in the joint probability distribution P (X,Y ) form t1 to t2 (t1 <




distribution P (Y ), or a change in the classifier model boundary given by P (Y |X), a change
in the class conditional probability P (X|Y ), or a change in the data distribution P (X) [58].
While any of these changes leads to a concept drift, due to changed data distribution, the
change in P (Y |X) is considered most critical and as such has been widely studied [63] .
This change is called the real concept drift, as it most commonly causes the classification
performance to drop. Detecting these changes usually requires labeled samples, which are
scarce in streaming data. To reduces dependence on labeling, unlabeled change detection
schemes have been proposed, which track change to P (X), as a surrogate for real drift [64].
However, these methods suffer from excessive paranoia, as they raise false alarms, being
overly sensitive to change. When coupled with human intervention, these can cause the
humans to loose trust in the alarm system, as it leads to wasted effort in verifying changes
which are flagged frequently and do not result in any actual change in P (Y |X). What is
needed is a drift detection system capable of detecting real drifts (i.e., drifts that leads
to degradation in the model performance), and one that does so without using excessive
labeled data.
Exploratory attacks can be seen as a special type of concept drift, where the drift
is driven by an adversary aimed at evading the system. As mentioned in [51], adversary
activity is different from traditional concept drift, in the sense that the drift is a function
of the learned model itself. Since, the goal of an adversary is to evade the classification, the
learned classifier guides the attacks. This phenomenon was observed in the real world, in the
study of spam evolution over the period 1998-2010 [44]. It was shown that popularity of the
spam construction techniques drives the spam arms race. As soon as the spam campaigns
start getting detected and identified, adversaries stop using the same techniques. From
a classification point of view, an attack can be seen as a change in the adversary’s data-
P (X|Y = Malicious) in Equation 1.4.
P (X,Y ) = P (X|Y = Legitimate).P (Y = Legitimate)
+P (X|Y = Malicious).P (Y = Malicious)
(1.4)
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To study adversarial change, the legitimate data is considered to be stationary (no
natural concept drift), while an adversary is considered intelligent enough to cloak changes
in P(Y=Malicious), to avoid any sudden suspicious spikes in attack vectors. A targeted
adversary gains information about the defender’s model C ; by means of carefully crafted
queries, to obtain membership information [6, 51]. It then uses this information to create
the attack campaign P (X|Y = Malicious), so as to increase the false negative rate of the
learned classifier C. In doing so, only efforts of serious attackers, which launch campaign
to significantly subvert the learned classifier and not just to get one single sample past
security, are considered. These attackers use machine learning, reverse engineering and
diligent reconnaissance missions, to launch large scale attacks. These attacks will force the
defender to expend significant time and resources to redesign the entire machine learning
model, starting from new data acquisition, retraining, testing and deployment. Study of
adversarial learning as a nonstationary phenomenon and as a special case of the general
concept drift phenomenon [65], is at the core of our work. We refer to such drifts in the
data distribution as the Adversarial Drift, to separate it from the broader Concept Drift
term.
1.3 Dynamic Adversarial Mining
Existing works on adversarial mining, approach the problem from two perspectives
: i) As a streaming data problem, where any change is possible and needs to be detected
and fixed [59], or ii) As a security problem, where proactive decisions are made in the
training of resilient models, to delay the onset of attacks, but nothing is done once the
system is deployed [41]. There is a knowledge gap between these two approaches, as they
fail to undertake a holistic view on the security of a system. A holistic view of the security
would understand that it is a cyclic process, where delaying attacks, detecting them and then
recovering, are all equally important to meet the system’s security goals. A dynamic security
paradigm would take proactive measures to delay attacks, and to make their subsequent
detection and fixing easier, as well. As such metrics like Attack delay, Difficulty to reverse
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engineer, Detect-ability of vulnerability of classifiers, and Recover-ability after attacks; are
more useful to dynamic security, than the traditional metrics of accuracy, precision and
recall. Also, dynamic security needs to operate as a never-ending learning scheme, with
efficient involvement of human in the loop, to provide expertise and retraining ability, from
time to time. The interdisciplinary field of Dynamic Adversarial Mining (Figure 1.4), needs
to incorporate lessons learned from: Machine Learning, Cybersecurity and Stream Data
Mining; to rethink use of machine learning in security applications and develop systems
which are ‘secure by design’ [66]. Some core ideas under the dynamic adversarial mining
scheme are:
• Ability to leave feature space honeypots in the learned classifier at training time, to
efficiently detect attacks using unlabeled data at test time.
• Semi automated self aware algorithms, which can detect abnormal data distribution
shifts, at test time.
• Maintaining multiple backup models, which can provide prediction when the main
model gets attacked.
• Ability to use a stream labeling budget effectively and to distribute the budget ap-
propriately, to detect and fix attacks. Thereby, managing human involvement in the
process.
• Understanding attack vulnerabilities on classifiers, from a purely data driven perspec-
tive, to effectively test the security measures employed.
This work takes steps towards an integrated approach of machine learning security,
under the canopy of Dynamic Adversarial Mining. Our work aims to encourage further
awareness and interest in the need for a dynamic security paradigm, by bringing together
ideas from the domains of Streaming data and Cybersecurity.
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Figure 1.4: The field of Dynamic Adversarial Mining, derives from the concepts of Machine
learning, Stream data mining and Cybersecurity.
1.4 Dissertation overview and major contributions
In this dissertation, we present approaches for dealing with adversarial drift in ma-
chine learning systems, when used in vulnerable application domains. We start by demon-
strating shortcomings in current usage of machine learning based classification techniques,
by developing an exploratory attack simulation framework. We then propose an unsuper-
vised drift detection methodology, capable of detecting data distribution changes, with a
low false alarm rate. The specific nature of adversarial environment and the impact of the
Defender’s decision, on the space of possible attacks, is demonstrated next. Based on lessons
learned from these works, we develop a dynamic security system which combines proactive
and reactive security paradigms, for providing long term security in Dynamic-Adversarial
environments. Detailed layout of the thesis is presented next.
Chapter 2 presents the background related work on the security of machine learning.
Two schools of thought are identified in literature: The Proactive security community, which
wants to delay attacks, and the Reactive security community, which wants to recover from
attacks swiftly. Survey of existing approaches in both these areas is presented and the need
for an integrated approach is highlighted. Also, work on multiple classifier systems and
their advantages, to both proactive and reactive security, is presented.
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The vulnerabilities of machine learning to exploratory attacks, at test time, is em-
pirically evaluated and studied in Chapter 3. This chapter presents the adversary’s view of
machine learning based defense, and presents data driven techniques, which an adversary
could use to circumvent these defenses. The Seed-Explore-Exploit (SEE) framework is pro-
posed, as a way to simulate attacks on black box classifier models. Two attack techniques
are presented under the SEE framework: The Anchor Points (AP) attack and the Reverse
Engineering (RE) attacks. These attacks represent different attacker goals, resources and
effects; and are evaluated on 10 real world datasets. Additionally, metrics to evaluate qual-
ity of attacks, based on attack accuracy and diversity, are proposed and evaluated, to better
understand adversary goals, capabilities and intentions.
As explained in Section 1.2, attacks on machine learning systems are a special case of
concept drift. Detecting these concept drifts is a challenging task, as labeling is scarce and
expensive, in a streaming cybersecurity application. Chapter 4 presents an unlabeled drift
detection methodology, which reduces the dependence on labeled samples. The proposed
Margin Density Drift Detection (MD3) algorithm is a distribution independent, classifier
independent, robust and streaming unlabeled drift detection technique, which is shown to
have a high reliable drift detection rate. The MD3 algorithm performs as well as the fully
labeled drift detectors, in terms of stream prediction performance. Also, the MD3 algorithm
leads to lower false alarm rate, when compared to other unlabeled drift detection methods.
This reduction in false alarm is especially useful for cybersecurity domains, where expert
intervention is limited by time and resources. Lower false alarms also leads to increased
trust in the system. The presentation of the MD3 algorithm is done from a domain agnostic
perspective, making it a suitable technique for dealing with dynamics in the prediction
problem, over time.
In Chapter 5, the impact of the Defender’s classifier design, on the adversarial capa-
bilities at test time, is analyzed. In particular, existing design strategies of- Restrictive one
class classifiers, Robust majority voted classifiers, and Randomization based classifier; are
shown to exhibit shortcomings in Dynamic-Adversarial environments. The idea of attack
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Detect-ability and Recover-ability, are highlighted as essential requirements for dynamic
environments. Based on this analysis, a novel feature importance hiding design is proposed
for better long term reactive security.
Based on insights we obtained about the nature of data driven adversarial activities
(Chapter 3, Chapter 5), and the ability to detect unlabeled changes efficiently (Chapter 4),
we propose the development of a dynamic security framework, in Chapter 6. The proposed
Predict-Detect streaming classifier framework, relies on the motivation that adversarial con-
cept drift is dependent on the learned model. As such, the framework aims to mislead
attackers, by goading them to affect feature honeypots left in the trained classifier. Thus
allowing them to be detected easily, using unlabeled samples. The framework also provides
benefits for active learning, for better retraining after attacks. It provides for a novel adver-
sarial aware drift handling system, which is designed to be extensible and customize-able,
to suit different design needs. Concluding remarks and potential future work, is presented
in Chapter 7.
The major contributions of this dissertation are:
• Demonstrating vulnerability of black box classifier systems, to adversarial test time
evasion samples. A data driven framework is presented, for white hat analysis and
systematic testing of adversarial capabilities and impact.
• A reliable unsupervised drift detection framework, for effective signaling of significant
performance affecting concept drifts from unlabeled streaming data. The framework
is developed to be domain agnostic and classifier type independent, for generalized
usage in dynamic environments.
• Detailed evaluation of the impact of classifier design, on the adversarial capabilities
at test time. The idea of feature importance hiding is demonstrated as a veritable
solution to ensure continued usage in adversarial drifting environments.
• An adversarial aware drift detection framework, which can provide unsupervised indi-
cation of adversarial activity for deployed classifier models. The first of it’s kind anal-
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ysis of simulated adversarial drift generation and handling, in a continuous streaming
environment, is presented.
• Foundations and extensible experimental frameworks, for work in the new interdisci-
plinary area of Dynamic Adversarial Mining, where a holistic approach to security is
demonstrated to be effective for long term security.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF WORK ON THE SECURITY OF MACHINE LEARNING
Cybersecurity systems, by their very nature, are in a never ending arms race between
the attacker and the system defender (Figure 2.1). In a cyclic process, the defender tries
to make attack resistant systems, while the attacker continuously tries to find and exploit
design flaws [49]. This warrants a dynamic view of the security problem (i.e., as an online
system capable of learning and adapting to changes over time), instead of trying to find
a one shot solution. The recent popularity of machine learning in cybersecurity domains
(e.g., spam classification, CAPTCHA systems, Intrusion detection), has garnered interest
in its security properties, from various viewpoints [52, 67–69]. The current research in the
domain of machine learning security can be broadly divided into two school of thoughts: a)
Proactive security and b) Reactive security [66, 68].
Proactive security is aimed at anticipating adversary strategies and making systems
resistant to possible attacks [70–76]. These methods focus on the Prevention component of
the attack-defense cycle (Figure 2.1), with the aim of delaying an attack till the maximum
possible extent. As shown in Figure 2.2) a), these defensive measures aim at increasing
the attackers effort δP , which is needed to degrade the target system’s performance (evade
the system). Model performance is given by the correct classification capability of the
defender’s model, and is typically measured using metrics such as: Accuracy, F-score, Pre-
cision and Recall. Work on proactive security views the attack-defense problem as a static
one, with the intention of bolstering defenses before deploying the system. The goal of these
approaches is to make the system stay active for a long period of time, with less frequent
human supervision and reduced susceptibility to most attacks. However, effects of system
attacks and fixing the system following an attack, are not discussed or analyzed by works
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Figure 2.1: The Attack-Defense cycle between adversaries and system designers (i.e., de-
fenders).
on proactive security.
While works on proactive security emphasize on the prevention problem, Reactive
security focuses on the problem of fixing the system after it is attacked [68, 77]. Reactive
security emphasizes on the Detection phase of the attack-defenses cycle (Figure 2.1). These
approaches aim at being able to swiftly detect attacks and fix the system, with limited hu-
man supervision, to make the system available and effective again. As shown in Figure 2.2)
b), these measures aim at reducing the delay δR, which is the time taken by the system
to detect degradation and fix (retrain) the model. Works in the area of concept drift de-
tection and adaptation are suitable for reactive security, as they do not make any explicit
assumption about the type of change and aim at maintaining high model performance, over
time [59,78,79].
Proactive security and Reactive security, are the different paradigms for securely
using machine learning in an adversarial environment. An analogy to explain the two is:
Consider the task of securing a precious artifact. Proactive security aims at securing the
vault in which the artifact is kept- by making thicker walls, by setting up barricades, chains
and locks, and by keeping track of suspects who have a history of theft. On the other hand,
Reactive security would concentrate its efforts on setting up surveillance and alarm systems,
so as to be able to apprehend the thief easily, if at all a larceny is attempted. While proactive
security might seem to be an obvious choice, this is not always the case [68]. Proactive
security relies on making explicit assumption about the adversary’s behavior, its reward
function, objectives and rationality. They are suited for prevention against catastrophic
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(a) Proactive security aims at increase time and
effort needed(δP ) to degrade a model
(b) Reactive security aims at reduce the time
taken to detect attacks and fix them(δR)
Figure 2.2: Goals of Proactive and Reactive Security.
events, which would lead to a sudden and total collapse of the system [68]. However, in
most cases, Reactive security can perform equally well, without making limiting assumptions
about the type of attacks, and by using fewer resources. In [68], it was suggested that
security officers should concentrate effort on monitoring tools, to detect attacks, and on
agile teams, to deals with an attack swiftly. While both schools of thought (Proactive and
Reactive) are effective in dealing with a portion of the attack-defense cycle, a combined
approach is needed. A practical cybersecurity system should take into account the dynamic
and temporal nature of the problem, integrating proactive measures to delay attacks and
reactive measures to swiftly detect vulnerabilities and recover from it. Effective involvement
of human in the loop, to ensure detection and recovery, is also an essential consideration
for such a system [61].
This chapter presents related work in the field of Proactive security and Reactive
security, for dealing with exploratory attacks [41]. Section 2.1 presents works related to
Proactive security. Works related to streaming data and reactive security approaches are
presented in Section 2.2. Use of Multiple Classifier Systems(MCS) as a popular tool in
cybersecurity streaming applications is discussed in Section 2.3. Chapter summary and
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main takeaways is presented in Section 2.4.
2.1 Related work on proactive cybersecurity
Proactive security techniques have been developed for both: a) Causative attacks
and b) Exploratory attacks. Causative attacks are caused by attackers affecting the training
dataset [52, 54, 67], by techniques such as poisoning [80] and label flipping [55, 67], or by
misleading the learning process, using red herring attacks [41]. These attacks poison the
datasets, by adding samples which disproportionately move the classifier boundary [1]. An
example of this is illustrated in Figure 2.3, where a one class outlier detector is gradually
shifted, over several iterations, by introducing samples close to its boundaries. Defense
against causative attacks are aimed at increasing the robustness of the learning model,
so that it is not affected by small number of injected malicious samples and noise. The
Reject On Negative Impact (RONI) is a popular defense strategy against causative attacks.
RONI aims to remove samples with high influence on the classification boundary, before
the training is performed [41]. This ensures that training is not driven by a handful of
influential samples. Other techniques aimed at dealing with causative attacks use game
theory models to ascertain the optimal strategy of the defender, knowing the adversary’s
optimal strategy [70, 81–83]. In an iterative manner, the attacker modifies attack samples
(constrained such that the original malicious content is not lost), while the classifier is
retrained to correctly classify them. The modeling is done as Nash and Stackelberg games
in [84,85]. Equilibrium state is found, such that the utility of both- the defender (aiming to
obtain maximum training accuracy) and the attacker (aiming to increase evasion by minimal
modifications), is balanced, with each party having complete awareness of the other. The
learned model is assumed to provide security for a long period of time, as it is secure against
a rational adversary, who aims to minimize its effort needed to attack models. However,
such approaches have the disadvantage of needing to specify the exact payoff function for
the two parties. Also, these approaches are not scalable to large amounts of data.
Exploratory attacks affect the performance of the classifier at test time, by means
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Figure 2.3: Causative attacks causing the one-class classifier to shift. G and G’ are goals of
the adversary, who intends to move the classifier boundary over time [1].
of crafted test samples aimed at evading the defender’s model. Evasion is performed by
means of partial reverse engineering of the model (using probes), to understand its working
and parameters. This information is then used to modify adversarial attack samples, so
that they will be classified as legitimate by the defender model [5, 51, 69, 86]. Works aimed
at securing machine learning systems at test time can be divided into two categories: a)
Complex learning methods and b) Disinformation methods. These categories of attacks are
discussed in the following sections.
2.1.1 Security based on learning of complex models
These methods increase the complexity of the learned model, to make it harder for an
attacker to effectively reverse engineer it with a limited number of probes. The complexity
is increased either by using difficult to mimic features in the classification model [2], or by
balancing weights across features, such that the resulting classification models are robust
[2, 71, 87]. Such robust classifiers require the adversary to reverse engineer and mimic a
large number of features, thereby increasing its efforts and cost, to successfully evade the
classifier. A practical challenge that these methods face is the balancing of complexity with
overfitting, as overfitting can lead to poor generalization performance and also make the
system vulnerable to causative attacks [41].
Complexity of the models can be increased systematically, by distributing weights
among informative features, to make a classifier robust [2]. In [88], feature reweighing
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was used by weighting every feature inversely based on their importance. This made the
classification boundary dependent on a larger number of features, thereby requiring attacks
to spend more effort in trying to evade the classifier. In [89], the task of selecting a reduced
feature subset in an adversarial environment was presented. Classification security was
introduced as a regularization term, in the learning objective function of the defender’s
model. This term was optimized along with the classifier’s generalization capability, during
the feature selection process, making it more secure against evasion attacks on reduced
feature spaces. In [90], an adversarial aware SVM was proposed, which considers two types
of attacks: a) Free range attacks, where adversaries can freely move in the dataspace, and b)
Restrained attacks, where an adversary incurs cost based on distance from existing samples.
By incorporating possible moves of the adversary, as constraints to the SVM optimization
function and by modifying its loss function, a resilient SVM model was trained. It was also
shown that an overly pessimistic view of attacks can lead to poor performance, as attacks in
practicality are much weaker. Robustness to random feature deletion at test time, caused
by noise or by adversarial reverse engineering, was introduced in [83]. It was shown that the
proposed methodology was resistant to changes caused by random feature deletion and also
to, a reasonable extent, those caused by deletion based on feature importance. In [75] the
predictive defense algorithm was proposed, which adds regularization terms in the min-max
formulation of the objective function, to model adversary actions in aggressively reduced










T (xi + a))
]
(2.1)
Where, the loss function represent misclassification rate and w represents the learned
model of the defender. The attacker attempts to circumvent the defender by using a lin-
ear transform vector a ∈ Rd. The terms α and β denote the regularization imposed on
attackers and defenders, respectively. The term α embodies the effort of an attacker, which
increases based on the distance from existing samples. The term β denotes the defenders
need to avoid overfitting to the data. By incorporating both regularization terms into the
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optimization function, this method makes it harder for an adversary to apply a simple linear
transformation on a few features of malicious samples, to get them classified as Legitimate
by the defender model. The use of this game theoretic formulation to the problem was
shown to outperform a naive Bayes classifier, used as gold standard, for the task of spam
classification with reduced feature space.
While the above methods rely on adding robustness to the training of a single classi-
fier, it was shown in [72,87,91] that combining classifiers trained on different subsets of the
data is more suitable to the task of security. Multiple Classifier Systems (MCS) [4] allow
classifiers trained on different subsets of the feature space to be combined in a natural way,
to provide an overall robust classification prediction. In [72], instance bagging and random
subspace methods were analyzed, as two MCS approaches, for securing against evasion
attacks. It was found that both approaches make the evasion problem harder for the adver-
sary. In particular, random subspace models are more suitable when a very small number
of features exhibit high discriminating capability, whereas bagging works better when the
weights are already evenly distributed among the features. These methods essentially have
the effect of averaging over the feature weights, as models trained on different views of the
problem space are aggregated to present the final result [87]. Related work in [5], provides
an empirical evaluation of the evasion hardness, by computing adversary effort needed to
launch gradient descent evasion attacks on the learning model. Theoretical proofs for ef-
fectiveness of MCS was presented in [73]. It was shown that arbitrary conjunctions and
disjunctions of individual linear classifiers, makes probing attacks by an adversary expo-
nentially expensive. It was also shown that models trained on disjoint subsets of the feature
space are theoretically equivalent, in their vulnerability to evasion attacks, as compared to
linear models. Heterogeneous combination of one class and binary classifiers, to produce
an evasion resistant model, has shown to balance high accuracy with improved security, in
works of [92].
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Figure 2.4: Amount of information known by an adversary. F denotes Feature space
information, C is information about Classifier used and T is information about training
set. O is outlier information [2].
2.1.2 Security based on disinformation
These methods rely on the concept of ‘Security by obscurity’, and they are aimed
at confusing the adversary about the internal state of the system [66]. The inability of
the adversary to accurately ascertain the internal state would then result in increased de-
lay/effort for performing the attack. Popular principles for applying disinformation based
security are: Randomization [48], Use of honeypots [93], Information hiding [94] and Ob-
fuscation [1]. An example obfuscation technique used in case of a classifier filter, is one
where the classifier would output correct prediction with a probability of 0.8, in an at-
tempt to sacrifice accuracy to provide security. Ideally, hiding all information about the
feature space and classification model could result in complete security. However, this goes
against the Kerchkoff’s principles of information security [95,96], which states that security
should not rely overly on obscurity and that one should always assume that the adversary
knows the system. The amount of information known by the adversary was formalized
in [2], as shown in Figure 2.4. Here, F denotes information about the feature space, C
denotes classifier parameters learned and T denotes the training dataset. The amount of
information known by an adversary is given by the different regions of Figure 2.4, and it
can range from limited information, such as only the feature information known (F ), to
complete symmetry between the defender and the adversary (FTC, where feature space,
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training data and classifier trained is known by the adversary). While, the training set and
classifier information can be assumed to be kept safe, by advanced database security and
encryption methods [97], information of the feature space should be assumed to be known
by the adversary. This information could be ascertained from publicly available information
from related applications, or by educated guessing, by the adversary. The information dis-
tribution representation of Figure 2.4, provides a formal mechanism to specify constraints
within which the adversarial analysis is done, for systematic evaluation and assessment of
application needs and defense capabilities.
When disinformation relies on obfuscation, the amount of information made avail-
able to the adversary is not limited, but obtaining the information is made harder [74].
Randomization is a popular approach to ensure that information presented is garbled. A
simple strategy for introducing randomization into the classification process was proposed
in [1], where it was suggested that randomness be introduced in placing the boundary of the
classifier. This was made possible by using the confidence estimate given by a probabilistic
classifier, to randomly pick the class labels. While this increases the evasion efforts neces-
sary, it leads to a drop in accuracy in non adversarial environments. A detailed analysis of
this tradeoff was presented in [6], where a family of robust SVM models were learned and
used to increase reverse engineering effort. A semi definite programming formulation was
used to learn a family of SVM classifiers, wherein any single classifier could be picked at
random to perform the classification with high accuracy, at any given time. It was shown
that a high variance in the distribution of classifiers is possible without incurring loss in pre-
dictive performance of the classifier. Using evasion accuracy and deviation in the learned
model, it was shown that the proposed model was able to mislead the adversary better
than [1], without any significant drop in accuracy in normal adversarial environments.
The work in [6] showed that choosing a single classifier is a suboptimal strategy,
and that drawing classifiers from a distribution with large variance can improve resistance
to reverse engineering, at little cost to the generalization performance of the model. This
idea has also been used in multiple classifier systems, where a random classifier is selected
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at any given time, from a bag of trained classifiers, to perform the classification. The
moving target approach of [98], divides features in K subsets and trains one classifier on
each of these subsets. One of these classifiers is chosen, according to a scheduling policy,
to perform the classification of an incoming sample x. It was shown that using a random
uniform scheduling policy provides the best protection against an active adversary. This
was formally proven in [76], where it was shown that the optimal randomization strategy is
to select classifiers randomly with equal probabilities. In case of targeted attacks, selecting
uniformly was shown to be the best strategy, whereas no randomization was the optimal
strategy in the face of indiscriminate attacks. Although the ideas of [98] and [76] are
applicable to multiple classifier systems, experimental results were shown only on a set of
two separately trained classifiers. Obtaining multiple sets of classifiers, with high accuracy,
was not discussed. The work of [91] uses the multiple classification system formulation,
by maintaining a large set of classifier models and with randomization being performed,
by assigning a different weighting scheme to the individual classifier’s prediction, for every
iteration. Experimentation was performed on the Spamassassin dataset, by pre-selecting
100 weighting schemes and allowing the classifier to choose any one of them with equal
probability, over different iterations. This resulted in increased hardness of evasion of the
classifier under simulated attacks.
While randomization is a popular method for incorporating obscurity against eva-
sion attacks, other methods have been suggested [66]. Limiting the feedback or providing
incorrect feedback, to combat probing attacks have been suggested in [1]. Use of honeypots
is another promising direction, wherein systems are designed for the sole purpose of being
attacked and thereby providing information about attackers [93]. Use of social honeypots
was suggested in [99], as a means of collecting adversarial samples about social spam. Bots
which behave as humans are deployed in the social cyber-space, specifically tested on Mys-
pace and Twitter data in [99], where they collect information about potential spammers.
Although a lot of recent work has been performed in the domain of security of ma-
chine learning, there is still a long way to go before security is ingrained into the learning
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task. A move towards ‘security by design’ [52] is necessary to ensure that the algorithms are
secure by their very nature, instead of external shields introduced as a last resort. While
traditional machine learning is concerned only with a good generalization over the data, this
might not be an optimal strategy if adversarial activity is expected. As shown in [37], a sim-
pler good fit to a small set of homogeneous data generates high accuracy (for the application
of detecting malicious crowdsourcing campaigns), but also makes the same model vulnera-
ble and easier to evade. On the other hand, work in [100] has shown that over-fitted models
leads to data leakage and privacy issues. There is a need to balance generalization with
security, especially in the domain of cybersecurity, where machine learning is introduced
primarily to ensure security. Work done by [6, 101], are first steps towards understand-
ing the accuracy-security trade-off and the practicality of applying machine learning in an
adversarial environment.
2.2 Related work on reactive cybersecurity
Adversarial learning is a cyclic process, as described in Figure 2.1 and in [49]. Attacks
are a question of when and not if. Proactive measures of security delay the occurrence of
attack, but eventually every system is vulnerable to attack. These measures do not provide
any direction or solution for dealing with attacks and for fixing the system for future use,
after it has been attacked. They are static one shot solutions, which drop the ball as soon
as a system is compromised. Reactive system on the other hand, can deal with attacks
after their onset and aim to fix the system as soon as possible. Work in [68] shows that,
in the absence of prior information about adversaries, reactive system performs as good as
a proactive security setting and is a suggested security infrastructure for industrial scale
systems. Reactive systems can also ensure that attacks are recognized and alerted, to take
appropriate counter measures.
Reactive methods have primarily been studied in the domain of streaming data
mining, where changes to the data, called concept drift, are detected and the system is
adapted to maintain performance over time [58]. In these techniques, the system is agnostic
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to the cause of change and treats any degradation in its performance in a similar way. As
such they are reactive but not necessarily adversary aware [81]. The work in [59] summarizes
the major frameworks, methodologies and algorithms developed for handling concept drift.
A trigger based concept drift handling approach [60] consists of two important components:
a) A drift detection module, and b) A drift adaptation module. The drift detection module is
responsible for detecting changes in the data and to signal further evaluation or adaptation
based on the detected changes. The adaptation module then launches retraining of the
system, by collecting new labeled data and updating the model. Ensemble techniques are
a popular choice for drift handling systems, as they allow modular retraining of the system
[102]. Ensemble methods have been proposed for drift detection [103] and for learning with
concept drift [78, 79].
An important consideration while applying drift handling techniques to the domain
of cybersecurity, is the need to work with limited labeled data. Labeling is expensive, time
consuming and in some cases not a possibility at all. The scale of modern day machine
learning system makes excessive dependence on labeled samples unpractical [61]. Several
methods in the concept drift literature have worked on this problem by suggesting partially
labeled approaches, which selectively label samples (based on a labeling budget) while still
maintaining high performance. These techniques have been studied under the online active
learning domain, where the task of identifying and labeling the most informative samples
is shown to produce good prediction performance with low labeling rates [104–106]. Use
of semi supervised methods in [103], emphasize the effective retraining of classifiers after
obtaining a few labeled samples from the active learning approaches. In a parallel line of
work, methods in [64,107] aim at reducing label dependence by making the drift detection
phase totally unsupervised. While labeling cannot be avoided for retraining, drift detection
from unlabeled data is shown to be an effective surrogate to approaches relying on labeled
data [63]. Recent works on using unlabeled approaches to handle retraining, as well, have
been proposed in [108]. However, these techniques make limiting assumptions on the type
and nature of drifts, to make it applicable to such latent updates. Only drift in existing
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Figure 2.5: Cascaded classifier. Majority of good samples are filtered out by a high recall
coarse model (left) and the per class classifier then detects specific hard to detect malicious
classes(right) [3].
classes with slow changes over time, are possible to detect using these approaches [109].
Another consideration in applying streaming data techniques to cybersecurity, is the
ability to deal with imbalanced data. In real world applications, data about normal behavior
is plentiful, while abnormal/malicious behavior tends to be sparse [3]. This could be natural
or intentional, as an attacker wants to avoid being detected. Dealing with imbalanced
data is not an easy task [110], and it is made challenging with the added constraints on
labeling and the effects of concept drift. Methods for dealing with streaming imbalanced
data, combine active learning with efficient archiving of labeled samples, to ensure drifts
are detected and new models can be retrained [111, 112]. The Reduced Labeled Sampling
(RLS) technique of [112] labels samples based on their distance to the support vectors
and also to existing minority class samples, to detect drift. Balancing class distributions,
during retraining, is done using the Synthetic Minority Oversampling (SMOTE) approach.
SMOTE performs convex combination of minority class samples, to generate additional
samples. The techniques of [111, 112] performs rebalancing by adding archived minority
class samples, closest to the current samples, into the training set. The Google’s system
for detecting adversarial web advertisements [3], tackles the problem of data skewness in a
multiclass imbalanced data environment. By using a one-vs-good scheme, a coarse model
is first used to identify if a samples is malicious or legitimate, and then a fine grained
model separates each of the difficult classes in data. A cascaded layout of the coarse model
(Figure 2.5), to weed out definitely good samples, followed by per class filters, was found
to be effective. As in Figure 2.5, the coarse model is able to account for a majority of the
samples, but fine grained distributions of the minority class are better captured by the local
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models. Additionally in [3], expert feedback was incorporated, for detecting emerging bad
ads, by using uncertainty based active learning [104]. Active learning on imbalanced data,
can be unfruitful in detecting minority class samples. As such, the proposed system used
a search based interface to allow experts to perform guided searches in real time, to find
minority samples denoting new attack vectors, based on their intuition. A similar search
based algorithm was presented in [113], which divides the data space into grids and then
performs uniform guided sampling within grids to detect minority class samples.
At the confluence of concept drift and adversarial learning, are the approaches of
adversarial drift [114] and adversarial active learning [115]. In [114], concept drift caused
as a result of attacks, was discussed. The need for a responsive system, with the integra-
tion of traditional blacklists and whitelists, alongside an ensemble of classifiers trained for
every class of malicious activity, was proposed. Additionally, emphasis was made on closing
the semantic gap between classification and actionable feedback, by allowing attacks and
changes to be described and explained, not just classified. Isolation of malicious campaign
and techniques to ensure zero training error, while still maintaining generalization, were
extensions suggested for traditional classification systems when used in an adversarial envi-
ronment. The vulnerabilities of the labeling process were analyzed in [115], which introduces
the concept of adversarial active learning. Adversarial environments can affect the selec-
tive labeling process, by means of providing malicious labels to mislead the detection and
retraining process. The Security oriented Active Learning Test bed (SALT) was proposed
in [115], to ensure effective drift management, human integration and querying strategies,
in an adversarial environment. Use of concept drift tracking within malware families was
analyzed in [116], to show the temporal nature of adversarial samples. Metafeatures (higher
order difficult to evade) were suggested, to detect malicious activity. Use of an ensemble
of classifier to detect spam emails was suggested in [117], where mutual agreement of pairs
of classifiers in the ensemble was tracked and concept drift was detected if the agreement
drops. In the event of a drift detection, poorly performing pairs of classifiers are selected
to be retrained. Extension of this work was proposed in [53], where the entire ensemble’s
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disagreement score distribution was tracked. A sudden increase in the overall disagreement
was used to indicate an attack on the system, without using external labeled data. Here,
feature bagging [118] was found to be an effective ensemble strategy to detect evasion at-
tacks, such as mimicry and reverse mimicry attacks, on the task of classifying malicious pdf
documents. These works provide initial ideas for using machine learning in an adversarial
environment, where the data is streaming and the attacks-defense is a cyclic never ending
process.
The reactive approaches have been well studied towards an online never ending learn-
ing scheme. When applied to the domain of cybersecurity, the adversarial cycle demands
reactivity, to ensure that attacks do not leave the system totally useless. Security is dy-
namic (Figure 2.1), as such an holistic detection, updating and learning pipeline is needed.
However, the current methods for reactive security do not explicitly consider an adversarial
environment, even though a dynamic environment is considered. In adversarial domains,
concept drift (attacks) are a function of the deployed model itself, as reverse engineering
is based on what model is learned in the first place [1]. This information can be used
to design more suited reactive systems in adversarial domains. A combination of proac-
tive and reactive approaches are necessary when dealing with such domains, as decisions
made in the design phase could ultimately make future steps down the pipeline easier. For
instance, a) Honeypots can make detection and subsequent retraining easier; b) Multiple
Classifier Systems (MCS), where many disjoint models are trained simultaneously, can be
used to quickly replace a degraded model at any given time; and c) Disinformation can be
used to mislead attackers, by misrepresenting the model. Further research in this area will
need a comprehensive look at the learning process, with adversarial effects considered at
every step of the process, towards an adversarial aware dynamic learning system. This will
require newer metrics of measuring system performance, beyond accuracy and f-measure,
towards metrics such as recovery time and data separability [119], which are necessary for
subsequent cycles of the process.
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2.3 Multiple Classifier Systems (MCS) in cybersecurity
According to the ‘No free lunch’ theorem [120], in the absence of any specific domain
information, no particular classification algorithm is better than the other, on average. In
such situations, ensemble of classifiers have shown to provide better accuracy than using any
single model. Multiple classifier systems (MCS), commonly known as Classifier Ensembles,
combine predictions of several independent and diverse models, which are trained on subset
of the original training dataset. These combined classifiers are found to have superior
accuracy than a single monolithic classifier, provided the base models are unstable and each
model has accuracy better than random guessing [121]. The multiple classifier systems have
found various application in stream data mining and in cybersecurity applications, owing
to their versatility and good generalization performance [72,121,122].
Typically, MCS need to perform the following steps: Generate a large pool of clas-
sifiers, select subset of classifier and then aggregate results of the classifiers [4]. Generating
diverse classifiers, which make independent test errors, can be done by- dividing samples,
as in instance bagging, or by dividing features, as in feature bagging [123]. Selecting subset
of classifiers can be done at random or dynamically at test time, based on the temporal
performance of the models [124]. Fusion of results is either via majority voting, sequentially-
as in boosting, via stacking or by Bayesian fusion techniques [125]. The layout of a basic
MCS is shown in Figure 2.6. The incoming data samples is given to a pool of classifiers
in the ensemble, which make independent predictions on the sample. Based on the fusion
strategy, these individual predictions are then combined to provide the final prediction of
the system.
There are several advantages to using a MCS instead of a single trained monolithic
classifier. The following points elucidate the advantages of MCS as applied to a Dynamic-
Adversarial domain.
a ) Improved generalization performance: An ensemble of models trained with inde-
pendent classifiers, which make uncorrelated errors and have accuracy>0.5, when
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Figure 2.6: General setup of Multiple Classifier Systems (MCS) [4].
combined will lead to improved performance, than a single monolithic model trained
on the entire data [121]. To understand this effect, consider an ensemble for binary
classification, which combines 50 individual classifiers using majority voting. If the 50
models are different from each other and each has an error rate of 0.4, the ensemble’s
error rate (εEnsemble) is given by Equation 2.2 (derived from [121]). It is seen that







εi(1− ε)50−i = 0.07 (2.2)
b ) Improved stability-plasticity balance: While operating in an incremental online
setting, models are faced with the stability-plasticity dilemma, where models can
either retain existing knowledge or adapt to new data. Ensemble methods enable
maintaining a balance, by allowing selected classifiers to be forgotten or added to the
ensemble, to maintain reactivity or stability as desired [60]. Ensemble models can also
dynamically redistribute weights between the classifiers, in the fusion section, where
classifier can be assigned weights based on their local and temporal characteristics to
the current data in the stream [126].
c ) Modular retraining and learning: In the face of concept drift, only a subset of
the models might degrade in accuracy. Using an ensemble model, it is possible to
selectively retrain these classifiers, while keeping the others untouched. This modular
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structure also ensures that novel sub-populations in the data can be incorporated
into the existing ensemble. This is especially true for malicious campaigns, which
usually have multiple sub-populations of attacks within them. By incorporating and
tracking these populations separately, they can be effectively learned at a granular
level [78, 117].
d ) Combining heterogeneous data sources: Heterogeneous features can be combined in
a natural way in MCS. For multimodal biometric systems, models can be created for
face recognition metrics, mouse movement metrics and keystroke patterns, separately,
and then weighted and combined to produce a final prediction system [127]. The use
of MCS allows these features to be trained by their own individual suitable model.
For example, mouse movement patters may be better learned by liner model, while
face recognition could benefit from using neural networks. MCS allows flexibility in
learning these individual traits and then emphasis is made on combination of these
results, which serve as expert reviews on the same problem.
e ) Robustness: Unstable classifiers, such as decision trees and neural networks, are
sensitive to small changes in the training data [123]. This makes them vulnerable
to causative attacks, where the attacker tries to modify a few samples to mislead
the classification system [128]. MCS techniques such as instance bagging distributes
weights among the training samples, to ensure that no individual samples has a large
effect on the classification outcome [72]. This also makes the classification resistant
to noise and stray changes. Additionally, feature bagging methods adds robustness
against evasion attacks, by distributing weights among features. This will ensure that
an adversary will have to mimic a large number of features, to cause prediction errors
for the defender.
f ) Detection of changes: Classifier models when trained on individual aspects of the
feature space, as in feature bagging [123], act as a committee of independent experts
who learn the same problem with different perspectives. Any changes in the expert
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opinions is indicative of suspicious activities, as it indicates that a few of the features
have been manipulated by an adversary. This information has been used in Query By
Committee(QBC) active learning methods, to label informative samples in order to
detect changes and retrain models. This disagreement was also discussed in [53,117],
as a method to detect distribution changes from unlabeled data.
g ) Flexible defense: MCS allows for flexible implementation of defense strategies. Ran-
domization was discussed as a disinformation strategy for MCS. Randomization can
be easily implemented in MCS, by training multiple independent classifiers and ran-
domly picking one classifier at any given time to perform the prediction. In [98],
the feature set was divided into two groups and models were trained on each half.
Random uniform selection of the classifiers, led to better resistance against evasion
attacks. Similarly, maintaining a distribution of classifiers and picking one at random,
led to better resistance to reverse engineering in [6]. MCS methods could also be used
to maintain a reservoir of models, so that a degraded model can be replaced with a
pre-trained well performing model, to ensure attacks are swiftly dealt with.
h ) Parallel implementation: Ensemble methods also allow for computational advan-
tages, as multiple models can be trained on subsets of the training data, in parallel,
and can be deployed in a map reduce framework to perform scalable distributed
computation [129, 130]. Learning can also be localized to data spaces, by combin-
ing clustering with classification, to learn a different pattern for differnt regions of the
data [126]. In this way, simpler local patterns can be used to represent complex global
patterns, in a manageable way. Incoming samples can be mapped to their clusters
and then the local model can be used to perform the computation on it.
Owing to these manifold advantages, the MCS systems are promising for use in
Dynamic-Adversarial environments, for detecting and handling changes caused by an ad-
versary.
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2.4 Towards adversary aware stream data mining
From the works on security in machine learning, it can be seen that there is a need
to re-evaluate the perceived security of learning based systems, before they can be safely
deployed in vulnerable applications, such as in the domain of Cybersecurity. While existing
works on Proactive and on Reactive security have largely been carried out in isolation
from each other, there is a need for a combined dynamic view of the problem. Proactive
steps can be taken in model development, to make subsequent detection and retraining
easier. Similarly, honeypots and randomization, can be used effectively to delay the onset
of attacks.
The study of adversarial drift, as a specific case of the larger field of concept drift,
is important to understand how adversarial behavior is affected by design decisions of the
learned model. As adversarial drift is dependent on the defender’s model (which the attacker
is trying to reverse engineer and evade), it could be possible to train models to mislead
adversary, and not just improve generalization. Also, there is a need for a framework which
generates such concept drift attacks, based on the characteristics of real world datasets, so
as to test the developed security measures.
Applying streaming data drift handling techniques, in adversarial environments, will
require the development of drift detection techniques which can operate with scarcely labeled
data. These drift detectors need to have a high attack detection rate and a low false alarm
rate. This is necessary, to use human expertise efficiently and also to build trust towards
the drift signaling system. Subsequent retraining and deployment is also an area which
needs further evaluation.
Lastly, the use of multiple classifier systems (MCS) was seen to be ubiquitous in
the adversarial learning domain. Developing improvements that can use MCS to provide
dynamic security, will allow back-compatibility with the previous works and the ability to




VULNERABILITY OF CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS IN ADVERSARIAL
ENVIRONMENTS - A DATA DRIVEN FRAMEWORK FOR SIMULATING
EXPLORATORY ATTACKS
In order to understand the security of a system, it is essential to understand its
vulnerabilities. As Sun Tzu says in The Art of War- “To know your Enemy, you must
become your Enemy” [131]. This chapter analyses the adversary’s point of view of the
machine learning system. In particular, attacks on classification systems are considered,
where the attacker tries to evade the deployed classifier, by crafting samples which violate
integrity of the cybersecurity system. This chapter aims to thoroughly analyze the problem
of adversarial evasion, to serve as a basis for proposing and evaluating security measures
for machine learning based classification systems.
3.1 Exploratory attacks on black box classifiers
Machine learning systems deployed in cybersecurity domains, operate in an adver-
sarial environment, susceptible to various types of malicious activities. Exploratory attacks
are the most common and non intrusive attacks, where client systems can submit queries
(probe samples), observe the system’s response and then understand its behavior [37]. The
attacker in this case is considered to have the same access as that of any other user of the
system, and as such can perceive the system only as a black box, to which it can submit
samples, and then analyze the response on the submitted samples. In order to craft evasive
samples, the adversary starts with a reconnaissance phase, wherein it tries to learn about
the deployed system by probing it. Once the adversary has learned enough information,
Parts of this chapter are published in [8].
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it launches an attack by creating samples which the defender classifies as Legimitate, even
though they are Malicious. These attacks affect the machine learning model at test time
and as such fall under the category of exploratory attacks [52]. Exploratory attacks are
non intrusive and unpredictable, as they affect a deployed system and can be a result of
multiple adversaries, with different goals and resources, trying to break in. This chapter
analyzes the vulnerability of the black box machine learning based classification systems,
to these types of Exploratory - Integrity violating attacks.
Exploratory test time attacks are illustrated in Figure 3.1a), where the deployed
black box model of the defender (C), is left vulnerable to adversarial activity. The defender
starts by learning from the training data and then deploying the classifier C, to provide
services to the client users. Once deployed, the model C is vulnerable to adversaries, who
try to learn the behavior of the defender’s classifier by submitting probes as input samples,
masquerading as client users. The adversary views the defender’s classifier only as a black
box system, capable of providing tacit Accept/Reject feedback on the submitted samples.
An adversary, backed by the knowledge and understanding of machine learning, can use
this feedback to reverse engineer the model C (as C ′). It can then avoid detection on future
attack samples, by accordingly perturbing the input samples. These evasion attacks are non-
intrusive in nature and difficult to eliminate by traditional encryption/security techniques,
because they use the same access channels as regular input samples and they see the same
black box view of the system. From the classification perspective, these attacks occur at
test time and are aimed at increasing the false negative rate of the model (i.e., increase
the number of Malicious samples classified as Legitimate by C [1,5]). Recent works in [46],
have shown that deep neural networks are vulnerable to such adversarial perturbations.
Also, cloud based machine learning services (such as Amazon AWS Machine Learning1
and Google Cloud Platform2), which provide APIs for accessing predictive analytics as a
service, are also shown to be vulnerable to similar black box attacks in [47]. As such, a




(a) An adversary making probes to the black box model C, can learn it as C ’,
using active learning.
(b) Example task of attacking behavioral CAPTCHA. Black box model C, based
on Mouse Speed and Click Time features, is used to detect benign users from
bots. Adversary can reverse engineer C as C′, by guessing click time feature and
making probes based on the human response time chart2, using the same input
channels as regular users.
Figure 3.1: Classifiers in adversarial environment, a) shows the general adversarial nature
of the problem and b) shows an example considering a behavioral CAPTCHA system.
An example of the aforementioned adversarial environment is illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.1b), where a simple implementation of a behavioral mouse dynamics based CAPTCHA
(Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) system,
is considered. This system uses mouse movement data, to distinguish humans from bots,
and they provide a user friendly way of doing this, by not forcing users to guess com-
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Figure 3.2: Google’s reCAPTCHA system which uses mouse movement and click behavior
to identify humans1.
plicated garbled text, as in traditional text based CAPTCHA systems [31]. A prototype
system developed and analyzed in [31], used machine learning and showed over 99% ac-
curacy in detection against bots. A similar approach was used by Google, in developing
its reCAPTCHA system, shown in Figure 3.21, which relies on a simple mouse movement
and click, to provide security. In these systems, the mouse movement and click patterns
are recorded and are used to distinguish if the client request originated form a human or
a bot. The illustrative 2D model of Figure 3.1 b), shows a linear classifier trained on the
two features of - Mouse movement speed and Click time, by the defender. An adversary,
aiming to evade detection by this classifier, starts by guessing the click time as a key feature
(intuitive in this setting), and then proceeds to makes probes to the black box model C,
to learn its behavior. Probes are made by going through the spectrum of average reaction
times for humans2, guided by the Accept(green)/Reject(red) feedback from the CAPTCHA
server. The average reaction time for humans is 272ms2, with the full spectrum of response
times shown in Figure 3.1b). A bot designed to evade this classification system, could try
the different reaction times in the range of 10ms-1000ms, based on a binary search, till it
lands on a critical region which is accepted by the classifier. The Accept/Reject feedback
from the CAPTCHA server, serves as a signal to guide the search process. Once this crit-
ical region has been identified, the subsequent bots can all use this information to avoid
detection, thereby rendering the classifier useless in securing the system. This is a simplis-




deployed classifiers tend to be more complex, non linear and multidimensional. However,
the same reasoning and approach can be used to evade complex systems, as shown in this
chapter.
Exploratory attacks on deployed classification systems, presents a symmetric flip
side of the learning problem. Instead of learning from data to generate a model, the task
of attacks is to learn about the model to generate evasive data samples [94]. As such,
exploratory attacks generation is a learning process which can be analyzed from a purely
data perspective, without incorporating specific domain knowledge. With this intuitive
motivation, the Seed-Explore-Exploit (SEE) framework is presented in this chapter, which
envisions attacks as a search problem, guided by information from the deployed classifier
system. Information from the system, is obtained by crafting and submitting samples, to
observe the system’s response (Accept/Reject). In doing so, the classifier itself is considered
to be a black box, which can be probed by the adversary, as shown in Figure 3.1. It is
assumed that an adversary has a limited probing budget, which it can use to learn and then
launch attacks. This is a practical assumption, as probes require crafting of samples which
can be time taking and expensive, and also, a large number of probes could be detected and
blocked out by the cybersecurity system. Based on the probing budget available, simple
evasive attacks to more complex reverse engineering attacks can be launched under the
proposed SEE framework.
In this chapter, vulnerability to exploratory attacks is analyzed, for binary classi-
fiers. It is shown that, only information about the feature space (can be obtained from
publications/ educated guessing) is sufficient to launch attacks, which can render the classi-
fiers unusable in an adversarial environment. Additionally, the SEE framework is developed
and experimentally evaluated to understand adversarial behavior, goals and effects. The
following claims are tested in this chapter: a) Attacks can be launched on classifier, with
knowledge of the feature space only, irrespective of the type of classification model of the
defender, the training dataset and the domain of application, b) Classification accuracy, as
a metric of predictive performance, has little significance in adversarial domains, c) The
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proposed SEE framework can be used to simulate exploratory attacks on machine learn-
ing systems, ranging from simple evasion to reverse engineering of the classification model,
d) Cloud based machine-learning-as-a-service providers, providing off-the-shelf predictive
capability, are also not safe, as they can be attacked by non intrusive probing.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents background
work on simulation of exploratory attacks on classifications systems. Section 3.3 presents
the SEE attack framework with two specific implementations: a) the Anchor Points attack
and b) the Reverse Engineering attack. Experimental evaluation and results are presented
in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents experiments demonstrating vulnerability of remote
black box prediction services, particularly the Google Cloud Platform’s Prediction service.
Section 3.6 presents further discussion on the nature of attacks and the need for diversity
in attack samples. Chapter summary is presented in Section 3.7.
3.2 Related work on exploratory attacks
Once a classifier model is trained and deployed in an application, it is vulnerable to
exploratory attacks. These attacks are non intrusive and are aimed at gaining information
about the system, which is then exploited to craft evasive samples, to circumvent the sys-
tem’s security. From the classification perspective, these attacks occur at test time and are
aimed at increasing the false negative rate of the model (i.e., increase the number of Mali-
cious samples classified as Legitimate [1]). These attacks are universal and are difficult to
eliminate by traditional encryption/security techniques, because they use the same access
channels as regular input samples and see the same blackbox view of the system.
Exploratory attacks are classified as being either: Targeted or Indiscriminate, based
on the specificity of the attacks [1]. Targeted attacks aims at modifying a specific set of
malicious input samples, minimally, to disguise them as legitimate. Indiscriminate attacks
are more general in their goals, as they aim to produce any sample which will result in the
defender’s model causing a false negative. Most work on exploratory attacks are concen-
trated on the targeted case, considering it as a constrained form of indiscriminate attacks,
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Figure 3.3: Gradient descent evasion attack over 500 iterations. Left- Initial image of digit
3, Center- Image which first gets classified as 7, Right- Image after 500 iteration [5].
with the goal of starting with a malicious sample and making minimal modifications to
them, to avoid detection [5, 56, 92, 132, 133]. This idea was formalized in [51], where the
Minimal Adversarial Cost (MAC) of a genre of classifiers was introduced, to denote the
ease with which classifiers of a particular type can be evaded. The hardness of evasion
was given in term of the number of probes needed, to obtain a low cost evasive sample.
A sample’s cost was given in terms of the accuracy of evasion and the distance from the
original targeted sample from which it was evolved. A classifier is easy to evade if making
a few optimal modifications to a set of samples, results in a high accuracy of evasion. Work
in [134], shows that linear and convex inducing classifier are all vulnerable to probing based
attacks, and [135] presents efficient probing strategies to carry out these attacks.
Particular strategies developed for performing exploratory attacks vary based on
the amount of information available to the adversary, with a broad classification presented
in [6] as: a) Evasion attacks and b) Reverse Engineering attacks. Evasion attacks are used
when limited information about the system is available, such as a few legitimate samples
only. These legitimate samples are exploited by masking techniques such as- mimicking and
spoofing, which masquerade malicious content within the legitimate samples. The mimicry
attack was presented in [53], where the Mimicus tool1 was developed, to implement evasion
attacks on pdf documents by hiding malicious code within benign documents. The good
words attacks on spam emails uses a similar technique. A spam email is inserted with benign
looking words, to evade detection. For example, the word SALE when replaced with S4LE
1www.github.com/srndic/mimicus/blob/master/mimicus/attacks/mimicry.py
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looks visually similar and can avoid being flagged by the detector [56]. Similarly, spoofing
attacks are common in biometrics [136] and for phishing websites [36], where visual similarity
can be achieved with totally different content. A general purpose - domain independent
technique for evasion was presented in [133]. Here, using genetic programming, variants
of a set of malicious samples were generated, as per a monotonically increasing fitness
function which denoted success of evasion. This is an attractive technique due to its generic
approach, but limited probing budgets and lack of a graded fitness function, are some of
its practical limitations. In the presence of a higher probing budget or specific information
about the defender’s classifier model, the gradient descent evasion attack of [5], can be
used. This attacks relies on knowing the exact classifier function used by the defender, or
the ability to reverse engineer it using a sufficient number of probes. Once information
about the classifier is known, the attack uses a gradient descent strategy to find an optimal
low cost evasion sample for the classifier. Search strategies were developed for a wide range
of classifiers with differentiable decision functions, including neural networks, non-linear
support vector machines, one class classifiers and for classifiers operating in discrete feature
spaces. An illustration of the gradient descent attacks for masquerading a sample is shown
in Figure 3.3, where the image 3 is modified to be classified as 7 over 500 iterations of
gradient descent.
Reverse engineering the defender’s model provides avenues for sophisticated ex-
ploratory attacks, as it exposes features important to the classifier, to be used for mimicry
attacks or large scale indiscriminate attacks. Perfect reverse engineering is not needed,
as an adversary is interested only in identifying the portion of the data space which will
be classified as legitimate. Reverse engineering was first employed in [51], where a sign
witness test was used to see if a particular feature had a positive or negative impact on
the decision. Reverse engineering of a decision tree classifier, as a symmetric model for
defender and adversary, was presented in [69]. [133] used genetic programming as a general
purpose reverse engineering tool, under the assumption of known training data distribution
and feature construction algorithm. The genetic programming output, because of its intu-
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Figure 3.4: Illustration of reverse engineering task. Blue line marks defender’s boundary
and Red marks the adversary’s reverse engineered model [6].
itive tree structure, was then used to guide evasion attacks on Intrusion Detection Systems.
The idea of reverse engineering was linked to that of active learning via query generation
in [6], where the robustness of SVM to reverse engineering is tested using active learning
techniques of random sampling, uncertainty sampling and selective sampling. Samples were
generated by iteratively generating random samples between two known seed samples, and
then selecting samples based on the aforementioned active learning techniques. A sample
illustrative reverse engineering task is shown in Figure 3.4.
Recent works on attacking black box classifiers have been proposed in [46, 47, 100,
137]. In [46], the vulnerability of deep neural networks (DNN) was demonstrated. An
adversary starts by probing the black box classifier, and then trains a substitute DNN, as
its perception of the original data space. From the trained model, adversarial samples are
crafted such that the modifications needed for misclassification are minimized. The fast
gradient sign method [138] and the Jacobian based source-target misclassification attacks
[46], were used to generate adversarial samples. The attack strategy was shown to generate
a mis-classification rate of >88% on Amazon Web Service’s machine learning models1 and
the Google Cloud Platform’s prediction model2. The membership inference attack was
developed in [100], as a strategy to attack black box classification models. Leakage of




inputs that it trained on, versus the ones it did not train on. This was done by means of
training a set of surrogate inference models, to analyze the target black box model. The
implications of privacy were analyzed, by demonstrating the leakage on a hospital discharge
dataset, while using models trained on the Google2 and Amazon’s1 cloud prediction services.
Model extraction attacks were presented in [47], which provide a mechanism for reverse
engineering models trained using ML-as-a-service providers. A generic equation solving
methodology was introduced for models of logistic regression, and a path-finding algorithm
was introduced for reverse engineering of decision tree models. For other class of non linear
models, like neural networks and non linear SVM, a retraining approach was discussed.
Here, the adversary collects samples using active learning, and then retrains a local model
as a surrogate to the targeted models. These models are then used as white box oracles
for attacking using the sign witness test proposed in [51]. It was shown that a model
which returns only binary output, as opposed to confidence values, is more secure to model
inversion attacks. However, further analysis of this claim was left as future work.
In the above mentioned works of targeted-exploratory attacks, it is assumed that
if an evasion is expensive (far from the original malicious sample), the adversary will give
up. The above techniques are not designed for a determined adversary, who is willing to
launch indiscriminate attacks. An adversary who wants to launch an indiscriminate attack
will not bother with the near optimal evasion problem [134]. These type of attacks have
been largely ignored, with the only mention we found was in [90], where it is termed -
the free range attack, as an adversary is free to move about in the data space. In such
attacks, the adversary will first analyze the vulnerabilities of the model, looking for pre-
diction blind spots, before attempting an attack. Analyzing performance of models under
such attack scenarios is essential to understanding its vulnerabilities in a more general real
world situation, where all types of attacks are possible. Also, most recent methodologies
develop attacks as an experimental tool to test their safety mechanisms, there are a few
works [5,43,46,47,69,100,132,137,139], which have attempted to study the attack generation
process itself. Our proposed work analyzes Indiscriminate-Exploratory-Integrity violating
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attacks, in a data driven framework, with different adversarial goals and their impact on
classification security. We analyze the attacks from an adversary’s point of view, consid-
ering the adversarial samples generation process, so as to understand the vulnerabilities of
classifiers and to motivate the development of secure machine learning architectures.
3.3 Framework for simulating data driven attacks on classifiers
The proposed Seed-Explore-Exploit (SEE) framework, for generating exploratory
attacks, is a machine learning driven framework which operates under the assumption of
minimal shared knowledge between the adversary and the defender. Only the feature space
information is shared between the two parties, as both operate on the same features and
are aware of: the number, type and range of features. All other information, about training
data and learned model, is kept hidden by the defender [2]. Both the adversary and the
defender are assumed to be capable data scientists, who are equipped with the tools of
machine learning and use a data driven approach to best suit their goals. The SEE frame-
work is presented in Section 3.3.1. Two specific attack strategies developed using the SEE
framework, the Anchor Points attacks (AP) and the Reverse Engineering attacks (RE), are
presented in Section 3.3.2 and Section 3.3.3, respectively.
3.3.1 The Seed-Explore-Exploit (SEE) framework
The SEE framework provides guideline for implementing a search based methodol-
ogy, to generate attacks against classification systems. The idea of Exploration-Exploitation
is common in search based optimization techniques, where the goal is to learn the data space
and then emphasize only on the promising directions [140]. Formally, the defender’s clas-
sifier model C, is considered to divide the entire data space into the Legitimate class and
the Malicious class, with the aim of maximizing prediction metrics, such as accuracy. A
data driven adversary, will gather information about C by using probing samples, which it
crafts to best explore the behavior of C. This information is then exploited by the adversary
to generate a set of attack samples D′Attack, which increases C ’s false negative rate. The
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Figure 3.5: Overview of the SEE framework.
formal model of an adversary based on its knowledge, goals and resources [66] is presented
below:
• Knowledge: Adversary is aware of the number, type and range of feature values.
These could be approximated from publications, publicly available case studies or
by educated guessing [2]. For example, in case of spam emails, the domain is the
dictionary of words, which is publicly well known. No information about classifier
type or training data is known.
• Goals: Adversary intends to produce false negatives for C. Additionally, the attacker
wants to avoid being detected and stopped by simple blacklisting techniques [141].
This is ensured by generating attack samples set (D′Attack) with high diversity. While,
repeating a single attack sample, over and over, leads to ensured false negative, such
attacks are easily detected and stopped. Diversity ensures variability in attack sam-
ples. Only serious attackers, who aim to force redesign of system, are considered.
• Resources: The attacker has access to defense system, as a client user. The attacker
can submit samples to be labeled by C, up to a probing budget BExplore, without
being detected.
Based on this model of the adversary, the SEE framework is presented in Figure 3.5.
The framework begins with a seed phase, where it receives a small set of samples from
either class. In the exploration phase, the attacker performs systematic search inorder to
obtain maximum information from a limited probing budget. Once the exploration phase
is complete, the attacker will launch an exploratory attack against C, where it will send the
set of attack samples (D′Attack) to the classifier. The adversary’s goal is to have a high false
negative rate for the D′Attack set and to make it have high variability. An example of the
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Figure 3.6: Depiction of Exploration and Exploitation steps in evading the Perspective
API.1
exploration and exploitation operations is illustrated in Figure 3.6. The Perspective API1,
which measures toxicity of online comments, is used for the evaluation. The API provides
a simple text box interface to an end user, to enter the comments and assess its toxicity.
As such it is a black box and remote ML based system. In Figure 3.6, it is seen that an
adversary realizing the toxicity of the keywords ’morons’ and ’iditos’, is able to modify them
to be ’m0ron’ and ’1diots’, respectively, to enable evasion. These modifications retain the
original intent of the comment, as humans can infer these modifications due to their visual
similarities, but a text analysis based ML model is easily fooled by such perturbations. The
SEE framework provides a systematic methodology to enable exploration and exploitation,
on black box classifiers. The specific steps of the framework are explained below:
1. Seed: An attack starts with a seed phase, where it acquires a legitimate sample (and
a malicious sample), to form the seed set D′Seed. This seed sample can be acquired
either by random sampling in the feature space, by guessing a few of the feature values,
or from an external data source of a comparable application. Random guessing is
possible only when the prediction surface is not too restrictive and when the attack
domain is small (difficult in case of one class classifiers, which occupy a small portion
of the feature space) [37]. However, in most cases, acquiring a sample by guessing
or from an external source is not difficult. For a behavioral CAPTCHA system [31],
the adversary could solve it themselves and record their movements to serve as seed.
1https://www.perspectiveapi.com/
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Similarly, picking any email from ones personal inbox would be a functional legitimate
seed.
2. Explore: The seed set D′Seed, serves as a basis for starting the exploration of the fea-
ture space. Exploration is a reconnaissance task, where the goal is to obtain maximum
diverse information, to understand the coverage and extent of the space of legitimately
classified samples, without being detected. As such, a budget constraint BExplore is
introduced, to limit the number of times the defense model C can be queried without
being thwarted or detected. To avoid detection, it is natural that the adversary will
spread out these attacks over time and space, in which case the BExplore term denotes
the time/resources an attacker has at its disposal. Exploration can be performed to
either directly reverse engineer the model’s boundary, or to obtain a set of benign
samples which serve as ground truth attack points. The exploration phase results in
a set of labeled samples D′Explore, and the goal of the adversary is to best choose this
set based on its strategy.
3. Exploit: The information gathered from the Exploration phase, is used in this phase
to generate a set of attack samples- the D′Attack set, to be used by the adversary
in their current attack campaign. D′Attack should have a high evasion rate and high
diversity to be effective.
The SEE framework provides a generic way of defining attacks on machine learning
systems. It serves as a blueprint, based on which a data driven attack can be generated on a
classification system. Specific instantiations of the Seed, Explore and Exploit phases can be
developed, to suit one’s needs or simulation goals. We provide two specific strategies based
on the SEE framework: the Anchor Points (AP) approach and the Reverse Engineering (RE)
approach, which embody different levels of sophistication of the adversary, the amount of
damage they wish to cause, and the BExplore they have at their disposal.
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3.3.2 The Anchor Points (AP) attack
The Anchor Points attack is suited for adversaries which have a limited probing
budget (BExplore), and have a primary aim of generating evasive samples for immediate
benefits. An example would be zero day exploits [142], where the adversary wants to
quickly exploit a new found vulnerability, before it’s fixed. From a data perspective, these
attacks start by obtaining a set of diverse samples, classified as legitimate by the defender’s
model C. These points, called Anchor Points, then serve as gold standards, denoting the
space of legitimately classified data. Attacks are generated by exploiting this ground truth
and by generating attacks around them. For example, an adversary would start with a set
of benign personal emails and then generate attacks by modifying certain words in these
emails so as to impart malice. By the nature of these attacks, they could be thwarted by
blacklists, which use approximate matching [141]. Nevertheless, they serve as a quick way
to generate attacks, in complex classification spaces. The implementation of these attacks
as per the SEE framework is presented here:
1. Seed: The AP attack needs only a single legitimate sample as seed, to serve as the
initial anchor point. This forms the seed set D′Seed.
2. Explore: The exploration phase proceeds by generating variants of the seed, by
performing a neighborhood search, to produce samples which would have a high chance
of being classified as legitimate, as shown in Algorithm 3.1. The exploration phase
generates the set of anchor points D′Explore, to be used in the exploitation phase. The
exploration phase is described in Algorithm 3.1, and is a radius based incremental
neighborhood search technique, around the seed samples, guided by the feedback from
the black box model C. Diversity of search is maintained by dynamically adjusting
the search radius (RNeigh), based on the amount of ground truth obtained so far. The
parameter RNeigh denotes the neighborhood radius to be used in the exploration, and
is adaptively fixed to ensure a balance between accuracy and diversity. This is done
by systematically reducing the radius, if the number of legitimate samples discovered
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Algorithm 3.1: AP- Exploration Phase
Input : Seed Set D′Seed, Defender black box model C. Parameters:
Exploration budget BExplore, Radius neighborhood- [RNeigh−min,
RNeigh−max]
Output: Explored Anchor Points Set D′Explore
1 D′Explore ← D′Seed
2 count legitimate=0
3 for i = 1 .. BExplore do
4 samplei ← Select random sample from D′Explore
5 RNeigh = (RNeigh−max −RNeigh−min) ∗ (count legitimate/i) +RNeigh−min
6 . Dynamic neighborhood search
7 perturbed sample← Perturb(sample i , RNeigh)
8 if C.predict(perturbed sample) is Legitimate then
9 D′Explore ∪ perturbed sample
10 count legitimate ++
11 Procedure Perturb(sample, RNeigh)
12 return sample+=random(mean=0, std=RNeigh)
while probing drops, and vice-versa, as shown in Equation 3.1. For a 0-1 normalization
scale, a RNeigh−min of 0.1 and a RNeigh−max of 0.5 is reasonable.
RNeigh = (RNeigh−max −RNeigh−min) ∗
#legitimate samples
#samples probed so far
+RNeigh−min
(3.1)
The exploration phase begins with the initial set of seed samples D′Seed. It then pop-
ulates the anchor points set D′Explore, by generating additional samples and verifying
if they also belong to the legitimate class, as seen in Algorithm 3.1. Additional points
are generated by perturbing the already identified benign set of points. Perturbation
is done by moving the sample randomly within the radius RNeigh, along every dimen-
sion. This radius is dynamically adjusted based on the number of correct samples,
as shown in Line 5. The algorithm returns D′Explore, which forms the set of explored
points, which were correctly classified by C.
3. Exploit: The exploitation phase uses the D′Explore to generate the D
′
Attack set, which
form the current campaign’s attack samples. The AP method combines the following
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two techniques to ensure high diversity and accuracy of attack samples.
(a) Simple perturbation: This technique (Line 5) uses perturbation similar to the
Perturb() procedure in Algorithm 3.1. However, the size of neighborhood is
reduced from the exploration phase, to ensure attacks points are close to the
ground truth anchor points. The exploitation radius is denoted by RExploit, and
is used to generate perturbed samples to populate the D′Attack set.
(b) Convex combination: In this technique (Line 8), the attack samples are generated
by performing a convex combination of samples randomly drawn from D′Explore.
This has the advantage of being able to produce high accuracy of attack rate.
But the diversity of the samples is limited, as the samples start to get cluttered,
in case where the D′Explore is small in size.
The exploitation phase combines both these techniques as shown in Algorithm 3.2.
The algorithm picks two random points from D′Explore, and then perturbs them by
adding a random generated number in the range [0, RExploit], along every dimension.
The perturbed samples are then combined using a convex combination, as shown in
Line 8.
The final output of Algorithm 3.2, comprises of the D′Attack set which is submitted
as an attack to model C. This culminates the adversarial round of the attack-defense
cycle and one iteration of the SEE approach. Usually, the size of D′Attack is much
larger than BExplore, to justify budget expenditure.
The Anchor Points (AP) attacks is illustrated on a synthetic 2D dataset in Fig-
ure 3.7. The initial defender’s classifier is probed using the radius search technique, with
a neighborhood radius of RNeigh. The resulting set of exploration samples which are clas-
sified as Legitimate by C, forms the anchor points set, to perform the exploitation. The
combination of random perturbation and convex combination is illustrated in Figure 3.7.
The final set of red points, is the attack set D′Attack, which evades the classifier C.
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Algorithm 3.2: AP- Exploitation Phase
Input : Anchor Points Set D′Explore, Number of attacks NAttack, Radius of
Exploitation RExploit
Output: Attacks set D′Attack
1 D′Attack ← []
2 for i = 1 .. NAttack do
3 sample1 ← Select random sample from D′Explore
4 sample2 ← Select random sample from D′Explore
5 perturbed sample1 ← Perturb(sample1, RExploit) . Random
perturbation
6 perturbed sample2 ← Perturb(sample2, RExploit)
7 λ = random in [0, 1]
8 attack samplei ← perturbed sample1 * λ + (1-λ)*perturbed sample2
9 . Convex combination
10 D′Attack ∪ attack samplei
11 Procedure Perturb(sample, RExploit)
12 return sample+=random(mean=0, std=RExploit)
Figure 3.7: Illustration of AP attacks on 2D synthetic data.(Left - Right): The defender’s
model from its training data. The Exploration phase depicting the seed (blue) and the
anchor points samples (purple). The Exploitation attack phase samples (red) generated
based on the anchor points.
The performance of the Anchor Points approach is largely dependent on probes
collected in the initial seed and exploration phase, and as such maintaining diversity in
search is key. Larger coverage ensures more diversity and flexibility in the attack phase.
However, since this technique is suited as an adhoc quick exploit, its efficacy lies on quick
impact and spread before the defender has time to respond.
55
3.3.3 The Reverse Engineering (RE) attack
In case of a sophisticated attacker, with a large BExplore, direct reverse engineering
of the classification boundary is more advantageous. It helps understanding the entire pre-
diction landscape quicker and allows launching of optimal evasion attacks based on gradient
descent, as was described in [5]. Reverse engineering in itself could be the end goal in some
cases, as it provides information about features and their importance to the classification
task [51]. Reverse engineering also allows the launching of large scale availability attacks,
which can cause retraining using the same features impossible [114]. However, a reverse
engineering approach is affected by the type of model being used for C, the dimensionality
of the data space and the number of exploration probes possible. Nevertheless, the goal of
the attacker is not to exactly fit the decision boundary, but to generate highly accurate and
diverse attacks. In accordance with this, a linear approximation of a nonlinear boundary
and a partial reverse engineering attempt should be sufficient. A linear approximation is
not a major limitation due to the following reasons: i) most large scale and dynamic data
mining systems resort to linear models, to prevent over fitting of the data and to save train-
ing time on the fly [143], and ii) a linear approximation of a nonlinear boundary would still
provide some degree of accuracy, which should be sufficient to launch a massive attack to
compensate for reduced accuracy. Based on this intuition, a reverse engineering strategy to
learn a linear classifier from the probes is developed here.
Since effective reverse engineering relies on the availability of informative samples, it
is necessary to use the available probing budget efficiently. Random sampling often results in
wasted probes which add no additional information, and as such is not a preferred choice in
this scenario. The query synthesis strategy of [144], generates samples close to the decision
boundary and spreads the samples along the boundary, to provide a good understanding
of the decision landscape. While query synthesis was used for active labeling of samples
in [144], we modify it to be used for the task of reverse engineering, here. Based on the
queries(probes), an attacker learns a surrogate classifier C ′, which is an approximation of
C, to be used for exploitation in the attack phase. The SEE implementation of the RE
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Figure 3.8: The Gram-Schmidt process of orthonormalization1. Randomly chosen vector v
is made orthonormal to vector u.
approach is presented here.
1. Seed: The seed set consists of one legitimate and one malicious sample.
2. Explore: The exploration phase uses the query synthesis technique of [144], to learn
a surrogate classifier C ′, as shown in Algorithm 3.3. The algorithm uses the Gram-
Schmidt process to generate orthonormal points, near the midpoint of any two ran-
domly selected points of opposite classes. In every iteration, a Legitimate XL and
a Malicious sample XM , are selected from the already probed samples. Then a ran-
domly selected vector XR, is made orthonormal to the line joining the vectors XL
and XM . This orthonormal point is then made equal to the magnitude λi (selected
randomly between 0 and λ) and moved to the midpoint of the line. This process
allows selection of points which will have high informative content and spread across
the boundary for better reverse engineering a model.
The orthonormalization process is depicted in Figure 3.81, where the vector v, selected
randomly, is made orthonormal to u, using the Gram-Schmidt process. The projection
of the vector v onto u, denoted by Projuv, is computed as < v, u > / ‖u‖. The
resulting orthogonal unit vector is given as v−Projuv, which forms the orthonormal
basis for the vectors v and u.
Algorithm 3.3 allows for effective reverse engineering, in a principled way. In case of
complex class boundaries, this approach will only provide an approximation of the
1http://nptel.ac.in/courses/122104018/node49.html
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Algorithm 3.3: Reverse Engineering by query synthesis
Input : Seed Set D′Seed, Defender model black box C, Exploration budget
BExplore, Magnitude λ
Output: Exploration query Set D′Explore, Surrogate classifier C
′
1 D′Explore L=Legitimate samples from D
′
Seed
2 D′Explore M=Malicious samples from D
′
Seed
3 for i = 1 .. BExplore do
4 XL ← Select random samples from D′Explore L
5 XM ← Select random samples from D′Explore M
6 X0= XL −XM
7 Generate random vector XR
8 XR = XR − <XR,X0><X0,X0> ∗X0
9 . Using Gram-Schmidt process to make XR orthogonal to X0





12 . Set magnitude of orthogonal midperpendicular vector
13 XS=XR + (XL +XM )/2
14 . Set XR to midpoint
15 if C.predict(XS) is Legitimate then
16 D′Explore L ∪ XS
17 else
18 D′Explore M ∪ XS
19 D′Explore = D
′
Explore L ∪ D′Explore M
20 Train C ′ using D′Explore
21 . Training can be based on linear classifier of choice
surface. As stated, the goal here is to have a rough understanding of the area of the
data space which is classified as Legitimate. The surrogate model C ′ obtained, is used
by the exploitation phase to generate attacks.
3. Exploit: The Reverse Engineered model C ′, can be used to generate attacks with
high diversity and accuracy, provided the reverse engineering was effective. Ideally,
a set of random points can be generated and verified against the surrogate classifier
C ′, before adding them to the attack set - D′Attack. However, a practical and effective
way would be to use the exploration set D′Explore of Algorithm 3.3, as a seed set to
generate a set of anchor points as in Algorithm 3.1, with the exception that we use C ′
instead of C. This process essentially allows us to make a large number of probes at
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Figure 3.9: Illustration of RE attacks on 2D synthetic data.(Left - Right): The defender’s
model based on training data. The Exploration phase depicting reverse engineering(red) us-
ing the Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization process. The Exploitation attack phase samples
generated after validation from the surrogate classifier (red samples).
theoretically 0 cost. The anchor points can then be perturbed to generate more attack
samples. The perturbation and search of neighborhood points can be done using a
large neighborhood radius(RNeigh), as we can now verify samples against C
′, before
sending them out. The increased RNeigh, allows samples to have high diversity at a
high confidence, as opposed to the AP approach, where radius needs to be constrained
to stay close to the ground truth points.
The Reverse Engineering (RE) attacks is illustrated on a synthetic 2D dataset in
Figure 3.9. The initial defender’s classifier is probed using the Gram-Schmidt technique,
to learn a surrogate model (red) from the original defender’s model (green). The surrogate
classifier is used to provide additonal validation, before submitting the attack samples (red),
which are used to evade C.
Both the AP and RE can attack classification models effectively. The fundamental
difference between the two approaches is that reverse engineering places its confidence on
its understanding of the separating function while the former approach places its confidence
only on the obtained anchor points.
Note on query synthesis and binary features:
Since most of these approaches rely on numerical operations on data, their applica-
bility to binary feature data might seem limited. However, this is not the case. The essential
task of neighborhood point’s generation (in the AP and RE approaches), can be applied
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to categorical data by selecting a fraction RNeigh of dimensions and flipping their feature
values. Similarly the task of convex combination in Algorithm 3.2 and that of finding the
orthogonal point in Algorithm 3.3, can be performed by finding the nearest feasible point in
the binary vector space to the generated points. This will allow approximation of the above
mentioned approaches when applied to datasets with binary feature values, as is common
in spam classification applications. Additionally, similar approaches can be used in the task
of generating the actual query which is to be submitted to the system. The above query
synthesis approaches do not consider how the numeric values generated can be related to an
actual real world probe which is submitted to the blackbox model. As suggested in [48], the
task of generating the actual input from the data sample, is a challenging one. However,
the real world input creation can be approximated by using the generated sample, as a
suggestion, and by closely mimicking its properties.
3.4 Experimental analysis of the SEE framework
This section presents experimental analysis of the AP and the RE attacks, on clas-
sifiers trained on seven real world datasets. Additionally evaluation on three datasets from
cybersecurity domains is presented to demonstrate the vulnerabilities of machine learning
systems in domains where its primary purpose is to ensure security. These experiments
are presented from an adversary’s point of view and the metrics used for evaluation: Accu-
racy and Diversity, are used for determining efficacy of an attack launched by the attacker.
Section 3.4.1 presents the datasets, metrics and experimental protocol for performing the
experiments. Results on real and synthetic datasets and sensitivity analysis is presented in
Section 3.4.2.
3.4.1 Experimental methods: Datasets, Metrics and Setup
3.4.1.1 Description of datasets
Experimentation is performed using 10 real world datasets, the details of which are
presented in Table 3.1. The first 7 datasets were chosen from the UCI machine learning
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repository [145] and are popularly used for binary classification tasks, in literature. These
datasets do not traditionally embody any security risks, but are attractive to evaluate the
classification evasion results, as they represent different application domains and types of
data. The Spambase1 [145], KDD992 [145] and the CAPTHCA [31] datasets are binary
classification tasks, which represent 3 different cybersecurity domains that use machine
learning as a core technique. The Spambase dataset, contains data about spam emails (such
as fraud schemes, ads, etc) and legitimate personal and work emails. The KDD99 dataset
is a popular network intrusion detection dataset, which is aimed at developing a model to
classify normal connections from different classes of attack connections. The CAPTCHA
dataset was developed recently at the University of Louisville [31], for the task of blocking
bots from human users, based on their mouse movement patterns, while solving a visual
image based behavioral CAPTCHA puzzle. The datasets contains mouse movement and
click patterns from 16 different human users, and bot data, from an external agent aimed
at subverting this system, by simulating human behavior.
All datasets were preprocessed by first reducing them to a binary class problem, if
it was multi-class originally. The Digits dataset was reduced to have samples of the digit 0




Figure 3.10: Synthetic 2D dataset generated for illustrative experimentation. The Legiti-
mate samples are in green and Malicious samples are in orange.
dataset was then converted to contain only numerical values, by transforming categorical
and nominal features to binary variables. The resulting number of features is shown in
Table 3.1. The data is then cleaned by filling in missing values by feature means and by
normalizing the range of each feature to [0,1]. Instances were shuffled to remove any bias
due to inherent concept drift. In all datasets, the class label 1 is taken to be the Malicious
class and 0 is taken as the Legitimate class, as a convention.
A 2D synthetic data was developed to illustrate the experimental behavior of the
different approaches, in order to better understand their internal working, as shown in
Figure 3.10. This 2D dataset has 1000 samples equally balanced between the Malicious
class (orange) and the Legitimate class (green).
3.4.1.2 Adversary’s metrics for attack quality
In this section, we analyze the effectiveness of attacks from an adversary’s perspec-
tive. We do this to better understand the adversarial perspective and capabilities, to be able
to better design countermeasures against them. An adversary aiming to create maximum
impact through its attack samples, needs to make the D′Attack set- Accurate and Diverse.
Accuracy ensures that the attack samples will cause an increase in the false negative rate
of the defender’s model C, while diversity ensures variability in attacks, so that it can go
unnoticed for a long time. Based on this intuition, we define 4 quality metrics which an
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attacker can use to measure/compare effectiveness of different attack strategies. The Effec-
tive Attack Rate (EAR) measures the accuracy of the attacks, and the 3 metrics: Standard
deviation of attacks (σEA), K-Nearest Neighbor distance (KNN-dist) and the Minimum
Spanning Tree distance (MST-dist), collectively represent diversity of the attack samples.
These metrics are based on the following definition of Effective Attacks (EA):
EA =
{
x : C(x) = Legitimate ∧ x ∈ D′Attack
}
(3.2)
An attack is effective only is it is classified as Legitimate by the defender model C,
as per Equation 3.2. The 4 adversary quality metrics compute quality over the set EA of
effective attacks.
a ) Effective Attack Rate (EAR): This is a measure of the accuracy of the attacks and
it is the ratio of attack samples which successfully evade the defenders classifier, given
by Equation 3.3. A value of 1 denotes perfect evasion.
EAR =
|EA|∣∣D′Attack∣∣ (3.3)
b ) Standard deviation of effective attacks (σEA): This is a measure of diversity, which








Where, µEA indicates the Euclidean mean of samples in the effective attack set EA.
A large value of σEA indicates that the data is more spread out and covers a larger
area of the data space, therefore having high diversity.
c ) K-Nearest Neighbor distance of effective attacks(KNN − distEA): This measure of
diversity computes local density information of the data samples (motivated by [146]).
The measure is computed by finding the average distance of the K-nearest neighbors
of a sample, for all samples and then averaging this value, as given by Equation 3.5.








Where, the dist(.) function computed Euclidean distance between two vectors. and
NNi(x), gives the i
th nearest neighbor of a the sample x. A higher value of KNN-dist,
indicates that data are relatively far from each other and that every sample is in a
locally sparse region of space, indicating high diversity. A value of K=5 is chosen for
experimentation.
d ) Minimum Spanning Tree distance of effective attacks (MST − distEA): This is
also a measure of diversity,which is computed by finding the length of the minimum
spanning tree over the set of EA samples, as per Equation 3.6 [147]. This is a measure
which promotes ectropy or collocation of points, in an attempt to obtain a more global
uniform and diverse spread of samples. This is especially useful in recognizing multiple
locally dense clusters which are far from each other.




The MST measure computes cluster separation only once, as opposed to pairwise
distance metrics which calculate distance between one point and every other point.
Thus the MST provides a better sense of global diversity, by allowing sub groups of
data to have less diversity. A high value of MST-distance, will indicate high diversity.
Diversity is computed using the three metrics of : σ, KNN−dist, MST−dist. While
each of these metrics capture variability in the dataset, the have different characteristics,
being sensitive to different data distributions. Standard deviation captures the overall
spread of data and is severely affected by outliers. A high spread of data leads to a higher
σ, as shown in Figure 3.11 a) and b), where a) has a σ of 0.228 as it covers the entire feature
space, while b) being concentrated in a small portion of the space has a σ of 0.058. Standard
deviation captures this global notion of spread effectively, but fails at capturing local data
characteristics. The Figure 3.11 c), represents data cluttered around two clusters and it has
a similar σ (=0.218) as Figure 3.11 a) (=0.228). These datasets are nearly identical from
the σ perspective, but their difference can be effectively caught by observing the KNN-dist

















Figure 3.11: Values of σ, KNN-dist and MST-dist for different data distributions over 100
test points.
its neighbors. KNN-dist captures this individual characteristic of points pointing out if the
locality is sparse or dense. However, it does not account for disjoint clusters in space, as it
is myopic in its scope. This distinction is caught by the MST-dist metric, which combines
a local and global scope by identifying variability caused by multiple disjoint spread out
clusters. The Figure 3.11 c) and d) have the same KNN-dist values of 0.017, but the
MST values show significant differences, being 0.037 and 0.063 for c) and d) respectively.
The MST measure is effective in case of attacks, especially the anchor points attacks, which
concentrate samples around ground truth values, but the ground truth points are themselves
spread out in space. However, using just MST alone is not the best indicator of the data
characteristics as depicted in Figure 3.11, where the MST values are similar to d) but the
data has a higher local spread. This distinction is caught by the KNN-dist metric, which
sees an increase from 0.017 to 0.025.
The experiments of Figure 3.11, indicate the need to consider all three diversity
metrics to have a holistic view of the data diversity. As such, our experiments will report
all 3 diversity metrics in an attempt to understand data distribution in high dimensional
data spaces, where visual analysis of data is not practical. In our future reference, the
subscript EA will be skipped while representing the diversity measures. Diversity will be
computed only on the correctly classified attack samples, unless otherwise mentioned.
3.4.1.3 Experimental protocol and setup
Experiments in this section follow the following protocol:
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a ) Experiments begin with a seed sample, which is obtained by random sampling in the
feature space upto a maximum of 1000 trials. If no seed is found after 1000 trials, a
manual seed is provided by randomly picking a sample from the training data. The AP
approach needs only one legitimate sample as seed while RE requires one legitimate
and one malicious sample in its seed set.
b ) The exploration phase comprises of BExplore probes to the defender model C, to
learn from it. The exploration radius of the AP approach is fixed as: [RNeigh−min,
RNeigh−max] = [0.1, 0.5]. The magnitude for the reverse engineering model λ (Algo-
rithm 3.3) is fixed at 0.25, and it was found that changing it has little effect on the
results.
c ) The defenders model is taken to be a linear SVM with regularization c=1, unless
otherwise mentioned [148]. The reverse engineered model for the adversary is taken
to be a linear kernel SVM with a higher regularization constant c = 10. A high
c value ensures that fitting to the defenders feedback is given higher weight than
generalizing from the samples. This is necessary, as the obtained feedback is limited,
and inadequate to try and generalize over the entire space. However, arbitrarily
increasing c is not a good strategy, as the defender could mislead the attacker, by
providing incorrect feedback for some of the probes. Thus c=10 is taken as a rule of
thumb.
d ) In the exploitation phase, NAttack samples are generated, which are to be submitted
as the adversary attack samples. Unless otherwise mentioned, the RExploit for AP is
taken to be 0.1 and for RE it is taken to be 0.5. A higher value for RE is possible due
to the availability of additional information, via the surrogate trained model. Effects
of varying these values are also presented.
All experimentation was performed using Python 2.71 and the scikit-learn [149] ma-
chine learning library. The results presented are averaged over 30 runs for every experiment.
1www.python.org
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3.4.2 Experimental results and analysis
Experimental results are presetned here, by considering different models for the de-
fender’s black box, and measuring its impact on the adversary’s effectiveness. Section 3.4.2.1
presents illustrative analysis on a 2D synthetic datasets, with a linear defender model. Re-
sults of a linear defender model on real world datasets is presented in Section 3.4.2.2. Effects
of varying the BExplore and the RExploit, on the accuracy and diversity of the AP and RE
attacks, is presented in Section 3.4.2.3. Effects of choosing 4 different non-linear models,
for the defedner, is demonstrated in Section 3.4.2.4.
3.4.2.1 Experiments on 2D synthetic dataset
To illustrate the AP and RE approaches and to understand their behavior, experi-
mentation is performed on the synthetic 2D dataset of Figure 3.10. The exploration budget
BExplore was taken as 10 probes and the number of attacks to be generated NAttacks was
taken to be 20 samples. The experimentation protocol was followed as per Section 3.4.1.3.
The results of the seed and exploration phases of the experiment are shown in Table 3.2.
The defender’s initial accuracy is its perception of safety, which it derives from training
its model C and cross validating it on the original training set of malicious and legitimate
samples. In this experiment the defender has a perceived safety of 100%. It took only 3
samples on average to find a seed sample, which is classified as legitimate by C. The Ex-
plored anchor points value of 0.8 indicates that 80% of the BExplore probes were found to be
classified as legitimate by C. These samples form the Anchor Points in the AP approach,
and a high value indicates a high AP coverage. The RE accuracy, is computed by testing
the initial training dataset (defender’s) on the reverse engineered model. This serves as a
measure of goodness of reverse engineering, as a high accuracy implies a similarity in the
C and the C ′ hypothesis. A near perfect reverse engineering is seen with 10 exploration
samples, as seen by the 99.97% accuracy of reverse engineering, in Table 3.2.
The attack phase follows the exploration phase and is aimed at generating NAttack =
20 samples of high accuracy and diversity. The Effective Attack Rate (EAR)(Equation 3.3)
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TABLE 3.2









100% 2.98±1.44 0.8±0.13 99.97%
TABLE 3.3
Results of accuracy and diversity of AP and RE attacks on 2D synthetic data.
EAR
Diversity of effective attack samples
σ KNN-dist MST-dist
AP (RExploit=0.1) 0.977±0.03 0.18±0.04 0.116±0.02 0.077±0.01
AP (RExploit=0.5) 0.797±0.12 0.189±0.03 0.169±0.03 0.087±0.01
RE (RExploit=0.1) 0.973±0.05 0.21±0.03 0.137±0.02 0.089±0.02
RE (RExploit=0.5) 0.937±0.08 0.21±0.03 0.173±0.02 0.108±0.01
metric for accuracy and the diversity metrics of -σ, KNN − dist, MST − dist, are
computed for the AP and RE methods of attacks, with two different exploitation radius
RExploit= 0.1 and 0.5. The AP approach has a high attack effectiveness at low exploitation
radius, with 97.7% of the attacks being classified as legitimate by the defender model C,
as shown in Table 3.3. The AP approach has low diversity, as the radius of exploit limits
movement away from the originally obtained anchor points. Increasing RExploit to 0.5 leads
to an increase in the diversity metrics, but causes the EAR of the AP approach to drop to
79.7%. This is attributed to the lack of confidence in samples far from the Anchor Points.
The RE approach provides high diversity and the diversity can be increased by increasing
the exploitation radius, with a much more acceptable drop in EAR value (∼4%). This is
a result of the effectiveness of the reverse engineered model which has a RE accuracy of
99.9%, as shown in Table 3.2. The exploited samples can be checked to see if they will be
classified as legitimate, by verifying them on the reverse engineered model. This allows the
attacker to use a large exploitation radius and still be confident in its attacks. A point to
be noted is that exact learning of the decision boundary is not needed, a partial reverse
engineering is sufficient while generating a large number of diverse attack samples.
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The standard deviation, seen from Table 3.3, is less useful in identifying the diversity
of samples, as there is no statistical difference (t-test at significance of 0.05) between the σ
of an approach at the two levels of RExploit. Significance changes are seen in the KNN-dist
and MST-dist metrics, for the RExploit of 0.1 and 0.5, indicating their efficacy as a diversity
metric. The σ is statistically different between the AP and RE approach, indicating the
overall spread of the data, which is higher for RE as it covers more space by distributing
the attacks more uniformly, as illustrated by Figure 3.12. In this figure, the AP and
RE attacks at RExploit= 0.1 and at 0.5 are presented. The initial learned model (green)
shows good separation and a wide margin in separating the malicious (orange) and the
legitimate samples (green). Attacks begins with the seed sample shown in blue, and then
proceeds to generate probes upto 10 samples (purple). Probes in case of RE are shown to
be concentrated near the boundary, as this attack is trying to learn the operating boundary.
In case of AP, the attacks are concentrated on the legitimate data space, to obtain more
anchor points. Attacks (red) are concentrated near anchor points for RExploit=0.1 as shown
in Figure 3.12a). In case of increasing theRExploit to 0.5, the effectiveness of attacks reduced,
seen as samples falling in the malicious side of C (Figure 3.12b)).The reverse engineered
model (red) in Figure 3.12 c) and d) shows a close fit with the defender’s hidden model,
which results in a large spread of attack samples, all of which lie on the legitimate side
only. A well reverse engineered model allows the attacker to spread out the attack in the
space, making its detection and subsequent fixing harder, for the defender. A sophisticated
adversary would prefer the RE approach, as it provides him with the ability to hide his
tracks and to spread out attack over time with high confidence, or to blend his attacks with
noise. While the quick exploitation of a new found vulnerability is possible with the AP
approach.
3.4.2.2 Experiments on real world dataset
Experiments on the 10 real world datasets, were performed by taking aBExplore=1000
to generate NAttack=2000 samples. The RExploit was taken as 0.1 for the AP approach and
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TABLE 3.4











Digits08 98% 4.6±2.63 0.63±0.01 92%
Credit 79% 3.13±1.89 0.71±0.01 71%
Cancer 97% 42.91±29.36 0.99±0.01 95%
Qsar 87% 49.5±28.81 0.99±0.01 42%
Sonar 88% 24.03±18.92 0.98±0.01 61%
Theorem 72% 4.07±2.52 0.67±0.02 57%
Diabetes 78% 2.93±1.23 0.50±0.02 71%
Spambase 91% 20.64±12.93 0.50±0.02 59%
KDD99 99% 6.07±4.23 0.91±0.01 55%
CAPTCHA 100% 7.27±5.35 0.92±0.01 91%
0.5 for the RE approach, as a high radius for AP leads to drastic decrease in the effectiveness
of attacks, as discussed in Section 3.4.2.1.
The results of the seed and exploration phases are shown in Table 3.4. No more
than 50 samples, on average, were needed for finding a seed and starting the attack process.
Over 500 anchor point, on average, were obtained from the exploration phase of AP. For
the RE approach, the average accuracy was close to the defender’s accuracy for Digits08,
Credit, Cancer, Diabetes and the CAPTCHA datasets, while the other datasets showed a
lower value.
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(a) AP attack with RExploit=0.1
(b) AP attack with RExploit=0.5
(c) RE attack with RExploit=0.1
(d) RE attack with RExploit=0.5
Figure 3.12: Illustration of AP and RE attacks on 2D synthetic data. left- initial defender’s
view of data (green: legitimate and orange: malicious), center - seed (blue) and exploration
phase probes (purple)/ reverse engineered model (red line), right- attack samples gener-
ated(red).
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Attacks were launched by generating 2000 samples after the exploration phase. The
results of the AP and RE attacks indicate a high EAR over all datasets (over 70%, with a
majority over 90%), as shown in Table 3.5. This indicates that both approaches are effective
in attacking classification systems, irrespective of the application domain. Even for datasets
where the RE accuracy was found to be low, the EAR is high. Thus confirming our claim
that a partial reverse engineering is sufficient for effective attack generation, when attacks
are large and diverse. The diversity of the reverse engineering attacks is higher than AP,
on all three metrics, indicating a larger spread of attacks, lower collocation of points and
a uniform spread the attack space. This high diversity is obtained while still maintaining
a high EAR. The AP approach, produces lower diversity but has a high EAR in all cases.
This is because the number of effective explored anchor points in Table 3.4 was 50% of the
BExplore, allowing a large scale AP attack to be possible. The AP approach is therefore
an adhoc quick attack mechanism, irrespective of the data domain, application type and
model used. Using the proposed hybrid randomization and convex combination of the AP
approach’s exploit phase, the diversity obtained is higher than obtained by pure random
perturbation of anchor points, and at the same time a high evasion rate is possible.
The RE approach’s EAR is low for the Credit, Theorem and the Spambase datasets.
In case of the Credit and Theorem dataset, the defender’s accuracy is low, indicating a
nonlinear separation/ inseparability of samples. The RE accuracy approaches close to
the defender’s accuracy, but since the original model D has limited accuracy, the reverse
engineered model can only be so good. For the Spambase dataset, the majority of the
features follow a heavy tailed distribution as shown for Feature #5 in Figure 3.13. In such
distributions, random sampling in the range [0,1] on each features is not the best choice.
Integrating domain information which is commonly known, as in the case of spam datasets
having heavy tails, can be beneficial. However, following a domain agnostic approach here,
we are still able to achieve a 71% attack rate indicating the viability of such attacks. One
thing to note is that although the RE accuracy for the Qsar dataset was low, the attack
accuracy was close to 1. This is because, generating a high accuracy on the training dataset
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TABLE 3.5
Results of accuracy and diversity of AP and RE attacks on real world datasets, with linear
defender’s model.
Dataset Method EAR σ KNN-dist MST-dist
Digits08
AP 0.96±0.01 0.23±0.002 0.48±0.01 0.41±0.01
RE 0.93±0.06 0.273±0.009 0.76±0.01 0.65±0.04
Credit
AP 0.98±0.01 0.218±0.001 1.19±0.02 1.01±0.02
RE 0.80±0.15 0.265±0.001 2.22±0.02 1.72±0.31
Cancer
AP 0.99±0.01 0.215±0.001 0.38±0.01 0.33±0.01
RE 0.99±0.01 0.263±0.001 0.5±0.01 0.45±0.01
Qsar
AP 1 0.216±0.001 1.1±0.01 0.94±0.01
RE 0.99+0.01 0.264±0.001 1.71±0.01 1.64±0.01
Sonar
AP 0.99±0.01 0.215±0.001 1.37±0.01 1.16±0.01
RE 0.98±0.01 0.265±0.001 2.22±0.01 2.1±0.015
Theorem
AP 0.97±0.01 0.219±0.002 1.05±0.02 0.89±0.02
RE 0.87±0.08 0.267±0.002 1.96±0.02 1.64±0.15
Diabetes
AP 0.98±0.01 0.217±0.003 0.27±0.01 0.23±0.01
RE 0.95±0.04 0.262±0.001 0.36±0.01 0.31±0.01
Spambase
AP 0.93±0.01 0.233±0.003 0.96±0.02 0.79±0.02
RE 0.71±0.2 0.273±0.004 2.04±0.06 1.39±0.4
KDD99
AP 0.99±0.01 0.215±0.001 1.06±0.01 0.91±0.01
RE 0.93±0.04 0.263±0.001 1.71±0.01 1.53±0.06
CAPTCHA
AP 0.99±0.01 0.215±0.001 0.80±0.01 0.68±0.01
RE 0.97±0.02 0.264±0.001 1.22±0.01 1.12±0.03
Figure 3.13: Distribution of Feature #5 for Spambase dataset, showing a heavy tail.
is not the goal of the RE approach. It is more concerned with generating a large number of
diverse attack samples which would be classified as legitimate. This is possible even with
partial reverse engineering. While a high RE accuracy indicates a high EAR, it is not a
required condition for the RE attack, making it of practical use in high dimensional spaces.
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3.4.2.3 Effects of varying exploration budget BExpore and radius of exploitation
RExploit
In evaluating the AP and RE approaches, the RExploit was kept fixed at 0.1 for
AP and 0.5 for RE. This was intuitively motivated, as confidence in attacks would reduce
as distance from anchor points increases, as they are the only ground truth information
available to the attackers. Effect of increasing the RExploit, on the accuracy and diversity of
AP attacks, is shown in Figure 3.14. The Credit, Theorem and the Spambase datasets were
chosen for these evaluation. These datasets are the ones where RE has a low EAR as seen
in Table 3.5. Effect of increasing RExploit to increase diversity of AP attacks, and increasing
BExplore to increase EAR of RE attacks, as viable alternatives to improve performance over
these three datasets is analyzed and presented.
The effective attack rate (EAR) reduces as the radius increases, as seen in Fig-
ure 3.14a), as samples move away from the anchor points. There is an associated increase
in the diversity using both KNN-dist and MST-dist measures, as shown in b) and d). Com-
parison of diversity and EAR at radius=0.5 for the RE and AP approach, shows that for
increasing diversity it is much better to switch to the RE approach instead of increasing
RExploit arbitrarily, as the effectiveness of attacks starts dropping rapidly with increased
radius. The drop in MST-dist in Figure 3.14 c) is due to the reduction of the size of the
Effective Attack set (EA).
Since, increasing diversity for AP approach leads to a drop in EAR, we now try
to investigate if we can increase the EAR of the RE approach while maintaining its high
diversity. Increasing the explore budget increases the EAR as this leads to better training by
allowing presenting more labeled samples. The increase in EAR ultimately plateaus, as per
the Probably Approximate Learning(PAC) principles [150], indicating that we do not need
to arbitrarily keep increasing this budget. The knee point is seen in the Figure 3.15(around
1500 for all datasets). After the knee point, the EAR of the all three datasets is 85%, and
adding more probing budget has little impact on the EAR or the diversity. This indicates
the need for a larger exploration budget to allow effective reverse engineering in complex
74
(a) Effect of RExploit on EAR (b) Effect of RExploit on KNN-dist(c) Effect of RExploit on MST-dist
Figure 3.14: Effect of changing RExploit on the Effective Attack Rate (EAR) and Diversity
(KNN-dist and MST-dist), for the AP approach.
(a) Effect of BExplore on EAR (b) Effect of BExplore on KNN-dist(c) Effect of BExplore on MST-dist
Figure 3.15: Effect of changing BExplore on the Effective Attack Rate (EAR) and Diversity
(KNN-dist and MST-dist), for the RE approach.
data spaces. This extra effort provides long term benefits as it leads to increased diversity
of attacks. RE is suitable for patient and sophisticated adversaries, who want to apply
data science in breaking the system. Increasing attack rate without having a high budget is
possible by reducing the radius of exploitation. However, this would affect the diversity and
as such is not desirable. In case of a low budget, it is better to stick to the AP approach,
but with RE, the assumption is that the adversary wants to spend time to learn the system
before attempting an attack
3.4.2.4 Experiments with non-linear defender model
While, experiments in this section so far have considered that the defender uses a
linear classifier, this is not a limitation/oversimplification of the attack framework. The RE
and AP approach are essentially data space search techniques independent of the underlying
model type of the defender. The efficacy of these attacks with different defender model is
presented here. Particularly, the following defender models were evaluated: K-Nearest
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TABLE 3.6
Effective Attack Rate (EAR) of AP and RE, with non linear defender’s model (Low EAR
values are italicized).
KNN SVM-RBF DT RF
Dataset AP RE AP RE AP RE AP RE
Digits08 0.89 0.96 0.97 0.89 0.87 0.63 0.85 0.48
Credit 0.96 0.78 0.94 0.53 0.79 0.42 0.79 0.33
Cancer 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.89 0.99 0.98
Qsar 1 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.76 0.99 0.99
Sonar 0.99 0.98 1 1 0.97 0.62 0.99 0.95
Theorem 0.97 0.813 0.95 0.5 0.95 0.79 0.62 0.78
Diabetes 0.99 0.935 0.99 0.9 0.83 0.63 0.88 0.61
Spambase 0.93 0.99 0.48 0.84 0.08 0.11 0.99 0.98
KDD99 0.99 0.93 1 0.99 0.89 0.54 0.92 0.27
Captcha 0.99 0.92 0.99 0.92 0.97 0.83 0.93 0.89
Neighbors classifier with K=3 (KNN) [151], SVM with an radial basis function kernel with
gamma of 0.1 (SVM-RBF) [152], C4.5 Decision Tree (DT) [153], and a Random Forest of 50
models (RF) [154], as shown in Table 3.6. The attacker’s model is kept the same as before
and the experiments are repeated for each of the defender’s model. Average values of EAR
over 30 runs are reported in Table 3.6.
The AP approach is minimally affected by the choice of defender’s model. The
drop in case of Spambase, is attributed to the heavy tailed distributions as explained in
Figure 3.13. In case of the decision trees, the model trained for Spambase, focuses only
on a few key features to perform the classification. Random probing attacks space out
attacks across dimensions without their feature importance, this leads to skipping over the
key features in the attack generation. This makes the attack is less effective. Although,
this could be compensated by performing partial reverse engineering and using a smaller
exploitation radius. The reverse engineering results are significantly dependent on the
defender’s choice of model. In case of nonlinear data separation, as in the Credit and the
Theorem datasets, the linear approximation is a bad choice and this is reflected in the low
attack rate. In all other cases, the low attack rate is attributed to the over simplification of
the understanding of the models, which in case of the decision tree and random forest tend to
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be complicated in high dimensional spaces. However, in a majority of the cases it is seen that
a 50% attack rate is still possible with the same linear SVM model used by the adversary.
This makes the SEE framework generally applicable to attack classification systems, without
explicit assumptions about model types, the training data or the parameters of classification.
This makes it a purely data driven approach requiring only feature space information.
3.5 Analyzing vulnerability of ML-as-a-service solutions
The ubiquity and widespread applicability of machine learning has driven the devel-
opment of Machine Learning as a Service (ML-as-a-service) systems, which allow developers
to use off-the-shelf solutions to integrate predictive capabilities to their applications. Ama-
zon’s Machine Learning service is offered via its web services platform (AWS1). Google also
offers a prediction API for its own cloud service - the Google Cloud Platform (GCP2).
These services provide an easy way for developers, with little background into developing
ML models, to easily upload their data and get a trained black box for their predictive
needs. The training and tuning of models is done by the service providers, providing the
ease of usage for developers, via APIs. This is a step towards mainstream access to machine
learning methodologies, without the need for domain expertise. While Amazon has men-
tioned that AWS-ML relies on using a logistic regression model, GCP has not mentioned
the details about its predictive model, to the best of our knowledge. This makes GCP a
true black box model, and an ideal test ground to demonstrate the efficacy of the AP and
the RE techniques, on a real world black box model. Here, the defender’s model is remote,
accessed from a client, and the adversary has no information about the internal workings
of the model [155]. We use the API’s Python client library to access the cloud service, and
the results on the three cybersecurity datasets are shown in Table 3.7.
The results of the experiment demonstrate that the AP and the RE attacks are
effective in attacking the defender’s classifier, by generating a high EAR over all datasets.











AP RE AP RE AP RE
EAR 1 1 1 1 0.99 0.97
σ 0.216 0.264 0.218 0.265 0.218 0.265
KNN-dist 1.324 2.148 1.105 1.714 0.813 1.228
MST-dist 1.127 2.078 0.944 1.645 0.695 1.131
Accuracy of
RE model C ′
48.1% 97.2% 100%
metrics of σ, KNN − dist and MST − dist, indicating the variability of attacks achieved
using the RE approach, in a real world setting. Furthermore, the RE accuracy in case
of the Spambase dataset (48.1%) highlights that linear approximation and partial reverse
engineering are sufficient to launch an effective RE attack (EAR=1). These experiments use
the same exploration budget (BExplore=1000) as the previous sections, to generate attacks
of high accuracy and high diversity. In a truly blind-folded setting, where the adversary
has no prior information about the defender’s classifier, a budget of 1000 (≈ $0.5)1 samples
indicates the relative ease with which classifiers can be evaded and the need for a more
comprehensive defense strategy, beyond a static machine learning model.
The results of Table 3.7, highlight the vulnerability of black box models, to ex-
ploratory attacks. The need to incorporate adversarial thinking and dynamics into the
system is necessary. While developers are excited to use a no hassle black box service, it is
necessary for them to understand the possibilities at test time, and be prepared for model
degradation/attacks. Accuracy and over-fitting are not the only concerns of the model de-
signers, in adversarial environments, and a comprehensive risk analysis is paramount before
making strategic integration with critical applications.
1https://cloud.google.com/prediction/pricing
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3.6 Why diversity is an important consideration in designing attacks?
Diversity has been considered an important goal for the attacker, in the SEE model.
An intuitive explanation for this is: Diversity ensures that attacks have enough variation,
causing their detection and prevention to become harder. An ubiquitous approach for
blocking attacks is the use of Blacklists, to filter out known malicious samples. Modern
blacklists are implemented using approximate search methods, such as locality sensitive
hashes, which are able to perform approximate matching against attack signatures [141].
With such a blacklist in place, perturbations to attacks are recognized and flagged for
further inspection. The goal of an attacker is to avoid detection by these blacklists, as they
can make a lot of the attack samples unusable with a quick filtering step. With enough
diversity, it is unlikely that blacklisting a few samples will cause the attack to stop. In
case of a diverse attack campaign, the defender will have to resort to choosing between
maintaining a huge blacklist of samples, or to remodel the machine learning system, both
of which are expensive tasks and require time.
To empirically evaluate the effect of diversity on blacklisting, a synthetic blacklisting
experiment is presented, which simulates the effect of approximate matching blacklist filters.
The blacklist is maintained as a list B, of previously seen attack samples with an associated
approximation factor: ε. An attack is detected if a new sample falls within ε distance to
any sample in the blacklist B. The entire blacklisting process is simulated as follows: i) the
attackers use the SEE framework to generate NAttacks attack samples which are submitted to
the defender model C, ii) the defender is assumed to gain information over time about these
NAttacks samples and then proceeds to blacklist them by storing them in B, iii) The attacker,
still unaware of the blacklisting, continues to use its existing explored information (AP or
RE model) to generate additionally more NAttacks new attack samples. The effectiveness
of the blacklisting process is computed as the number of effective attacks in NAttacks new,
which are detected by B. The % of attacks stopped indicates effectiveness of blacklists and
consequently the effect of diversity. A small rate would indicate that blacklisting is not
effective in stopping such attacks.
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(a) Effect of blacklisting on AP attacks with RExploit=0.1
(b) Effect of blacklisting on RE attacks with RExploit=0.5
Figure 3.16: Effect of diversity on blacklisting of attacks. Left to Right - The initial training
data of the defender and learned model C (green), the exploration phase anchor points
(purple) and reverse engineered model C ′ (red), attack points submitted (red), blacklists
(red circles) deployed to stop attacks and attack samples from second round of attacks
(yellow).
TABLE 3.8
Effect of blacklisting on AP and RE attacks with ε=0.01.
Attack Method % of Attacks Stopped % False Alarms
AP 94% 5.3%
RE 44.5% 5.5%
With an exploration budget of 20, exploitation NAttack of 40 and NAttack new of
400, the experiments are first performed on the 2D synthetic dataset. The results with
an approximation factor for the blacklist ε=0.01, is shown in Table 3.8. It is observed
that blacklisting stops 94% of the AP attacks, which is consistent with its lower diversity
observation. This indicates that, on average 376 attacks were stopped by just using 40
blacklisting samples, making the AP attack ineffective. This is illustrated in Figure 3.16 a),
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Figure 3.17: % of attacks stopped by blacklist with ε=0.1, on real world datasets.
Figure 3.18: MST-dist of AP and RE attacks on real world datasets.
where the AP methodology tends to be concentrated in a smaller portion of the data space,
causing subsequent attack samples to be packed more closely. In case of RE, the attacks
are more spread out (Figure 3.16 b)) and only 44% of the attacks were stopped, indicating
that it can still be used to generate subsequent attack campaigns, without having to repeat
the exploration and learning phases. An additional point to be noted is that ε cannot be
arbitrarily raised to increase the effectiveness of blacklisting. Increasing the approximation
factor leads to an increase in the number of false positives, which causes legitimate samples
to be misclassified as attacks, increasing the false alarm rate. False alarms are reported in
Table 3.8, and are computed by passing the legitimate class training samples through the
blacklist and seeing if they are blocked. Monitoring false positives is essential as a blacklist
which causes too many false alarms will be impractical.
Results of the blacklisting experiment, with an ε = 0.1, on the UCI datasets is
shown in Figure 3.17. In order to balance effects of approximation across datasets, the
approximation factor is multiplied by
√
d, where d is the number of dimensions of the
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dataset. In all experiments, the exploration budget is kept fixed at 1000, the exploitation
samples NAttack=2000 and additional 2000 samples(NAttack new) are generated to test the
blacklisting effects. The AP approach has a higher % of attacks stopped than the RE
approach, across all datasets. This directly indicates the effects of diversity on effectiveness
of attacks, as the Figure 3.18 shows. In these cases, increasing the ε, as a countermeasure
to stop attacks, is not a viable option, due to additional false alarms caused. A higher
diversity in RE would force the reevaluation of the security system, leading to redesign,
feature engineering and collection of additional labeled samples. All these are time taking
and expensive efforts, making the RE approach effective as an attack strategy. As such, if
an attacker is sophisticated and has enough probing budget BExplore, it can launch diverse
attack campaigns, which are harder to stop, by adhoc security measures.
3.7 Chapter summary
This chapter presents the attacker’s view of the machine learning based cybersecurity
system. Using machine learning has been advantageous to the task of stopping malicious
samples, by learning patterns from existing data of normal and abnormal use. However,
machine learning is a double edged sword, as it can be used by the attacker as well, to
circumvent the security of the system. With minimal knowledge about the learning process,
an adversary was shown to be able to attack binary classifiers, with high accuracy. The goal
of this chapter was to demonstrate the ease by which classifiers can be evaded, and the need
for a new paradigm in using machine learning, when applied to adversarial environments.
The Seed-Explore-Exploit (SEE) framework was used to generate exploratory at-
tacks on classifier systems. The Anchor Points (AP) attacks and the Reverse Engineering
(RE) attacks, were presented as two implementations under the SEE framework, demon-
strating different attacker goals and resources. Experimental evaluation on 10 real world
classification datasets, including 3 from cybersecurity domains, showed the ability of the
SEE framework to attack classifiers irrespective of the data domain. The vulnerability of
black box and remote cloud based ML-as-a-service providers was also demonstrated, to
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exploratory attacks via a client API user. Additionally, the use of diversity as a metric, to
denote attack strength, was presented and empirically evaluated. Diversity was emphasized
as a veritable adversarial criterion, to launch large scale attacks which are difficult to stop
by adhoc blacklisting techniques. The following claims made at the start of the section are
justified:
• Claim a: Attacks can be launched on classifiers, with knowledge of the feature space
only, irrespective of the type of classification model of the defender, the training dataset
and the domain of application.
Experimentation on 10 different datasets was performed, agnostic of their application
domains. While it was found that domain information can be helpful to increase
the accuracy of attacks, it was possible to attack models, with a greater than 50%
evasion rate, with knowledge of only the feature space. Additional experiments were
performed with non linear defender’s model, unknown to the attacker, and it was
found that the AP attacks was effective, irrespective of the model complexity. The
RE model was sensitive to the type of model, as it makes the linearity assumption
of class separation. Nevertheless, a majority of the cases show a high attack rate,
indicating the efficacy of the domain agnostic SEE attacks. Moreover, experimentation
on a true remote black box system, the Google Cloud Platform’s prediction service,
demonstrated the efficacy of launching exploratory attacks in the real world.
• Claim b: Classification accuracy, as a metric of predictive performance, has little
significance in adversarial domains.
The SEE framework when evaluated on 3 cybersecurity datasets, showed that while
each of these datasets had a perceived initial accuracy of 90%, it took less than 21
samples, on average, to find a legitimate sample which goes undetected. Based on the
SEE framework, an average attack accuracy of 97% was possible for the AP approach
and 87% for the RE approach. This indicates that defender’s accuracy measure is
not the best metric to denote security, in these applications. All these attacks were
launched by probing, without manipulating the learning algorithm of the defender. In
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case of the Google Cloud Platform, all models had an initial training accuracy >90%,
which was perceived as a good fit for the application. However, it was observed that an
attack rate of >97% was possible against these models. This makes accuracy provide
a false sense of security in adversarial environments.
• Claim c: The proposed SEE framework can be used to simulate exploratory attacks
on machine learning systems, ranging from simple evasion to reverse engineering of
the classification model.
The proposed SEE framework was used to simulate AP and RE attacks on 10 real
world classification datasets. The AP attacks used ground truth legitimate points to
launch attacks, while the reverse engineering model learned the classifications bound-
ary to launch diverse attacks. The SEE framework sets the attack as a search problem,
and is general in its applicability, based on the attacker goals, resources and desired
effects. A quick attack with low probing budget is possible using an implementation
similar to the AP attack. A long term and effective attack is possible if large number
of probes can be made to the system, so as to reverse engineer the model. The SEE
framework was able to demonstrate both classes of attacks, under a common generic
data driven framework. This framework was shown to be effective for vulnerability
analysis, under different data domains and choice of defender models, including a real
world application where it is evaluated on the Google Cloud Platform’s prediction
model.
• Claim d: Cloud based machine-learning-as-a-service providers, providing off-the-shelf
predictive capability, are also not safe, as they can be attacked by non intrusive probing
Experiments on Google Cloud Platform’s prediction API was performed to analyze
the efficacy of the proposed SEE framwork, against a true remote black box model.
We used the API as a client user, to probe the model and then launch adversarial
samples against the trained model. It was seen that even when models were trained
according to effective cross-validation principles, to provide a high accuracy of 97.3%,
on average, the models were still evaded with an attack rate of 99.3%. This was
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possible even though no information about the trained model was available to the
adversary. This demonstrates the fundamental vulnerability of machine learning,
which requires a domain agnostic analysis and solution.
The purpose of this chapter is to make the model designers aware of the nature of
attacks that invade classification systems, from a purely data driven perspective. These
attacks can change data distribution over time, violating the stationarity assumption of
machine learning models, making them ineffective for providing security. Wearing the white




REACTING TO DATA DISTRIBUTION CHANGES - DETECTING CONCEPT
DRIFT FROM UNLABELED STREAMING DATA USING MARGIN DENSITY
In Chapter 3, it is seen that an adversary can probe the deployed classifier model,
to evade it at test time. This evasion is done by crafting samples, whose distribution is
different from the training phase, for the Malicious class samples. Detecting and handling
of these changes, is an important aspect of reactive security measures. However, most
works on reactive security is contributed by research in the domain of concept drift. In
this domain, dealing with changes to data distribution is emphasized. As such, we start
our analysis of the dynamic aspects of attacks by developing a reliable unsupervised drift
detection methodology, which can operate in a streaming environment. The methodology
in this chapter is developed independently of the application domain. Since attacks cause
the distribution to drift at test time, this methodology aims to detect it as a performance
affecting change in the test time distribution of data. The generic nature and effectiveness
of the methodology, demonstrates it to be an effective reactive strategy for detecting and
handling concept drift.
4.1 Detection of concept drift from unlabeled data
Machine learning models in real world applications operate in an environment where
the data distribution can change constantly. These changes, called concept drift, can cause
the performance of the model to degrade over time [58]. As such, it is necessary to adopt an
adaptive strategy, which can detect changes and update the model, when new data is avail-
able. While updating a model requires labeled data (for retraining), the detection process
Parts of this chapter are published in [9–11].
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does not have to. Labeling is a time consuming and expensive activity, which often requires
human intervention. The scale of modern day machine learning applications and the volume
of requests, makes labeling a luxury which is not affordable and is impractical [61]. There is
therefore a need to reduce the dependence on labeled samples, in the stream classification
process. While, periodic retraining of classifiers will need labeled samples from time to
time; the continuous use of labeled samples to verify model performance (in-order to detect
drifts) is a wasted effort, especially when drifts are infrequent. Majority of the adaptive
techniques mentioned in literature [63, 65], rely on the unhindered and infinite availability
of labeled data, making their applicability to the real world, suspect. This chapter develops
a reliable reactive approach to dealing with concept drift, from unlabeled streaming data.
We take a domain independent and adversarial agnostic approach to drift detection, where
any changes in the data leading to classification degradation, is considered relevant. This
allows for a purely concept drift perspective on the problem of data distribution changes
(adversarial or otherwise), making it widely applicable for different application needs.
Being able to detect drifts from unlabeled data, is necessary to ensure scalable us-
age of adaptive classification systems. However, the existing methods of unlabeled drift
detection are essentially change detection techniques, which signal an alarm for any shift in
the data distribution, irrespective of its effect on the classification process [7, 64, 156–158].
For the task of classification, change is relevant only when it causes model performance to
degrade. This relevance is a function of the learned model, as illustrated in Figure 4.1,
where the same data shift resulted in diametrically opposite results. In Figure 4.1a), the
model performance is unaffected, while in b), there is a complete failure in the prediction
capabilities of C2. The difference lies in the classier models C1 and C2, which are a result
of learning on different views of the same data. The existing unlabeled techniques fail to
make this distinction between the two cases, as they totally exclude the classifier from the
detection process and make decisions solely on the distribution characteristics of the unla-
beled data. This results in increased sensitivity to change and a large number of generated
false alarms.
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Figure 4.1: Drift as a function of the learned classifier model.
False alarms in drift detection, makes the algorithm overly paranoid and leads to
wasted labeling effort, to verify if the change is relevant to the classification task. This
behavior is especially undesirable in cybersecurity applications because- a) Frequent false
alarms annoys experts who provide model verification, causing the detection process to
loose credibility, b) An overly reactive system can be used by an adversary to manipulate
learning or to cause it to spend an excessive amount of money on labeling [41] and c)
increased labeling due to false alarms are expensive (even using crowd-sourcing websites at
large scale, every day is expensive) and they cause delay in detection of attacks.
From a probabilistic perspective, concept drift can be seen as a change in the joint
probability distribution of the data samples X and their corresponding class labels Y, as per
Equation 4.1 [159]. Unlabeled change detection techniques track changes to P (X), while
the labeled drift detection approaches directly track P (Y |X). In this chapter, an unlabeled
drift detection methodology is proposed, which can vicariously track changes to P (Y |X),
without needing explicit labeled samples. Changes are tracked based on the distribution of
samples relative to the learned classifier’s boundary, to make it robust towards irrelevant
changes in distribution of data.
P (X,Y ) = P (Y |X).P (X) (4.1)
The Margin Density Drift Detection (MD3) methodology, proposed in this chapter,
monitors the number of samples in a classifier’s region of uncertainty (its margin), to detect
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Figure 4.2: Classifier blindspots (margin) for SVM (left) and Feature-Bagged Ensemble
(right).
drift. Robust classifiers, such as Support Vector Machines(SVM) [148] or a feature bagged
ensemble [118], after training, have regions of uncertainty called margins as depicted in
Figure 4.2. These regions are a result of the classifier’s attempt to generalize over unseen
data and they represent the model’s best guess over that data space. A large margin width
with a low density (given by number of samples) is at the core of any optimization based
classification process (such as SVM). While, explicit information about class distribution
is learned in the training of a classifier, an additional auxiliary information also learned
and often overlooked is the margin characteristics, such as the expected margin density.
This information is representative of the data state and any change in it could indicate
non-stationarity. Margin is crucial to the generalization process and any changes to the
margin density is worthy of further verification. Since the margin density can be computed
from unlabeled data only, it could be used as a substitute to explicit-labeled drift detection
techniques, for monitoring changes in P (Y |X).
In this chapter, we present the proposed MD3 approach and test the following claims:
a) The MD3 approach can be used as a substitute for fully labeled approaches to detect
drifts, without significant reduction in the predictive accuracy over the stream, b) The
MD3 approach can reduce the number of false alarms compared to other traditional change
tracking unlabeled methodologies, c) The MD3 approach can perform computations incre-
mentally in a streaming environment and can be used independently of the type of classifier
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used and the application domain, and d) The robustness of MD3 leads to less labeling
effort needed in the adaptation process. The MD3 algorithm is proposed as a streaming
drift detection algorithm and as such it needs to operate under the constraints of stream-
ing data, which are: Data samples need to be processed one at a time continuously, only
limited amount of memory is available to store past information and response needs to
be swift and in near real time. The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents
background work relevant to labeled and unlabeled drift detection approaches. Section 4.3
presents the Margin Density metric and the Margin Density Drift Detection (MD3) stream-
ing algorithm, which uses the margin density metric. Experimental results on drift induced
datasets, real world concept drift datasets from cybersecurity domains, and benchmark
concept drift datasets, are presented in Section 4.4. Additional discussion regarding the
efficacy of the margin based approach, when compared to other state of the art uncertainty
tracking methodologies, is presented in Section 4.5. Conclusion and chapter summary is
presented in Section 4.6.
4.2 Review of concept drift detection techniques
Detecting change is essential to trigger based stream adaptation strategies. Several
methods in literature have been proposed recently (Table 4.1, [63]). The techniques can be
divided into two categories, based on their reliance on labeled data: Explicit/Supervised
drift detectors and Implicit/Unsupervised drift detectors. Explicit drift detectors rely on
labeled data to compute performance metrics, such as accuracy and f-measure, which they
can monitor online over time. They signal drop in performance and as such are efficient in
signaling change when it matters. Implicit drift detectors rely on properties of the unlabeled
data features, to signal deviations. They are prone to false alarms, but their ability to func-
tion without labeling, makes them useful in applications where labeling is expensive, time
consuming or not available. Table 4.1 shows a taxonomy of the drift detection techniques
with popular techniques in each category.
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4.2.1 Explicit concept drift detection methodologies
4.2.1.1 Sequential analysis methodologies
These techniques continuously monitor the sequence of performance metrics, such
as accuracy, f-measure, precision and recall; to signal a change, in the event of a significant
drop in the values. The CUmulative SUM (CUSUM) approach of [160], signals an alarm
when the mean of the sequence significantly deviates from 0. As per Equation 4.2, the
CUSUM test monitors a metric M, at time t, on an incoming sample’s performance εt,
using parameters v for acceptable deviation and θ for change threshold.
M0 = 0; Mt = max(0,Mt−1 + εt − v)
if Mt > θ then
′alarm′ and Mt = 0
(4.2)
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where, M0 is the initial metric at time t=0. Mt is the current metric computed as
an accumulation of the metric so far - Mt−1, and the sample’s performance at time t= εt.
The parameter v denotes acceptable deviation from mean and θ is the change detection
threshold. The max function in the above equation is used to test changes in the positive
direction, for a reverse effect (i.e., to measure drop in accuracy), a min function can be used.
This test is memory-less and can be used incrementally. A variant of this approach is the
Page-Hinckley Test (PHT) [160], which was originally developed in the signal processing
domain to detect deviation from mean of the Gaussian signal. PHT monitor the metric as
an accumulated difference between its mean and current values, as per Equation 4.3.
M0 = 0; Mt = Mt−1 + (εt − v); MRef = min (V )
if Mt −MRef > θ then ′alarm′ and Mt = 0
(4.3)
where, the terms have the same meaning as in case of Equation 4.2, as described
above. Both the CUSUM and the PHT, are best suited for univariate change detection of
a sequence of performance measures, tracked for online algorithms. A related statistical
change detection was proposed in [161], to deal with imbalanced streaming data, which
monitors multiple performance metrics. The technique monitors the true positive rate, false
positive rate, true negative rate and false positive rate, obtained from the confusion matrix
of the classification. The confusion matrix presents a detailed view of the classification
performance by explicitly monitoring the number of true positives, false positive, false
negative and true negatives, as shown in Figure 4.3. While traditional metrics of accuracy
are biased towards the majority class, the confusion matrix presents a more detailed view,
suitable for imbalance class problems.
4.2.1.2 Statistical Process Control based methodologies
The Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning model of machine learning,
states that the error rate of a trained model will decrease with increasing number of samples,
if the data distribution remains stationary [150]. The drift detection techniques based on
Statistical Process Control, monitor the online trace of error rates, and detects deviations
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Figure 4.3: Confusion matrix showing the four classification performance metrics.
based on ideas taken from control charts. A significantly increased error rate violates the
PAC model and as such is assumed to be a result of concept drift. The Drift Detection
Method (DDM) [162] and the Early Drift Detection Methodology (EDDM) [163] are popular
techniques in this category.
The DDM approach monitors the probability of error at time t as pt and the standard
deviation as st =
√
pt(1− pt)/i. When, pt+st reaches its minimum value, the corresponding
values are stored in pmin and smin. A warning is signaled when pt + st ≥ pmin + 2 ∗ smin
and a drift is signaled when pt + st ≥ pmin + 3 ∗ smin. The EDDM was developed as an
extension of DDM, and was suitable for slow moving gradual drifts, where DDM failed.
EDDM monitors the number of samples between two classification errors, as a metric to be
tracked online for drift detection. Based on PAC model, it was assumed that, in stationary
environments, the distance (in number of samples) between two subsequent errors would
increase.
The Statistical Test of Equal Proportions (STEPD) [164], computes the accuracy of
a chunk C of recent samples and compares it with the overall accuracy from the beginning
of the stream, using a chi-squared test to check for deviation. An incremental approach was
proposed in [165], where the Exponentially Weighted Moving Average(EWMA) was used
to signal deviation in the average error rate, in terms of the number of standard deviations
from the mean. The metric M (here, error rate) at time t is updated as per Equation 4.4.
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M0 = µ0; Mt = λ ∗Mt−1 + (1− λ) ∗ εt
if Mt − µ0 > θ ∗ σ0 then ′alarm′
(4.4)
where, µ0 and σ0 are mean and standard deviation obtained from the train data,
by random sampling. The error rate at time t is given by εt, θ is the acceptable deviation
in terms of number of standard deviation from the mean, and λ is the forgetting factor
which controls the effect of previous data on the current sample. The EDDM, STEPD and
EWMA, also employ the warning and subsequent drift signaling system as in the DDM
approach.
4.2.1.3 Window based distribution monitoring methodologies
Unlike all the methods mentioned thus far, which operate in an incremental fash-
ion one sample at a time, window based approaches use a chunk based or sliding window
approach over the recent samples, to detect changes. Deviations are computed by compar-
ing the current chunk’s distribution to a reference distribution obtained at the start of the
stream, from the training dataset [166]. Window based approaches provide precise local-
ization of change point, and are robust to noise and transient changes. However, they do
need extra memory to store the two distributions over time.
The Adaptive Windowing (ADWIN) algorithm of [166], uses a variable length sliding
window, whose length is computed online, according to the observed changes. In case change
is present, the window is shrunk and vice-versa. Whenever, two large enough sub windows,
of the current sliding window, exhibit distinct averages of the performance metric, a drift
is detected. Hoeffding bounds [176] are used to determine optimal change threshold and
window parameters. The ADWIN methodology was shown to provide rigorous performance
guarantees, efficient memory and time complexities, and freedom from having to specify
cumbersome parameter values. Another window based approach- the Degree of Drift (DoD),
detects drifts by computing a distance map of all samples in the current chunk and their
nearest neighbors from the previous chunk [167]. The Degree of Drift metric is computed
based on a distance map and if the distance increases more than θ, a drift is signaled. The
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Paired Learners approach of [177], uses a pair of reactive learner, trained on recent chunk
of data, and a stable learner, trained on all previously seen data. Differences in accuracies
between the two approaches is indicative of a drift. This disagreement is captured in a binary
valued circular list, and an increase in the number of ones beyond a change threshold θ, is
signaled as concept drift. Drift is managed by replacing the stable model with the reactive
one and setting the circular disagreement list to all zeros.
A recently proposed permutation based method [168], relies on the assumption than
randomly choosing training and testing data from a chunk of data should lead to similar
accuracy of prediction, unless the window has nonstationary data. This method is based on
the idea commonly used in classifier’s cross validation evaluation [178]. In cross validation,
the entire training dataset is split into K bands (sequential sets of samples). In each iteration
or fold of the cross validation approach, one band is chosen as the test data and the other
(K-1) bands form the training dataset. Generating a model on the training dataset and
then testing on the test dataset, gives the performance on that fold of the cross validation
process. The same process is repeated K times and the average performance is reported.
Cross validation provides a good estimate of the generalization error, when the data is
stationary. The permutation approach of [168], splits the current window into two parts to
train a model on the first half and test on the second half. The window is then shuffled and
the process is repeated. A significant change in the performance between the two indicates
a drift, as concept drift is sensitive to the sequence of data. This method was shown to
have better precision-recall values and robustness, when compared with the DDM, EDDM
and the STEPD described in Section 4.2.1.2.
4.2.2 Implicit drift detection methodologies
4.2.2.1 Novelty detection / Clustering based methods
Novelty detection methods relies on using distance and/or density information to de-
tect previously unseen data distribution patterns. These methods are capable of identifying
uncertain suspicious samples which need further evaluation; and they define an additional
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Figure 4.4: Distinction between Novelty (S2) and Drift (S1) in DETECTNOD [7].
‘unknown’ class label to indicate that these samples do not fit the existing view of the
data [156]. Clustering and outlier based approaches are popular implementation strate-
gies for detecting novel patterns, as they summarize current data and can use dissimilarity
metrics to identify new samples [158].
The OnLIne Novelty and Drift Detection Algorithm (OLINDDA), uses K-means
data clustering to continuously monitor and adapt to emerging data distributions [156].
Unknown samples are stored in a short term memory queue, and are periodically clustered
and then either merged with existing similar cluster profiles or added as a novel profile to the
pool of clusters. The MINAS algorithm of [169], uses micro clusters which it obtains using
an incremental stream clustering algorithm- CluStream, and it extends the OLINDDAs
approach to be used in a multi class problem. The DETECTNOD algorithm of [7], uses
a clustering model to define the boundaries of existing known data. It relies on Discrete
Cosine Transform (DCT) to build a compact representation of these clusters and uses this
information to provide a nearest neighbor approximation on incoming test samples. Samples
falling out of the normal mode, are clustered into k clusters and based on their similarity
values to existing clusters, they are either termed as ‘Novelties’ or ‘Drifts’. Figure 4.4
illustrates this process, where S1 is identified as a drift in the existing normal mode sub
clusters and S2 is identified as a novel pattern.
The Woo ensemble [158] and the ECSMiner [157], are two techniques which rely on
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the concept of micro clusters. The Woo ensemble clusters data and assigns a classifier to
each of these clusters. A new sample falling outside the boundary of any existing cluster
is marked suspicious and its density is monitored. An increased number of samples within
the radius of suspicious samples indicates a new concept, which then triggers retraining
of models and readjustment of the cluster centroid. The ECSMiner uses the concept of
Filtered Outliers, which represent samples which fall outside the boundary of all existing
clusters, and works similar to the Woo ensemble. The GC3 approach of [102], extends this
idea of micro clusters to be used with a grid density based clustering algorithm, where
novelty is determined by newly appearing dense grids in the data space.
All the above novelty detection techniques, rely on clustering to recognize new regions
of space, which are previously unseen. As such they suffer from the curse of dimensionality,
being distance dependent, and also the problem of dealing with binary data spaces. Addi-
tionally they are suitable to detect only specific type of cluster-able drifts. If the drift does
not manifest itself as a new cluster or a novel region of space, these detection techniques
will fail. Nevertheless, these techniques are suitable for multi-class classification problems
where many classes can appear and disappear during the course of the stream.
4.2.2.2 Multivariate distribution monitoring
Multivariate distribution monitoring approaches, directly monitor the per feature
distribution of the unlabeled data. These approaches are primarily chunk based, which
store summarized information of the training data chunk (as histograms of binned values),
as the reference distribution, to monitor changes in the current data chunk. Hellinger
distance and KL-divergence are commonly used to measure differences between the two
chunk distributions [179], and to signal drift in the event of a significant change.
The Change of Concept (CoC) technique [170], considers each feature as an indepen-
dent stream of data, and monitors correlation between the current chunk and the reference
training chunk. Change in the average correlation over the features is used as a signal
of change. Pearson correlation was used, which makes the normality assumption for the
97
distribution. A non parametric and widely applicable unlabeled approach was proposed
in [64], called the Hellinger Distance Drift Detection Methodology (HDDDM). It is a chunk
based approach which uses Hellinger distance to measure change in distribution, over time.
An increased Hellinger distance, between the current stream chunk and a training reference
chunk, is used to signal drift. Chunk distribution is computed by making a histogram for
each feature, with
√
N bins where N is the number of samples in the chunk. The Hellinger
distance (HD) between the reference chunk P and the current chunk Q is computed using




















The computed Hellinger distance, which is averaged over all the features, results in a
number in the range [0,
√
2]. A HD value of 0 indicated completely overlapping distributions
while
√
2 indicates total divergence. The HDDDM approach in [64], was used to detect drifts
in conjunction with an incremental learning algorithm, to trigger resetting of the model.
Efficacy of this approach was indicated by increased accuracy, which was a result of the
interventions leading to retraining, upon drifts detection.
To make the drift detection computationally efficient in high dimensional data streams,
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based feature reduction was used in [171] and [172],
which reduce the set of features to be monitored. It was shown that monitoring the re-
duced feature space allowed to detect drifts in the original features. [171] advocates the
use of the Semi Parametric Log Likelihood (SPLL) criterion to monitor changes in the
data projected on the principal components. It was proposed that monitoring the principal
components with the lowest 10% of Eigenvalues is sufficient for detecting effective drifts.
However, the work in [172], presented contrasting results. It was shown that analyzing
principal components with large Eigenvalues is more valuable, as data characteristics in the
original feature space are best summarized by the top component vectors, which retain the
maximum variance after the reduction.
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Although, the PCA based approached are efficient in reducing the number of features
to be tracked, they still suffer from significant false alarms, as do the other multivariate
distribution approaches. All of these methods are sensitive to changes in any of the fea-
tures, irrespective of their importance to the classification task. These methods are also
not suitable for detecting concept drifts in cases where drift is not manifested by feature
distribution changes (P (Y |X) changes but not P (X)). Furthermore, in the classification of
imbalanced datasets, these methods are not effective in tracking the changes to the minority
class samples. Changes in these samples do not signal a significant deviation, as minority
class samples comprise only a small percentage of the original dataset.
4.2.2.3 Model dependent drift detection methodologies
The methodologies of Section 4.2.2.1 and 4.2.2.2, explicitly track deviations in the
feature distribution of the unlabeled data. As such, they are essentially change detection
methodologies, which assume that a change in data distribution P (X) will lead to changes
in the classification performance P (Y |X). While these methods are attractive for their
independence to the type of classifier used, these methods lead to detecting a large number
of false alarms (i.e., changes which do not lead to degradation of classification performance).
False alarms lead to wasted human intervention effort and as such are undesirable. The
model dependent approaches of [107, 173–175], directly consider the classification process
by tracking the posterior probability estimates of classifiers, to detect drift. They can
be used with probabilistic classifiers, which output the class probabilities P (Y |X) before
thresholding them to generate the final class label. By monitoring the posterior probability
estimates, the drift detection task is reduced to that of monitoring a univariate stream of
values, making the process computationally efficient.
The use of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, Wilcoxon rank sum test and the two sam-
ple t-test, was suggested in [175], to monitor the stream of posterior probability estimates.
The idea of margin was introduced, by using a 1-norm SVM, and the average uncertainty
of samples was monitored in lieu of the multivariate feature values. This idea was extended
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by [173], to the task of detecting domain shifts in high dimensional text classification appli-
cations. A reduced false positive rate was obtained by tracking the ‘A-distance’, which was
proposed as a measure of histogram difference obtained by binning the margin distribution
of samples, between the reference and current margin samples. The Confidence Distribution
Batch Detection (CDBD) approach [174], used KL-divergence to perform a similar analysis
of classifier confidence output values (margin), to detect drifts over text streams. Addition-
ally, they combine the drift detection with active learning, to further reduce the amount of
labeled data requested.
These methods are attractive as they significantly reduce false alarms. However,
their dependence on using probabilistic models limit their applicability. Also, these methods
trigger to any change in the posterior distribution of the margin samples. Changes away
from the margin of the classifier are less critical to the classification process, but none of
the above mentioned approaches provide robustness against such changes.
4.2.3 Unlabeled drift detection in adversarial classification
In the domain of adversarial classification, where concept drift is initiated by an
attacker intending to subvert the system, unlabeled drift detection can be extremely helpful
as an automated early warning system. Ensemble based techniques have been proposed
in [117] and [103], which use disagreement scores between the ensemble models, to signal
changes to the data distribution. In [117], an ensemble of classifiers is used to perform
email spam classification. The average pairwise mutual agreement of the classifiers in the
ensemble was used to signal change and drive retraining. However, the methodology also
relies on periodic checking, using labeled samples, to ensure that high agreement is not a
result of undetected changes affecting most classifiers. Recent work in [53], also indicates
the relationship between drift and classifier agreement scores. Feature bagging was found to
be effective in characterizing adversarial activity in the task of malicious pdf classification.
Drifts caused the classifier agreements to shift disproportionately towards the center of the
[0,1] range, instead of being concentrated at the peripheries. The work in [53], concentrates
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on an empirical analysis of this effect and provides initial experimentation specific to the
pdf malware domain. A visual inspection of the change is presented. However, harnessing
it as a signal for change in the context of streaming data was not explored.
The proposed Margin Density Drift Detection (MD3) technique, in this chapter,
provides a way to signal drift from unlabeled data, in a reliable manner. Unlike other implicit
drift detection techniques, the proposed MD3 approach is less susceptible to raising false
alarms. By actively including the learned classifier’s information into the decision process,
the MD3 approach is able to discern changes that could adversely affect the classification
performance. As such, it embodies the benefits of both the classes of drift detectors - like
explicit drift detectors, it detects drifts only when they can impact classification results, and
it does so using unlabeled data, saving labeling budget as with the implicit drift detectors.
In doing so, the approach bridges the gap between the two categories of drift detectors, by
providing the first of its kind - domain independent, cost-effective and model independent,
drift detection scheme for reliably signaling change in high dimensional data streams.
4.3 The Margin Density Drift Detection (MD3) methodology
The proposed margin density approach for detecting drifts, uses the average number
of samples in a classifier’s margin as a univariate signal to be tracked over time. The MD3
approach provides a distribution independent, classifier type independent, unlabeled drift
detection approach, capable of detecting drifts from high dimensional streaming data; with
high robustness towards stray changes and false alarms. The margin density metric along
with the motivation behind its usage is presented in Section 4.3.1. Computing margin
density from probabilistic and non probabilistic classifiers is presented in Section 4.3.2,
along with synthetic experiments on a 2D dataset to demonstrate its change detection
characteristics. Use of margin density signal in a streaming algorithm to detect concept
drift and trigger retraining, is described in Section 4.3.3.
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4.3.1 Motivation
The ability to generalize from the training dataset is at the core of any classification
technique. This generalization effort leads to regions of space, known as margins (Fig-
ure 4.2), where the classifier is uncertain and tries to present a best guess, based on its
learned information. Margin is the portion of the prediction space, which is most vul-
nerable to misclassification. This intuition has been used by existing works on active
learning [104, 105], to develop labeling strategies based on uncertainty of data samples.
The Uncertainty sampling technique [180] and the Query By Committee technique [104],
are two methodologies which select samples based on the distance from the classification
boundary and the disagreement between ensemble models for a given samples, respectively.
These approaches explore the informativeness of the margin samples for the task of man-
aging labeling budget efficiently. They advocate a reduced dependence on labeled samples,
but still rely on continuous monitoring of stream with labeled data. The MD3 approach
explores the use of margin tracking for unlabeled drift detection.
A change in the number of samples in the margin is indicative of a drift, as depicted in
Figure 4.5, where the distribution of samples with respect to their distances from the classi-
fier boundary is shown, against a fixed margin. A sudden increase or decrease in the number
of samples within the margin, makes the stationary assumption of data, suspect. Classifiers
define margin width and acceptable misclassifications during the training process, to avoid
over fitting. As such tracking a sudden change in the margin characteristics can indicate
distribution changes. Changes of data distribution relative to the classification boundary,
enables tracking of the posterior probability distribution of the space P (Y |X) without using
labeled data, by tacitly involving the classifier in the detection process. Thus, the change
relevance, which is a function of the learned model (Figure 4.1), is directly included in the
detection process. By using a fixed margin and by tracking the density of the samples clos-
est to the classification boundary, the proposed MD3 approach avoids false alarms caused
by changes away from the boundary, which seldom result in any performance degradation.
This makes the change detection process robust, and provides a better approach to utilizing
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(a) Initial distribution of sam-
ples wrt. distance from classifier
boundary.
(b) Drift causing increase in
margin density.
(c) Sudden drift causing drop in
margin density.
Figure 4.5: Drifting scenarios and their effects on the margin density.
the margin, than the existing margin based methods described in Section 4.2.2.3.
The idea of margin is intuitive in probabilistic classifiers, which have an explicit
notion of uncertainty. However, the motivation behind its usage is much more general. A
classifier’s boundary is an embodiment of the set of features which it deems important to
the prediction task at hand. Monitoring changes close to the boundary enables us to limit
tracking to the important features only. The multivariate approaches of Section 4.2.2.2
suffer from false alarms, because they do not differentiate between changes in any of the
features, giving equal weights to all features. The margin density approach tracks margin
changes, which summarizes the important features and their interaction, which results in
boundary formation.
In a real world high dimensional datasets, there are multiple sets of features which
can provide high classification performance. A robust classifier, such as a SVM with hinge
loss or a feature bagged ensemble, can utilize a majority of these features, by evenly dis-
tributing weights among them, to create a better generalization over the data [71, 123]. In
doing so, the classifier model serves as a committee of experts with multiple independent
perspectives on the same data. A change in any one perspective (set of features), will cause
an increased disagreement and consequent uncertainty in the predicted results. Since, only
relevant features can provide a good perspective on data, this uncertainty is indicative of
a drift which requires attention. The robust classifier functions as a self-contained, self-
monitoring prediction unit, aware of its own capabilities and deviations. In Figure 4.6, the
coupled classifier C1 ∨ C2, leads to a monitoring scheme where C1 and C2 are constantly
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Figure 4.6: Change detected by coupled classifiers C1 ∨ C2.
monitoring each other. This coupled detection strategy can be extended to high dimensional
spaces, and it provides an unsupervised approach where changes in some relevant features
are triggered by corresponding invariances in other relevant features. Using this idea, the
margin density approach can be extended to classifiers such as decision trees and K- nearest
neighbors, which provide explicit class labels and not probabilistic values, by using them in
a feature bagging ensemble. This ensemble setup trains multiple base models, on different
subset of features, and combines their results. This has the effect of distributing classifica-
tion importance weights to the different features, as the features are averaged to produce
the final prediction.
4.3.2 The Margin Density (MD) metric
The Margin Density (MD) is introduced as a univariate metric, which can be tracked
over time, to detect drifts from unlabeled data. The MD metric is defined as:
Definition 4.3.1. Margin Density (MD): The expected number of data samples that
fall within a robust classifier’s (one that distributes importance weights among its features)
region of uncertainty (its margin).
The MD metric, being a ratio, has its value in the range of [0,1]. MD can be
computed from classifiers with explicit notions of margins, such as a linear kernel SVM. It
can also be computed by disagreement scores of feature bagged ensembles. Here, the term
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margin is taken as a notation for the regions of uncertainty of a robust classifier, where the
classification importance weights are distributed among its features. For SVM, the margin
is well defined by the algorithm, but for other classifiers, such as decision trees, we use the
notion of a pseudo-margin given by the region of space with high disagreement based on a
feature bagged ensemble. The term margin will be used to refer to the region of uncertainty
for both the cases, as a notation. Section 4.3.2.1 shows how the MD can be computed for
these two cases and Section 4.3.2.2 shows its ability to detect different kinds of changes in
the data distribution, by experimentation on a synthetic dataset.
4.3.2.1 Computing the margin density metric
Classifiers with explicit margins
Classifiers such as Support Vector Machines (SVM) and Logistic regression, explicitly
define margins in their setup [148]. A soft margin linear kernel SVM finds an optimal
maximum width separating hyperplane between two classes, by allowing a few samples to
enter the margin, for better generalization capability. This is made possible by the addition
of slack variables (ξ) to the SVM’s objective function, to allow for non separable cases and
to add robustness against noisy samples close to the SVM boundary. The optimization
function of a linear kernel soft margin SVM is given in Equation 4.6 [148], where w is the
normal vector of the separating hyperplane given by w.x+ b = 0 and b gives the offset from
the origin, yi is the class label of the sample xi and C is the regularization cost parameter









Tw + b) ≥ 1− ξi; ξi ≥ 0
The above equation learns a linear boundary, which separates the two classes with
a margin of width 2/||w|| given by w.x± b = 1, as shown in Figure 4.7. The trained SVM
model, has an expected number of samples in the margin, due to its soft constraints. The
margin density here, is given by the ratio of samples which fall inside the margin of the
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Figure 4.7: SVM with margin w.x± b = 1.
SVM, as per Equation 4.7. The signal function S(w,b)(x) checks if a given sample x falls





; ∀x ∈ X
where, S(w,b)(x) =

1, if |w.x+ b| ≤ 1
0, otherwise
(4.7)
The set of unlabeled samples is given by X and the distance from the hyperplane
is given by |w.x + b|. This term is threshold by a sign() function, to produce the final
class label of +1 or -1. If the distance from the hyperplane, for a sample x, is within the
margin (≤ 1), then the signal function S returns a 1; denoting that it contributes to the
margin density. For other probabilistic classifiers, such as logistic regression, which return
probability of class +1 or -1 as p(y = +1|x) and p(y = −1|x), the confidence is computed
as |p(y = +1|x) − p(y = −1|x)| and the threshold θmargin (typically taken as 0.5) is used
to specify the cutoff for uncertain samples. Samples with confidence less than θmargin, con-
tribute to the margin density.
Classifier without explicit margins
Classifiers such as decision trees [153] and K-nearest neighbors [151], return discrete
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Algorithm 4.1: Random Subspace Ensemble
Training:
for i= 1,2,3,...,K: do
Select J random features from all D features
Construct Ci in XJ and add it to ensemble E
Classification:
Use majority voting to provide prediction on the input sample x.
y(x) = argmaxy(votes(y))
class labels and they do not have any intuitive notion of margin. These models are consid-
ered unstable [121], and they reduce the number of features necessary to build the models.
In order to make them robust and to distribute weights across features, they are used with
a feature bagging ensemble technique. Feature bagging improves generalization of unstable
classifiers, by training multiple base models of the classifier on different subset of features,
from the original D-dimensional data space [118]. Random subspace [123,181] is an imple-
mentation strategy for feature bagging and is given by Algorithm 4.1. The entire feature
space of D features is divided into K randomly chosen subspaces, with J features each, and
a classifier is trained on each of these subspaces. The resulting ensemble E has classifiers
Ci; i = 1..K, and majority voting is used to predict the final label y for a given sample x.
By employing random subspace ensemble, any base classifier type can be made robust and
the margin density signal can be extracted from it.
In Algorithm 4.1, the set of K models in the ensemble D, are trained on different
views of the feature space and serve as a committee of experts with independent views on
the prediction problem. An increased disagreement between the models is indicative of high
uncertainty over a sample. The margin density MD for this type of models is computed by
measuring the number of samples which have high uncertainty, as given by Equation 4.8.
The Signal function SE(x), checks to see if the sample x has certainty less than θmargin
(typically taken as 0.5). In the equation below, pE refers to the voted mean predicted class














The set of unlabeled samples X is collected and the ratio of samples which have
critical uncertainty (≤ θmargin), is given as the margin density. The ensemble E can be
comprised of classifier of any type (even heterogeneous classifiers can be considered), mak-
ing the margin density approach applicable irrespective of the choice of the classification
algorithm used.
4.3.2.2 Change in margin density (∆MD) as an indicator of drift
To understand behavior of the margin density metric and its efficacy as an indicator
of drift, it is evaluated here on a synthetic dataset, under different change scenarios. A
change scenario is setup by generating an initial distribution of 500 samples, used for training
a model, and then generating 500 additional samples from a changed distribution, for testing
the model. The change in margin density (∆MD) is evaluated as the difference in margin
densities of the training and test data: ∆MD = |MDTrain−MDTest|. By comparing ∆MD
with changes in the training and testing error (∆Err), which is representative of a metric
used by fully labeled drift detectors, the effectiveness of MD to detect true drifts is evaluated.
Similarly, a comparison with traditional feature based unlabeled drift detection techniques is
evaluated, by checking the Hellinger distance between the distributions (∆HD) [64]. Since
∆Err and ∆MD are within the range [0,1] and ∆HD has a range of [0,
√
2], the ∆HD values
were normalized to [0,1] by dividing the values by
√
2 in all the following experiments. The
margin density metric was evaluated for a linear kernel SVM and for a Random subspace
ensemble with 2 orthogonal C4.5 decision trees.
Experiments on a 2D synthetic dataset with two classes, using an SVM and a random
108
(a) A0 - Initial(SVM) (b) A0-A1 (c) A0-A2 (d) A0-A3 (e) A0-A4
(f) A0 - Initial(RS) (g) A0-A1 (h) A0-A2 (i) A0-A3 (j) A0-A4
Figure 4.8: Drift Scenarios with SVM (top) and random subspace (RS) (bottom) on 2D
synthetic dataset. A0 is the initial distribution. A1-A4 represent different drift scenarios.
TABLE 4.2
Results of change detection metrics ∆Err, ∆MD and ∆HD, on synthetic drifting scenarios.
Base Model- SVM RS
Drift Scenario Err MD HD Err MD HD
A0-A0 (Baseline) 0 0.01 0.12 0 0 0.12
A0-A1 0.19 0.43 0.33 0.5 0.5 0.33
A0-A2 0 -0.04 0.58 0 0 0.58
A0-A3 0.05 0.42 0.58 0.1 0.17 0.58
A0-A4 0.5 -0.05 0.69 0.5 0 0.69
B0-B0 (Baseline) 0 0.03 0.1 0 0 0.1
B0-B1 0 0.02 0.27 0 0 0.27
C0-C0 (Baseline) 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.11
C0-C1 0.41 -0.72 0.82 0.41 -0.19 0.82
subspace(RS) model are depicted in Figure 4.8. A0 represents the initial training distri-
bution of the samples and A1-A4 represent 4 different change situations. A change from
A0-A0, was considered as a control experiment to denote changes due to random sampling,
as shown in Table 4.2. The drift scenario A0-A1, represent changes which directly affects
classification boundary due to drift in one of the features. This causes the error to increase
by 19% for SVM and 50% for RS. Correspondingly, the MD changes by an average of 0.47
and the HD changes by 0.33. Since the Hellinger distance is computed from the unlabeled
data, independently of the learned classifier, the ∆HD values for SVM and RS are same for
109
any given scenario, shown in Table 4.2. Change scenarios A0-A2 and A0-A3, represent shift
of equal magnitude but opposite direction. In A0-A2, the shift is away from the margin,
while in A0-A3 the shift is towards the margin, as shown in Figure 4.8c) and d) for SVM,
and h) and i) for RS models. Both these scenarios result in the same change in ∆HD of
0.58, indicating shortcomings of traditional feature tracking approaches in differentiating
false alarms from relevant changes. The MD metric shows no change for the A0-A2 sce-
nario but detect the A0-A3, consistent with the error tracking approach. By using a fixed
margin and tracking its density, changes away from the margin are effectively ignored, as
they rarely cause performance degradation. This property of the margin density approach
makes it more resistant to false alarms, compared to other margin based methods [107,175].
An extreme data distribution shift is seen in Figure 4.8e) and j), which is representative of a
drastic drift affecting all features simultaneously; a situation rare in real world applications.
This change occur away from the margin and goes unnoticed by the ∆MD metric. They
are however, tracked by the ∆HD and ∆Err methods. These changes are rare in real
world operational environments and can be more effectively caught by novelty detection
methods described in Section 4.2.2.1, which are designed for such changes. The Hellinger
distance metric, in an attempt to provide completeness in drift detection, leads to excessive
false alarms. This effect is exacerbated in high dimensional datasets, where there are many
irrelevant features, which do not contribute to the classification process. This is illustrated
in Figure 4.9, where the Z-dimension is not useful to the prediction task. A drift in the Z-
direction leads to a false alarm by ∆HD but is correctly ignored by ∆Err and ∆MD, as
seen for the entry B0-B1 in Table 4.2.
An additional scenario C0 is presented, to indicate the need for tracking both a drop
as well as a rise in the margin density. The scenario C0-C1 as shown in Figure 4.10, is
common in case of non linear or tightly packed class distributions, which causes the initial
margin density to be high. This drift leads to a drop in the margin density, indicated
by negative values in Table 4.2, indicating the need to track the absolute value of margin
density change :|∆MD|. This is in contrast to the ∆Err and ∆HD metric, where only a
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(a) B0 - Initial(RS) (b) B0-B1
Figure 4.9: Drift Scenario in 3D synthetic dataset, change occurs along Z-dimension, which
is irrelevant to the classification task.
(a) C0 - Initial(SVM) (b) C0-C1(SVM)
(c) C0 - Initial(RS) (d) C0-C1(RS)
Figure 4.10: Drift scenario causing drop in margin density, with SVM model (top) and
random subspace model (RS) (bottom). C0 is the initial distribution of samples.
spike in error rate or Hellinger distance is considered relevant to change detection.
The analysis in this section indicates the ability to use the change in margin density
(∆MD), as a signal for drift detection. The MD metric signals change, when it is relevant
to the classification process, while providing high robustness against stray changes. Change
in irrelevant features, in high dimensional spaces and in regions away from the classifier’s
margin, are effectively filtered. This effect was observed for both - classifiers with explicit
margin and by using a random subspace ensemble, for cases where margin is not explicit.
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4.3.3 The Margin Density Drift Detection (MD3) algorithm
The MD3 algorithm, being a streaming data algorithm, needs to operate with limited
memory of past information, to continuously process data indefinitely, and has to provide a
quick response time. The change in margin density is used as a metric for detecting drift in
a streaming data environment. The incremental classification process, continuously receives
unlabeled samples X and predicts their class labels Y, based on the classification model C,
as shown in Figure 4.11. At any given time t, the signal function S(Xt), computes if the
sample Xt lies within the margin of C. This computation is performed using Equations 4.7
and 4.8, based on the type of model used. This signal is used to update the expected margin
density. A significant change in the margin density at time t (MDt), signals a change which
requires further inspection. Following this, the next Ntrain samples are requested to be
labeled by an external Oracle. The Oracle can be any entity which can provide true labels
for the unlabeled sample Xt, at a given cost. If the performance of C, on the Ntrain labeled
samples, is found to have degraded, a drift is confirmed and the model is retrained using
these collected labeled samples. In the MD3 approach, there is no need for continuous
monitoring using labeled samples, as the drift detection process is unsupervised. Labeling
is requested only when a drift is suspected, for confirmation and retraining. The MD
metric reduces the need for frequent confirmation, owing to its robustness toward irrelevant
changes, making the labeling process essentially for the retraining phase only.
The MD3 algorithm (Algorithm 4.2), begins with an initial trained classifier C, which
is obtained by learning from the initial labeled training dataset, before the model is made
online. From this initial training dataset, a reference distribution, summarizing margin and
performance characteristics of the dataset, is learned. This reference distribution comprises
of the expected margin density - MDRef , the acceptable deviation of the margin density
metric- σRef , expected accuracy on the training dataset - AccRef and its deviation σAcc.
These values are learned from the training dataset by using the K-fold cross validation
technique, commonly used for evaluating classifiers [178]. In the cross validation method,
the entire dataset is sequentially divided into K bands of samples. In the first iteration, the
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Figure 4.11: Overview of the MD3 algorithm in a stream classification setting.
first K-1 bands are used as a training dataset to learn model C and then the Kth band is used
to test the model. The process is repeated K times, where each band functions as the test
set exactly once. Accuracy and Margin density values from the K test sets are considered
results of random experimentation. The average values and standard deviation, of the test
accuracy and margin density, over the K iterations is used to form the reference distribution.
Cross validation allows to create a population of the metric values, to better estimate their
expected values and acceptable deviation. These values are then used to signal change
based on the desired level of sensitivity, given by parameter θ. Change is signaled when the
margin density at a time t, given by MDt, deviates by more than θ standard deviations
from the reference margin density value MDRef , as given by Equation 4.9. The same
sensitivity parameter is used to detect significant drop in performance, for the obtained
labeled samples, from the reference accuracy values as per Equation 4.10.
if |MDt −MDRef | > θ ∗ σRef ⇒ Drift suspected (4.9)
if (AccRef −AccLabeledSamples) > θ ∗ σAcc ⇒ Drift confirmed (4.10)
Here, LabeledSamples is the set of Ntrain samples, which were requested to be labeled
once a significant drift is suspected by Equation 4.9. A drop in accuracy confirms that
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Algorithm 4.2: The MD3 algorithm
Input : Unlabeled stream X, Initially trained model C, Reference
distribution (MDRef , σRef , AccRef , σAcc). Parameters: Sensitivity
Θ, Stream progression λ = (N − 1)/N(where N is the chunk size),
Ntrain(= N by default)
Output: Predicted label stream Y
1 MD0 = MDRef
2 currently drifting = False
3 LabeledSamples = ∅
4 for t= 1,2,3,...: do
5 Compute margin inclusion signal-
S(x = Xt) =
{
1, if Xt in margin
0, otherwise
6 Update MDt = λ * MDt−1 + (1− λ) ∗ S(Xt)
7 if |MDt −MDRef |>Θ * σRef then
8 currently drifting = True . Drift Suspected
9 LabeledSamples←Collect Ntrain labeled samples by querying Oracle
10 if currently drifting and |LabeledSamples|== Ntrain then
11 . Enough labeled samples to make decision
12 if (AccRef -AccLabeledSamples)>Θ * σAcc then
13 Retrain C with LabeledSamples . Drift Confirmed
14 Update Reference distribution (MDRef , σRef , AccRef , σRef )
15 currently drifting = False
the change is indeed a result of concept drift and that model retraining is necessary, to
update the classifier C. Once retraining is performed, a new reference distribution (MDRef ,
σRef , AccRef , σAcc), is learned from the LabeledSamples set, based on the K-fold cross
validation technique described above. By allowing users to specify the intuitive parameter
of sensitivity, suggested to be picked in the range of [0,3], the entire change detection process
is made flexible to be used in different streaming environments. A larger value can be set
if frequent signaling is not desired, alternatively a lower value could be used for critical
applications, where small changes could be harmful if undetected.
The drift detection process, set around tracking the margin density signal MD, is
made incremental by using the moving average formulation of Equation 4.11. Here, the
margin density at a time t, given by MDt, is computed incrementally by using a forgetting
factor λ on - MDt−1, and combining it with the signal function S(Xt), which indicates if
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the current sample Xt falls within the margin of the classifier C.
MDt = λ ∗MDt−1 + (1− λ) ∗ S(Xt) (4.11)
The parameter λ is the forgetting actor for the stream, and it can be computed by
specifying the chunk of influence parameter-N. The λ is computed as λ = (N − 1)/N . This
formulation makes it applicable as a stream monitoring system, by making incremental
updates to the margin density metric. It should be noted that, here incremental formu-
lation is specified for the drift monitoring process only. This is irrespective of the stream
classification algorithm used, which could process data either - incrementally, by chunk or
by using a sliding window. Separating the detection and classification schemes, makes the
MD metric more general in its implementation, to be used in different classification setups.
This also ensures that we can perform controlled testing of the efficacy of the drift detection
methodology.
4.4 Experimental results and analysis
This section presents experimental analysis and results of the proposed MD3 ap-
proach, on two sets of experiments: Section 4.4.2 presents results on drift induced datasets,
to better understand drift detection characteristics of the framework in a controlled envi-
ronment; Experiments with real world drifting data are presented in Section 4.4.3 and Sec-
tion 4.4.5, to demonstrate its practicality. Experimental comparisons with a fully labeled
drift detection technique- the AccTr approach based on EWMA [165], and the unlabeled
drift detection approach of- HDDDM [64], were performed. Two variant of the MD3 ap-
proach were used. MD3-SVM uses a linear kernel SVM as the base model, while MD3-RS
uses a random subspace implementation of the margin density approach. Details about
experimental methods and setup are presented in Section 4.4.1. Effects of varying the mar-
gin width parameter θmargin and that of varying the detection model are also presented, in
Section 4.4.4.
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4.4.1 Experimental methods and setup
Experimental methods used for comparative analysis
The drift detection on data streams, are evaluated and compared using the following tech-
niques.
• Static baseline model (NoChange): This approach assumes that data is static with
no drift over time. As such, no change is signaled, model is never updated and no
labeling is requested. This is the lower baseline and any approach should atleast be
better than a NoChange approach.
• Fully labeled Accuracy Tracking (AccTr): This model forms the upper baseline for
the drift handling mechanisms. All data is assumed to be labeled and the explicit
tracking of accuracy is used to signal change. An unlabeled drift detection mechanism
is effective if its performance is close to the AccTr approach. The AccTr approach is
illustrated in Figure 4.12, where every predicted sample’s correct label is requested
from an Oracle and the accuracy is checked to see if it has significantly deviated from
the training accuracy. The accuracy is tracked incrementally by using the EWMA
[165] formulation of change tracking as given by Equation 4.4.
• MD3 using SVM model (MD3-SVM): This approach uses the SVM based imple-
mentation of MD3. A linear kernel SVM, with hinge loss is used. Margin density is
computed by tracking number of samples in the classifier’s margin.
• MD3 using random subspace(RS) model (MD3-RS): The proposed random subspace
drift detection technique of MD3 is used. 20 C4.5 decision trees are used as the
ensemble, each one has 50% of the features randomly picked from the feature space.
Margin density is given by number of samples in regions of high uncertainty (high
disagreement) of the ensemble. The threshold for critical uncertainty was chosen as
0.5, and samples with confidence less than 0.5 are considered to be in the margin.
• Hellinger Distance Drift Detection Methodology (HDDDM): The approach obtained
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Figure 4.12: Unlabeled (HDDDM), Fully Labeled (AccTr) and the Margin Denstiy(MD3)
drift detection techniques, showing portion of stream that they track.
from [64], is representative of traditional unlabeled approaches found in literature,
which track changes to feature space. In particular, the HDDDM approach tracks the
average Hellinger distance of all samples within two distributions and signals change
when the distance increases beyond a threshold. Hellinger distance is a popular metric
in streaming data research, and a comparison using this will enable us to highlight the
fundamental differences between the unlabeled approaches and the MD3 approach.
These methods provide representations of the main different paradigms of drift de-
tection: Explicit detector(labeled) and Implicit detectors(unlabeled), as presented in Sec-
tion 4.2. A comparative analysis of these methods will highlight the efficacy of the MD3
approach and its place in the literature on drift detection techniques.
Experimental setup
To ensure that bias due to the underlying classification process does not affect our analysis
of the detection scheme, all approaches were implemented in an incremental manner using
the moving average formulation of Equation 4.12.
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Metrict = λ ∗Metrict−1 + (1− λ) ∗ S (4.12)
The metric at time t depends on the signal function S(.), which is defined based
on the detection method used. The AccTr approach uses error as a signal. If predicted
label is different from the correct label, the signal is 0, otherwise it is 1. For the MD3
approaches, the signal is obtained by the margin inclusion test, as given by Equation 4.7
for MD3-SVM and Equation 4.8 for the MD3-RS methods. The HDDDM approach is not
incremental by nature. It is a chunk based approach, as computing histograms of data
needs an entire chunk of data. We modified this approach, such that a chunk is defined
incrementally, sliding at a rate of one sample. For a given time t, the chunk comprises of
t −N latest samples, where N is the chunk size. The λ forgetting factor in Equation 4.12
is taken as (N − 1)/N for AccTr and MD3 approaches, to ensure equivalence in the drift
detection evaluation as compared to the HDDDM approach.
The initial 15% of the stream is assumed to be labeled. This forms the initial training
set from which the classifier model C is learned, along with the reference distribution metrics
(expected metric and acceptable deviation). The reference distribution was obtained via 5
fold cross validation on the training data, as described in Section 4.3.3, for the AccTr and
MD3 approaches. For the HDDDM approach, the reference distribution and acceptable
deviation was obtained by using a sliding window of 3*N unlabeled samples with a slide
rate of N/3 samples. The Hellinger distance between the subsequent chunks in this sliding
window, formed the population for learning the expected Hellinger distance and its standard
deviation. A sensitivity of θ=2 (from the suggested range of [0,3]), was chosen to balance
robustness with reactivity, for all the drift detection methods. After a drift is indicated, the
number of labeled samples to be requested - Ntrain is taken to be equal to N. This ensures
that the same number of recent samples which indicated a drift, are used to confirm the
drift and retrain the classifier.
All experiments were performed using Python 2.7 ad scikit-learn machine learning
library [149]. Support Vector Machine with a linear kernel and regularization constant of
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1.0, was chosen as the prediction model for all the experiments. In order to ensure that
differences between detection techniques MD3-SVM and MD3-RS are not a result of the
different training capabilities of the SVM and RS classifiers, the task of prediction and
detection were separated for the MD3-RS approach. The training dataset was used to train
two models: a linear SVM and a RS model. While, the SVM was used to provide prediction
as the online classifier C (Figure 4.11), the RS model was used solely for the purpose of
detection of drift and for triggering retraining of C. This setup enables us to analyze the
drift detection properties of the two approaches, by blocking out their different prediction
behavior.
4.4.2 Experiments on drift induced datasets
This section presents experimental evaluation of the MD3 approach on static datasets,
which were induced with concept drift in a controlled manner. By controlling the location
and nature of drifts in these datasets, a better understanding of the drift detection capa-
bilities of the different approaches, in a real world setting, is obtained. Six datasets were
chosen from the UCI machine learning library [145], and they were preprocessed to have
only numeric and binary values, normalized in the range of [0,1]. The multiclass datasets
were reduced to a binary class problems and the data instances were shuffled randomly,
to remove any unintended concept drifts already in the data. The characteristics of the
datasets is shown in Table 4.3. The chunk size parameter N, shown in Table 4.3, is used to
process the stream based on the number of instances present in the datasets.
The drift induction process is explained next, followed by experimental results and
analysis on the drift induced data.
Inducing concept drift in datasets
The drift induction process of [107], provides a way to include a single concept drift in static
datasets, at a particular location in the data stream. This allows for controlled drift analysis,
while at the same time retaining properties of the real world applications from which the the
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TABLE 4.3
Characteristics of datasets chosen for drift induction experiments.
Dataset #Instances #Attributes Chunksize N
Digits08 1499 16 150
Digits17 1557 16 150
Musk 6598 166 500
Wine 6497 12 500
Bank 45211 48 2500
Adult 48842 65 2500
dataset is derived. The dataset is first shuffled to remove any unwanted concept drift and
to prepare it for the drift induction process. The drift induction process of [107], induces
feature drift in the dataset, after a point in the stream, called the ChangePoint. Drift
is induced by randomly picking a subset of the features and rotating their values, for a
particular class. For example, if the feature (1,5,7) are picked for class label 0, after the
ChangePoint, the instances belonging to class 0 have features (1,5,7) shuffled as (7,1,5). This
basic approach ensures that feature drifts are induced and also, the original data properties
of the dataset are maintained. This approach is however dependent on the features selected
for rotation and it provides erratic results if the ‘right’ set of features are not selected.
Our drift induction approach, proposed here, extends the basic idea of [107], and
allows for greater control over the nature of change. Instead of randomly picking a set of
features, to be rotated, we pick features based on their importance to the classification task.
This is done by ranking the features, based on their information gain metric [182], and then
selecting features form the top or bottom of the list based on the nature of change desired.
Two sets of experiments were performed: a) The Detectability experiments, which choose
the top 25% of features from the ranked list, and b) The False alarm experiments, which
choose the bottom 25%. This was done to test the detection capabilities and robustness to
irrelevant changes, respectively. The top 25% of the ranked features have a high impact on
the classification task, as these are ranked based on their information content, and modifying
these features results in model degradation, which is necessary to be detected and fixed.
Modifying the bottom 25% of the features, has less impact on the classification process and
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TABLE 4.4








Digits08 97.5 97.1 77.6 95.3
Digits17 99.5 99.6 60.1 99.9
Musk 93.9 91.9 82.7 90.1
Wine 100 100 67.6 100
Bank 83.3 83.2 56.2 84.7
Adult 85 85.2 58.6 85.4
results in false alarms, which should be ignored by the detectors.
The effect of changing the top 25% and bottom 25% of the features on the 6 UCI
datasets is shown in Table 4.4. In all the datasets, the ChangePoint was induced at 50%
of the stream. A model is trained on the data before the ChangePoint, and tested on
the samples after this point. The similarity in accuracy of the model on the training and
original test set (before induction), indicates an initial static dataset. For the Detectability
experiments, the top 25% of the features are rotated and this results in a significant drop in
the test accuracy, after ChangePoint, as seen in Table 4.4. This indicates true drifts, which
need to be detected by a drift detection algorithm. Rotating the bottom 25% of the features
in the False alarm experiments, does not show any significant drop in test accuracy. Al-
though the same number of features are rotated in both cases, features have different levels
of relevance, when it comes to the classification task. We perform our experimental analysis
on the top 25% and bottom 25% datasets, to analyze behavior of the different algorithms,
under different change conditions.
Experimental results on drift induced datasets
The NoChange, AccTr, MD3-SVM, MD3-RS and the HDDDM methodologies, were
analyzed in the Detectability and the False alarm experiments. The number of drifts de-
tected, the false alarms raised and the accuracy over the stream, is reported in Table 4.5.
A drift is detected if there is a significant change in the metric being tracked. This results
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in requesting of N (Table 4.3) labeled samples, to confirm if the deviation leads to a drop
in the accuracy. A false alarm is the result of a change signal, which after obtaining labeled
samples was found to have no significant effect on the classification performance. In case
a false alarm is reported, no retraining of the classifier takes place and the labeled samples
are discarded. In the Detectability experiments, there is exactly one true drift induced,
which causes accuracy to drop after the midpoint of the stream. In case of the False alarm
experiments, the induced change does not affect performance and as such exactly one non
relevant change is introduced in these experiments.
The Detectability experiment causes the model’s performance to drop over time,
which is evident from the low accuracy of the NoChange model, as seen in Table 4.5. This
indicates the need for a drift detection methodology, to deal with the induced drift. The
AccTr approach, directly monitors the classification performance with labeled samples, as
such it serves as the gold standard for detecting drifts, in our experiments. This approach
detect exactly 1 drift in all 6 cases, indicating its robustness against false alarms. The
AccTr, HDDDM and the MD3-SVM and MD3-RS, techniques are all able to detect atleast
one drift in these experiments (Detectability) and as such are able to reach similar final
accuracies. The MD3-RS and MD3-SVM are unsupervised methods and are still able to
reach accuracy similar to the fully labeled AccTr approach (average difference of <1% for
both cases). This indicates the ability of the MD3 approaches to be used instead of the
labeled approaches, without significantly compromising on the prediction performance.
The resistance to false alarms, is shown by the number of drifts detected in the False
alarm, in Table 4.5. Changes in these experiments do not cause a significant performance
degradation. As such, a drift detected does not lead to retraining of the classifier, resulting in
a false alarm. While the AccTr and both the MD3 approaches are resistant to such changes,
the HDDDM approach signals it as a relevant change which needs further inspection. The
HDDDM approach does not differentiate between the change in the top 25% features vs the
change in the bottom 25% features, as it is a classifier agnostic technique which relies solely
on tracking the changes in the raw feature values distribution. The HDDDM approach
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TABLE 4.5







Accuracy Drifts detected False Alarms Drifts detected
Digits08
NoChange 86.4 0 0 0
AccTr 94.4 1 0 0
MD3-SVM 93.8 1 0 0
MD3-RS 94.4 1 0 0
HDDDM 93.5 2 1 1
Digits17
NoChange 71.9 0 0 0
AccTr 94.2 1 0 0
MD3-SVM 89 1 0 0
MD3-RS 93.2 1 0 0
HDDDM 88.7 2 1 3
Musk
NoChange 87 0 0 0
AccTr 94.1 1 0 0
MD3-SVM 94 2 1 0
MD3-RS 94.8 2 1 0
HDDDM 94.3 1 0 1
Wine
NoChange 80.1 0 0 0
AccTr 96.9 1 0 0
MD3-SVM 96.9 1 0 0
MD3-RS 94.9 1 0 0
HDDDM 96.9 3 2 1
Bank
NoChange 67.5 0 0 0
AccTr 89.4 1 0 0
MD3-SVM 89.4 1 0 0
MD3-RS 85.3 1 0 0
HDDDM 89.6 1 0 3
Adult
NoChange 67 0 0 0
AccTr 87.9 1 0 0
MD3-SVM 87.9 1 0 0
MD3-RS 87.9 1 0 0
HDDDM 88.2 3 2 3
causes a higher false alarm rate, than the MD3 approaches, on both experiments. Another
observation is that the MD3-SVM and MD3-RS show similar behavior, on average, with only
a deviation of 0.25% in accuracy and the exact same number of drifts detected. This shows
the generic applicability of the margin density signal irrespective of the implementation
technique used to compute it.
Accuracy over time, for the Detectability experiments, is shown in Figure 4.13. After
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the ChangePoint, a significant drop in accuracy is seen in all cases. The drift detection
approaches are swift in recognizing this change and after retraining (seen as point after which
accuracy starts to rise again), they are able to again provide high prediction performance.
The NoChange approach (gray), does not detect any drift and as such the performance
continues to degrade in this case. The MD3 approaches, have accuracy trajectories close
to the AccTr detector, indicating its use as a surrogate to the fully labeled approach. This
accuracy is higher, in most cases, than the HDDDM approach. While the MD3 approach led
to a false alarm on the Musk dataset only, the HDDDM approach is seen to trigger changes
multiple times over the course of the stream. These changes are frequent (atleast 1, on
average), and often occur without any correlation with the change in accuracy values. The
MD3 approaches detect drifts in close proximity to the AccTr approach, seen by minimal lag
between the green diamonds and- the orange and the blue diamonds. The MD3-RS approach
is more robust to change, which causes it to detect drifts with a delay in the Figure 4.13
d) and e). However, the drift detection for all approaches is close to the ChangePoint,
illustrating their ability to detect the true drift effectively.
Progression of the Accuracy and Margin Density metrics over time, for the De-
tectability experiment is shown in Figure 4.14. A drop in the accuracy (green) is seen after
the ChangePoint. This is accompanied by significant spike in the MD3-RS (orange) metric.
The metric MD3-SVM(blue), shows either a significant spike (in Figure 4.14 a), b) and
d)), or a drop in margin density (in Figure 4.14 c), e) and f)). The margin density metric,
similar to the accuracy metric, shows a high signal-to-noise ratio. It stays stable before the
ChangePoint and after the retraining is performed (indicated by circles in the plots), with
a significant deviation only when drift occurs. This confirms that the drift detection is a
result of the informativeness of the margin density metric, in detecting drifts, and not due
to random variations in the data stream.
124
(a) Digits08 (b) Digits17 (c) Musk
(d) Wine (e) Bank (f) Adult
Figure 4.13: Accuracy over time for the NoChange (gray), AccTr (green), MD3-SVM (blue),
MD3-RS (orange) and the HDDDM (red) approach on the Detectability experiments. True
drifts detected are shown as diamonds and squares represent false alarms.
4.4.3 Experiments on real world cybersecurity datasets exhibiting concept
drift
Machine learning models deployed in real world applications, operate in a dynamic
environment where concept drift can occur at any time. Such drifts are not only plausible,
but in fact expected and rampant in the domain of cybersecurity, where attackers are
constantly trying to generate data that degrades the classifier. In this section, 4 real world
concept drift datasets are chosen from the domain of cybersecurity, as presented in Table 4.6.
These datasets are high dimensional and popularly used in machine learning literature, to
test online binary classification models in a concept drifting environment. The spam and
spamassassin datasets taken from [183,184], represent the task of separating malicious spam
email from legitimate ones. Phishing [145] contains data about malicious web pages and
the nsl-kdd dataset [185] is derived from the task of intrusion detection systems, which
filters malicious network traffic. All the datasets were preprocessed by converting feature
to numeric/binary types only, and by normalizing each feature value to the range of [0,1].
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(a) Digits08 (b) Digits17 (c) Musk
(d) Wine (e) Bank (f) Adult
Figure 4.14: Accuracy (green), Margin Density for SVM (blue) and Margin Density for
RS (orange), over time, in the Detectability experiments. Drifts detected are denoted by
diamonds and circles denote the retraining point.
TABLE 4.6
Description of real world concept drift datasets, from cybersecurity domain.
Dataset #Instances #Attributes Chunk Size - N
spam 6213 499 500
spamassassin 9324 499 500
phishing 11055 46 500
nsl-kdd 37041 122 2500
The final data characteristics are shown in Table 4.6. These datasets exhibit concept drift,
but the exact nature and location of the drifts is not known in advance.
The NoChange, AccTr, MD3-SVM, MD3-RS and HDDDM methodologies are eval-
uated on the 4 datasets. The metrics used for evaluation are: Accuracy of the stream,
Number of drifts signaled, Number of false alarms and the total percentage of samples
which were requested to be labeled. Accuracy determines the predictive performance of the
online system. Number of drifts signaled indicates sensitivity to change. False alarms occur
when a drift is signaled, but upon obtaining labeled samples it was found that performance
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has not significantly degraded, thus requiring no retraining. Since the location and number
of drifts is not known in advance, the false alarm refers only to cases which did not lead
to a retraining of the models, causing the requested labels to go wasted. False alarms are
0 for the case of the AccTr approach as this approach directly tracks drop in accuracy,
unlike the other unlabeled techniques. False alarms refers to situation where Equation (4.9)
is triggered due to a suspected drift, but upon receiving labeled samples we confirm that
retraining is not needed (Equation (4.10)), as the accuracy has not degraded significantly.
The labeling% indicates the cost expended by the methodology (in term of labels requested)
and is directly related to the number of false alarms, as every alarm leads to requesting
of Chunk Size- N(shown in Table 4.6) samples to be labeled. A high accuracy, high drift
detection, low false alarm and low labeling% is desirable.
In all cases, the accuracy of the NoChange approach is significantly lower than the
other drift detection techniques, as observed from Table 4.7. This confirms the drifting
nature of the datasets and the need for drift detection. The accuracy obtained by the
margin density methodologies is close to the fully labeled AccTr approach, with MD3-SVM
having an average deviation of 1.3% and the MD3-RS having a 0.9% deviation, only. This
indicates the ability of these techniques to detect drifts, as good as a labeled drift detection
mechanism. The labeling requirement for the MD3 approaches is 88.3% less than the AccTr
approach, which relies on a totally labeled stream for performing its computation.
The HDDDM approach, on average, performs poorly compared to the MD3 ap-
proaches, and also needs 8.3% more labeling. This is a result of its high false alarm rate.
False alarms are harmful as it causes the system to react to every change in the data dis-
tribution, noise or otherwise, making adaptiveness a hassle than a solution. Especially in
the domain of streaming cybersecurity applications, an overly responsive system is a serious
problem, as it is vulnerable to malicious manipulation of the training process. Also, label-
ing is a time consuming and expensive task. A system which frequently requires manual
intervention is less likely to be trusted and can cause experts to disregard its warnings.
The HDDDM approach needed 1250 more labeled samples than the MD3 approaches, on
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TABLE 4.7
Results on real world concept drift datasets, from cybersecurity domain.
Dataset Methodology Accuracy Drifts signaled False alarms Labeling %
spam
NoChange 57.5 0 0 0
AccTr 90.6 1 0 100
MD3-SVM 87.3 2 1 18.9
MD3-RS 89.2 2 1 18.9
HDDDM 80.7 2 1 18.9
spamassassin
NoChange 67 0 0 0
AccTr 92.8 1 0 100
MD3-SVM 92.8 2 1 12.6
MD3-RS 92.8 2 1 12.6
HDDDM 92.6 4 3 21.9
phishing
NoChange 86.9 0 0 0
AccTr 92.9 2 0 100
MD3-SVM 91.7 1 0 5.3
MD3-RS 90.8 1 0 5.3
HDDDM 92.8 4 2 21.3
nsl-kdd
NoChange 79.6 0 0 0
AccTr 90.1 1 0 100
MD3-SVM 89.4 1 0 7.9
MD3-RS 89.9 1 0 7.9
HDDDM 87.2 2 1 15.8
average, due to its increased false alarm rate. The MD3 approach on the other hand, signals
change only when it would affect the system performance directly, making it suitable as a
self-guided automatic monitoring system for drift detection.
Progression of accuracy over the 4 datasets, is shown in Figure 4.15. It is seen that
the MD3 methodologies and the AccTr approach converge and behave similarly over time.
This indicates that MD3 could be used as a replacement for a fully labeled drift detection
approach. The similarity in the MD3-SVM (blue) and the MD3-RS (orange) approaches, in
terms of the accuracy progression and the number of drifts/false alarms detected, indicates
the general applicability of the margin density metric as a drift indicator metric. The mar-
gin density metric provides good performance irrespective of the type of machine learning
technique it is implemented on, making it classification algorithm independent.
The HDDDM (red) approach performs worse than the other methods on the spam
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(a) spam (b) spamassassin
(c) phishing (d) nsl
Figure 4.15: Accuracy over time for the NoChange (gray), AccTr (green), MD3-SVM (blue),
MD3-RS (orange) and the HDDDM (red) approach on real world concept drift datasets.
True drifts detected are shown as diamonds, and squares represent false alarms.
and the nsl-kdd datasets. This is attributed to the delay in its drift detection. In all
datasets, the number of false alarms (squares) is high for the HDDDM approach, which
translates to increased labeling expenditure as shown in Table 4.7. The MD3 approach,
signals 1 false alarm in the spam and spamassassin datasets. In the spam dataset, the
MD3-SVM and the MD3-RS approaches signal change at time-stamps 3829 and 3676 re-
spectively (Figure 4.15a), which are reported as false alarms. However, these are not without
basis, there is a small drop in the accuracy at these points, albeit not enough to warrant
concept drift recovery. The margin density metric is sensitive to changes in accuracy, but
is still robust compared to other feature tracking approaches (HDDDM), which seem to
signal changes without any correlation to accuracy degradation. From the experiments, it
can be concluded that the MD3 approach is a classification technique independent, high
performing, unlabeled drift detection technique, which is robust to irrelevant data changes
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TABLE 4.8
Results of using logistic regression (L1-penalty) as the detection model for MD3.





and is attractive for deployment in machine learning based cybersecurity systems, due to
its reduced need for manual intervention.
4.4.4 Effects of varying the detection model and the margin width (θmargin)
In all the experiments so far, the detection model was taken to be a Linear SVM
with regularization parameter of C=1, for the MD3-SVM technique, and a random subspace
ensemble with C4.5 Decision Trees as its base models, for the MD3-RS technique. Moreover,
the margin width (θmargin), was kept fixed at 0.5, based on intuition. The effects of varying
these settings on the detection capabilities of the MD3 framework, are presented in this
section.
4.4.4.1 Effects of varying the detection model
The 4 real world datasets from Section 4.4.3 are evaluated here using the following
5 additional detection models: linear SVM with C=100 (high regularization constant), lin-
ear SVM with C=0.001 (Low regularization constant), logistic regression with L2-penalty,
random subspace ensemble with logistic regression (L1-penalty) models and random sub-
space ensemble with multinomial naive Bayes models. The results of these experiments are
presented in Figure 4.16. All models were evaluated using the scikit-learn machine learning
library [149].
Experimental results of varying the detection models are presented in Figure 4.16.
It is observed that varying the underlying model has no significant effect on the detection
capabilities of the MD3 methodology. A Friedman’s non parametric test [186] on the final
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(a) spam (b) spamassassin
(c) phishing (d) nsl
Figure 4.16: Effect of varying the detection model on the drift detection and the prediction
accuracy, over time.
accuracy values for all the 4 datasets, showed that there is no statistically significant dif-
ference between the performance of the different models, at a p-value of 0.05. The number
of drifts detected and the relative position of the detection are also observed to be close in
a majority of the cases.
These results are inline with our intuition in Section 4.3.1, where we postulate that
the margin density signal could be a general, model independent indicator of change that
could be applied to any robust classifier model, which distributes classification importance
weights among its features. The models in the experiments described here are all robust
classifiers, which distribute feature weights, and as such perform similarly under the MD3
framework. The results of applying the MD3 methodology on a non-robust classifier is
shown in Table 4.8, where a logistic regression model with L1-penalty is used. The margin
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for a logistic regression model is defined as described in Section 4.3.2.1, with the probability
obtained from the posterior estimates of the classifier. This classifier tends to minimize the
number of features used in the final models, making it unsuitable for the MD3 methodology.
The results of Table 4.8 show that the model does not detect any drifts for the phishing
dataset and also performs significantly worse on the spam and the spamassassin dataset.
This is because the L1-penalty model tends to minimize the number of features used, which
violates the central premise of coupled features detection (Section 4.3.1), that the MD3
model relies on. However, it can be seen from Figure 4.16 that the same L1-penalty based
logistic regression model when used with the random subspace ensemble can be effective for
usage under the MD3 framework. The MD3 methodology, with its ability to use models of
explicit and non-explicit margins, can therefore be applied as a general detection scheme
irrespective of the base models used.
4.4.4.2 Effects of varying the margin width (θmargin)
In case of the MD3-RS approach, the concept of margin is defined by the margin
width parameter θmargin, which was taken as 0.5 in all the experiments thus far. Experi-
ments in the previous section demonstrate that varying the underlying detection model has
no significant effect on the detection capabilities of the MD3 framework. In this section,
we evaluate the effect of varying the parameter θmargin for the MD3-RS model, which uses
C4.5 decision tree models as its base classifier type.
The results of the varying the θmargin are shown in Figure 4.17. It is seen that
the choice of the parameter θmargin does not have a significant effect on the final results,
as all accuracy plots follow a similar trajectory in time. The only failure case is seen in
case of a θmargin=0.05 for the phishing dataset (Figure 4.17 c) - grey). At this margin
width, the samples captured are insufficient to detect drift effectively. The margin density
signal is depicted in Figure 4.18, for the phishing and the nsl-kdd dataset. It is seen that,
for the phishing dataset at a θmargin=0.05 the signal fails to detect a drift. For all other
margin values, although the absolute signal magnitude is different, they are all effective
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(a) spam (b) spamassassin
(c) phishing (d) nsl
Figure 4.17: Effects of varying the margin width (θmargin) on the drift detection process of
MD3.
in detecting change and do so at nearly the same location. This can be attributed to the
reference distribution learning component of the MD3 algorithm, which learns the expected
margin density via cross validation on the training dataset. Subsequent changes tracked
are relative to the reference distribution, making them effective even when margin width
changes. To maintain robustness to change and to ensure that drift detection is effective,
a θmargin in the range of 0.25-0.75 is suggested. Further tuning can be done based on the
desired sensitivity required for the application.
4.4.5 Experimental results on benchmark concept drift datasets
The MD3 methodology is evaluated on two popular real world data streams here - the
Electricity Market (EM) dataset and the Covertype dataset (Covtype). These are widely
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(a) phishing (b) nsl
Figure 4.18: Margin density metric over time, for different values of (θmargin).
(a) Electricity Market (EM) dataset (b) Covertype dataset
Figure 4.19: Accuracy over time for the NoChange(gray), AccTr(green), MD3-SVM(blue),
MD3-RS(orange) and the HDDDM(red) approach, on real world benchmark concept drift
datasets.
used datasets for benchmark test of concept drift handling systems [63,162]. The electricity
market dataset represents pricing data collected from New South Wales, Australia, which
fluctuates based on the supply and the demand components of the market [63, 162]. The
Covertype dataset consists of forest cover data and is a multi-class dataset [187]. This
dataset was reduced to a binary class prediction problem by considering only the class
labels of 1 and 2. Both datasets were pre-processed by converting features to numeric
values, normalized in the range of [0,1]. Chunk size N of 2500 was chosen for evaluation
of both datasets. These datasets have unknown type and location of the drift, and as such
serve as real world benchmarks for evaluating concept drift techniques.
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TABLE 4.9
Results on benchmark real world concept drift datasets.




NoChange 62.3 0 0
AccTr 68.4 2 100
MD3-SVM 66.9 2 13
MD3-RS 67.7 2 13




NoChange 62.2 0 0
AccTr 74.2 16 100
MD3-SVM 71.3 18 24.2
MD3-RS 75.4 22 29.6
HDDDM 74.9 25 33.6
The results of Table 4.9 show that although both datasets have unknown concept
drift, they benefit from drift handling, as the accuracy of the NoChange approach is worse
than that of the other techniques (Figure 4.19). The MD3 approaches were found to have
similar accuracy to the fully labeled AccTr approach (∆ = 1.1% for EM and ∆ = 0.85%
for Covtype). The MD3 approach was also seen to signal fewer drifts than the HDDDM
approach, leading to half the labeling budget in case of EM and 3/4th in case of the Covtype
dataset, for the same resulting accuracy, on average.
4.5 How the MD3 compares to other margin based drift detection techniques?
The ability of the margin density signal to effectively ignore changes to the unlabeled
data, which do not affect the classification performance, makes its usage attractive as an
unsupervised drift indicator. This is because unlike the feature based change detectors
like HDDDM, the margin density (MD) approach implicitly includes the model in the
drift detection process. Other unlabeled drift detection techniques developed in literature
[107, 173–175] and described in Section 4.2.2.3, also incorporate the notion of a margin.
However, these techniques differ from the MD3 approach in the signal being tracked. The
MD3 technique tracks the margin density (MD) signal, which is the expected number of
samples in the uncertain regions of a classifier. The other margin based techniques of
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TABLE 4.10
Characteristics of synthetic data generator used for comparing effects of the different margin
based change detection metrics. (Table 4.11).
Before drift (1-500 Samples):
XClass1 ∼ N (µ = {0.5, ...(5 features), 0.85, 0.85, ..., 0.85 (Upto 20features)}, σ = 0.12)
XClass2 ∼ N (µ = {0.5, ... (5 features), 0.15, 0.15, ..., 0.15 (Upto 20features)}, σ = 0.12)
After Drift (501-1000 Samples):
No Change:
XClass1 ∼ N (µ = {0.5, ...(5 features), 0.85, 0.85, ..., 0.85 (Upto 20features)}, σ = 0.12)
Change Upto feature i:
XClass2 ∼ N (µ = {0.75, ..., 0.75 (i features), 0.15, ..., 0.15 (Upto 20features)}, σ = 0.12)
Section 4.2.2.3, essentially track the average change in the uncertainty of samples over
time. The difference between the two paradigms is subtle, and the ability to specify a fixed
margin, before deployment, is responsible for the efficacy of the margin density approach.
To elucidate the difference between these paradigms and their implications, a synthetic
experiment is designed in this section.
In order to understand the effects of the different margin based techniques, an ex-
periment similar to that in Section 4.3.2.2 is performed. A synthetic 20 dimensional dataset
is generated. The dataset has 1000 samples, with concept drift occurring at the midpoint
(500 samples). The characteristics of the data are shown in Table 4.10. The dataset has 20
dimensions, the first 5 of which are made irrelevant to the classification task, by assigning
them the same distributions for the two classes. After the midpoint, drift is induced in the
dataset by changing Class 2’s feature distribution. The feature distributions are incremen-
tally changed upto feature i, by changing their mean values. The remaining 15 features
(feature 6-20) are all relevant to the classification task and the effect of changing them
gradually is analyzed via this experiment. The effects of these changes are evaluated by
training a model on the first 500 samples and evaluating change metrics on the remaining
500 samples after the drift. We chose the random subspace ensemble with decision trees as
its base models (MD3-RS), for the experiments here.
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TABLE 4.11
Results of change detection metrics ∆Err, ∆MD, ∆Uncertain and ∆HD, on varying intensi-
ties of drift on synthetic data. Features 1-5 are irrelevant to the classification. Bold entries
represent first indication of change, for each of the metrics.
# of features
affected (i)
∆Err ∆MD ∆Uncertain ∆HD
1 (Irrelevant) 0 0 0 0.13
3 (Irrelevant) 0 0 0 0.17
5 (Irrelevant) 0 0 0 0.22
6 0 0 0.05 0.23
7 0 0 0.2 0.26
8 0 0 0.2 0.28
9 0 0 0.25 0.3
10 0 0 0.25 0.33
11 0 0.5 0.4 0.35
12 0.5 0.5 0.45 0.37
13 0.5 0.5 0.45 0.39
14 0.5 0.5 0.35 0.41
15 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.43
The effects of changing the feature values of the synthetic 20-Dimensional dataset,
is presented in Table 4.11. The change in the training and testing error (∆Err), the margin
density metric (∆MD), the average uncertainty (∆Uncertain) and the Hellinger Distance
(∆HD), are compared. Changing feature 1-5 have no significant effect on the classification
error, as these features are irrelevant from a classifier’s perspective. The HD metric, owing
to its model agnostic measurements, is unable to see this distinction and as such a change
is seen for the ∆HD metric in Table 4.11. Both the margin density technique and the
uncertainty tracking techniques, are robust against such changes. The advantage of the
MD technique, over the traditional uncertainty tracking techniques, is seen in case of the
changes in the relevant features (6-20). A robust classifier, such as the random subspace
ensemble, is inherently capable of providing high predictive performance, even if a few of
the relevant features drift. Unless a majority of the features change at the same time, the
robust classifier is unaffected by changes to a few features. The traditional uncertainty
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tracking techniques fail to distinguish between critical changes and changes which can be
inherently managed by a robust classifier. By tracking the posterior probability estimates
of the classifier models, the uncertainty based techniques could effectively ignore changes to
irrelevant data (similar to the MD3 approach), but they still lead to additional false alarms
when compared to the margin density approach. The MD approach limits the critical
area of uncertainty being monitored and as such it limits the tracking to the most critical
drifts only. This is seen in Table 4.11, where the MD metric is affected after 11 features
drift simultaneously, as opposed to 6 features for the Uncertainty tracking techniques. The
actual fully labeled technique would signal drift after 12 features are affected. The MD
signal comes closest to tracking the actual drift using only unlabeled data, with a high
robustness to false alarms. The margin density approach is robust not only to changes in
the irrelevant features, but also to changes in the relevant features, which are not critical
to a robust classifier’s performance.
The Uncertain and the HD metrics, presented here, are representations of two
paradigms of unlabeled drift detection techniques in literature. The HD metric represents
the fundamental behavior of the feature distribution tracking techniques (Section 4.2.2.2)
[64,170–172], while the Uncertainty metric represents behavior of the model based posterior
probabilities tracking techniques (Section 4.2.2.3) [107,173–175] . Although the actual usage
and the implementation of the metrics are nuanced and different in literature, our purpose
here is to demonstrate the underlying principle that makes the margin density signal more
robust to false alarms. The purpose of this section is to provide motivation for future work
on improving reliability of unlabeled drift detection techniques. The generation and analy-
sis of real world datasets, with similar characteristics as the synthetic data presented here,
could also be a useful contribution to better enable further research in this area.
4.6 Chapter summary
In this chapter, the Margin Density Drift Detection (MD3) methodology was pro-
posed, to detect drifts from unlabeled data. The proposed methodology uses the number of
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samples in a classifier’s region of uncertainty, as a metric for detecting drift. A significant
deviation in the margin density metric, was used to signal the need for labeled samples for
subsequent retraining of the classifier. MD3 was shown to be independent of the classifi-
cation algorithm used, robust to stray changes in data distribution and a good substitute
to a labeled drift detection scheme. Experimental analysis was performed on 6 drift in-
duced datasets, 4 real world concept drift datasets from the cybersecurity domain and on
2 benchmark concept drift datasets. The results indicated high detection and prediction
performance, coupled with low false alarm rate for the MD3 approach. When compared
with a state of the art unlabeled feature tracking approach - The Hellinger Distance Drift
Detection Methodology (HDDDM), the MD3 algorithm resulted in a fewer labeling per-
centage, for the same (and sometimes higher) accuracy. The claims made at the start of
the chapter are summarized below:
• Claim a: The MD3 approach can be used as a substitute for fully labeled approaches to
detect drifts, without significant reduction in the predictive accuracy over the stream.
The margin density approach, when tested on 6 drift induced datasets, resulted in a
<1% difference in the accuracy, on average, between the fully labeled drift detection
methodology-AccTr. When tested on the 6 real world datasets, the average difference
was 1.1%. Additionally, the plotted accuracies over time, followed a similar trajectory
for the AccTr and the MD3 approaches. The ability of the MD3 approach to detect
drift when it was detected by AccTr, with minimal lag, makes it a suitable surrogate
to be used in lieu of the labeled approach.
• Claim b: The MD3 approach can reduce the number of false alarms compared to
other traditional change tracking unlabeled methodologies.
The margin density approach was compared to the HDDDM approach, which tracks
changes to the unlabeled data feature values to detect distribution changes. A drift
induced experiment, which ranks features by their importance and then systemati-
cally introduces drift in the bottom 25% of the features, was used to generate changes
which do not cause significant performance degradation. While the HDDDM ap-
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proach signals these changes as potential drifts, the AccTr labeled approach and the
MD3 approach, were both resistant to these changes and effectively ignore it. When
compared on the real world cybersecurity datasets, the HDDDM approach causes four
times as many false alarms as the MD3 approach, on average.
• Claim c: The MD3 approach can perform computations incrementally in a stream-
ing environment and can be used independently of the type of classifier used and the
application domain.
The margin density metric was computed incrementally in the MD3 algorithm, by
making use of a moving average formulation of the metric along with a forgetting
factor λ. It was shown that the metric computations can be made independent of
the online classification technique used. Experiments were performed in a streaming
fashion, with samples appearing one at a time and limited memory and time con-
straints are imposed. The MD3 model was implemented using a SVM model and a
random subspace ensemble of decision trees. Both models perform identical in terms
of number of drifts detected and false alarms detected across all experiments. The
average accuracy of these two methods showed no significant difference. As such the
MD3 approach was found to be model independent. Margin density can be computed
explicitly from probabilistic classifiers and for classifiers which do not have a notion of
margin (e.g., Decision Trees), they could be placed in the random subspace ensemble
setting. Experimentation performed by varying the underlying model of the detection,
indicted that as long as the model is robust, distributes feature weights among the
informative features, it can provide the benefits of margin density based detection.
• Claim d: The robustness of MD3 leads to less labeling effort needed in the adaptation
process.
Every drift signaled, requires labeling of samples to confirm if it leads to accuracy
degradation and to retrain the classifier, in the event if drift is confirmed. By being
robust towards false alarms, the MD3 approach used, on average, 8.3% less label-
ing than the HDDDM approach over the 4 real world cybersecurity concept drift
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datasets. On the benchmark datasets, an average reduction of 9.85% in labeling is
seen, between the HDDDM and the MD3 approaches. Additional proof of concept ex-
periments, comparing MD3 with other uncertainty based drift detection approaches,
indicated that margin density provides a better way to account for innate robustness
of classifiers, making it more reliable in detecting significant drifts.
The MD3 algorithm showed to be an efficient, robust and practical way, of detecting
model degradation in a streaming data environment, using unlabeled data. Experiments
on concept drifting datasets from the cybersecurity domain indicate its capability to detect
concept drift, when changes can be of an adversarial nature. However, the specific nature
of the adversarial activity in these cybersecurity datasets is not known. Ability of using
the ideas learned from the margin density approach and applying them to detect targeted
attacks against a classifier, is an area which requires further investigation. Another direction
of future work would be to use the margin density information along with active learning
strategies, to selectively label samples for the confirmation and retraining phase. This would
allow for further savings in terms of reduced labeling, in the online classification process.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPACT OF DEFENDER’S CLASSIFIER DESIGN ON ADVERSARIAL
CAPABILITIES IN DYNAMIC - ADVERSARIAL ENVIRONMENTS
Classifiers deployed in adversarial domains, are susceptible to evasion at test time.
Chapter 3 demonstrated the nature of these attacks and established the adversarial model
for testing security measures. In Chapter 4, a reliable unsupervised drift detection method-
ology was developed for detecting and reacting to changes in distribution, over time. How-
ever, this methodology did not consider the specific nature of adversarial changes, as it
assumes that drift detection would be sufficient to deal with adversarial test time activity.
Adversarial changes in data distribution are dependent on the deployed classifier, which the
attacker is trying to evade. In this chapter, the relation between the defender’s model design
and the capabilities of an adversary at test time, is analyzed. This chapter evaluates the
specific nature of the adversarial domain, which makes it different from other distribution
changes. This evaluation is aimed to motivate the development of adversarial aware design
of classifiers in dynamic domains.
5.1 The dynamics of securing against data driven exploratory attacks
In Chapter 3, data driven exploratory attacks on black box classifiers were demon-
strated. It was seen that classifiers after deployment are vulnerable to probing based attacks,
where an attacker learns the behavior of the system and then crafts samples, to evade it.
These attacks lead to degradation in the prediction capabilities of the deployed model, as
the attacks cause a drift in the data distribution. For a classification system to be applicable
in a Dynamic - Adversarial environment, it needs to account for the adversarial capabilities
at test time, and also needs to focus on the ability to recover from attacks, for continued
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of model performance over time, indicating onset of attack and
recovery from it. Static measures of security focus on delaying onset of attacks. Dynamic
measure focus on detection and recover only.
operation in a dynamic environment.
Most works in adversarial machine learning, concentrate on making classifiers harder
to evade. They do so by resorting to Complex learning strategies [2, 4,40,71–73,87], which
advocates integrating maximum informative features into the classifier models, or by in-
tegrating Randomness into the prediction process [40, 66, 74, 76, 91, 98]. The emphasis of
these two strategies, is to make attacks harder/expensive to carry out. However, these
methodologies approach the problem of security from a static perspective. They focus on
the ability to ward of attacks, but fail to provide insights or directions regarding measures to
be taken after an attack commences. This is illustrated in Figure 5.1, where the predictive
performance of a classifier faced with an attack, and subsequent recovery, is shown. Static
measures of Complex learning and Randomness, concentrate only on the portion of the
attack-defense cycle before the attack starts. Any practical and usable system also needs
reactive dynamic measures, which can deal with attacks after it has affected the system’s
performance.
Dynamic approaches are developed in the domain of concept drift research, where
the aim is to detect and adapt to changes in the data distribution over time. One such
methodology for reliable drift handling was developed in Chapter 4, as the Margin Density
Drift Detection framework (MD3). However, this approach, like the other works on concept
drift detection [58–60, 63], considers an adversarial agnostic view of the system. Concept
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drift detection considers any change in data equally, without regard into the domain specific
nature of the change. This makes it ineffective in an adversarial setting, where drifts are a
result of attacks, which are in turn a function of the model deployed by the defender. As
such, the ability to control drifts by adjusting the strategies of the defender, are an important
strategic advantage disregarded by concept drift research. This chapter brings together the
concepts of Adversarial data mining and Dynamic data mining, under a common paradigm
of Dynamic Adversarial Mining. The aim is to look at the never ending nature of the
attack-defense cycle, where myopic thinking can only help win battles, but not the war.
Impact of classifier design on the detect-ability of attacks and the overall evasion resistance
is analyzed.
The central theme of this chapter is to analyze the impact of different classifier
design strategies, on the adversarial capabilities at test time. As an illustrative example
consider the 2D synthetic data in Figure 5.2. A classifier model C is trained on the space of
Legitimate class training samples (blue). The model C is seen to be restrictive, as it allows
only a narrow margin of samples to be admitted into the system as benign samples. This
strategy is considered to provide better security from a static perspective, as it would require
an adversary to craft samples in a small and exact range of feature values. However, looking
at the problem from a dynamic perspective, it is seen that the space of possible attacks is
now highly overlapped with the training data. As such, once an attack starts, the adversary
has enough information about the feature space, so as to become indistinguishable from
benign traffic entering the system. These attacks are harder to detect (using unsupervised
techniques), and also harder to recover from, due to the inseparability of samples. On
the other hand, the simple design of Figure 5.3 a) (simple as it reduces the number of
features used in the model C), has a larger space of possible attacks, making it easier to
evade. However, the increased space means that an adversary evading C will not be able
to completely reverse engineer the location and characteristics of the Legitimate training
samples, due to the added uncertainty provided by the large space of possible attacks.
The illustrative example of Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3, demonstrate the need to de-
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Figure 5.2: Impact of using a restrictive defender model. Attacks are harder to carry out,
but will lead to inseparability from benign traffic.
Figure 5.3: Impact of using a simple defender model. The space of attacks causes uncer-
tainty regarding exact features of benign data.
velop countermeasures from a Dynamic - Adversarial perspective. In such an environment,
delaying the onset of attacks, detecting attacks and recovering from them are all equally
important, for the continued usage of the classification system. In this chapter, the impact
of classifier design strategies on the severity of attacks launched at test time, is presented.
The existing ideas of Randomness and Complex learning, for securing classifiers, are evalu-
ated from a dynamic perspective. Also, the ability to take preemptive measures, to ensure
defender’s leverage in a dynamic environment, is evaluated. In particular, the ability to
hide feature importance is demonstrated, as a proactive measure to enable efficient reactive
security.
The following claims are evaluated in this chapter: a) Restrictive one-class classifiers,
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Complex Learning and Randomization, are not effective as long term security measures, b)
Unsupervised Drift Detection (particularly MD3), can be actively evaded by an adversary at
test time and c) Using a reduced feature set in the defender’s model can improve the detect-
ability of attacks and prevent information leakage to the adversary. The analysis in this
chapter is based on intuitive representative methodologies, which demonstrate the inherent
vulnerabilities of different classification based systems, as they often tend to be evaluated
only on a strict set of predefined objectives. In a real world environment, attacks can take
any shape and can almost always circumvent defenses, over time. In such environments,
staying ahead of the attacker at every step is more crucial than hoping for an iron clad
design [49]. By understanding the nature of probing based attacks and the requirements
of a dynamic system, the proposed solution aims to provide better long term security in
Dynamic - Adversarial environments.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 presents related work in
the area of countermeasures against exploratory attacks. Section 5.3 presents the idea of
adversarial uncertainty, as a novel way of analyzing the impact of classifier design strategies
in dynamic environments. Impact of classifier design on adversarial capabilities is also dis-
cussed in this section. Section 5.4 experimentally evaluates vulnerabilities of Randomness,
Complex Learning and One-class classifiers, from the perspective of providing long term
security. The proposed hidden classifier design is presented and evaluated in Section 5.5.
Chapter summary is presented in Section 5.6.
5.2 Background work on the security of machine learning against exploratory
attacks
The vulnerability of machine learning to adversarial activity, has received consider-
able attention in recent times [40, 66, 100, 137]. Countermeasures have been developed to
thwart attacks or to make them otherwise difficult to carryout, by training resilient mod-
els. Most work on securing classifier have focused on targeted-exploratory attacks, where
an adversary starts with an attack payload, which it wants to optimally modify, so as to
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evade the defender’s model [72,73,87]. Attack cost is given by the distance from the initial
adversarial samples, to the samples which first cause evasion, commonly measured using
L1-Euclidean norm for numeric data spaces. Under this framework, countermeasures have
been developed, evaluated and compared. The methodologies can be broadly divided into
two classes: a) Obfuscation approaches, which rely on randomness to mislead an adver-
sary [2, 4, 40, 71–73, 87], and b) Complex learning approaches, which rely on integrating
orthogonal information into the classifier model [40, 66, 74, 76, 91, 98], to make it harder to
mimic.
Obfuscation relies on randomization to make attacks harder. By training multiple
models over the hypothesis space of the training data, several alternate decision strategies
are made available at test time [72, 76, 91, 98]. Randomly choosing among these strategies
have shown to increase the cost of adversarial evasion [76]. An example of such an approach
is a multi-modal biometric system [136] which alternates between fingerprint recognition and
voice recognition to provide authentication services. As such, an adversary will be confused
about the influence of a particular biometric, on the final outcome of the system, making
evasion by mimicking, harder to achieve. Randomization was found to be effective in a
multiple classifier system (MCS) setting to make evasion harder [98], and was also shown
to be effective against reverse engineering attacks on Support Vector Machines [6]. In [91],
randomization of the class boundary was used to demonstrate increased difficulty of evading
the SpamAssassin spam filtering system. Providing misleading feedback on input samples
was proposed in [76], as an effective measure against targeted evasion attacks. However, in
the same work, randomization was found to be ineffective against attacks of indiscriminate
nature, where any samples evading the classifier is considered a valid attack payload. The
reason for this shortcoming is due to the nature of randomization based security, where all
information is available to be probed, but information needs additional validation (more
probes) to determine its veracity.
Complex learning methods relies on increasing the robustness of classifiers, by evenly
distributing importance weights among the informative features of the model. Considering
147
the earlier multi-modal biometric example, a system which uses both fingerprint and voice
recognition is harder to evade, as an adversary needs to successfully evade both sets of
features, to gain access. Feature bagging was proposed as a way to increase robustness
in a MCS setting in [72]. In [75], modifying the min-max formulation of the loss function
was proposed, to ensure robustness in a game theoretic formulation of the attack-defense
problem. An adversarial aware SVM model was proposed in [90], by adding additional terms
to the loss function of the model. In all these approaches, it is postulated that distributing
feature weights will require the adversary to mimic a large number of features, in order to
gain access to the system, thereby making it secure. This is especially true for the case of
targeted evasion attacks, where the adversarial cost is determined by the number of features
which need mimicking, to cause an evasion [51]. Robustness provides security against
targeted evasion attacks, against feature deletion attacks and against random perturbation
to existing attack samples [71, 72]. In [188], the idea of defensive distillation and gradient
masking was proposed, to make deep neural networks robust against minor perturbations
to attack samples. In [138], the idea of adversarial training is proposed for securing against
large perturbation to attack samples, by preemptively training networks with adversarial
samples, to ensure robustness at test time. The underlying notion in all these techniques
is that the cost of changing samples by an adversary, given by the number of features
to be mimicked, is increased. However, the effectiveness of these countermeasures against
indiscriminate and black box attacks on classifiers, is not evaluated. An attacker free to move
in the feature space is not concerned with the number of features which need modifying. As
such, the idea of robustness and the security it promises needs scrutiny in such a setting.
The above mentioned techniques of Complex learning and that of Obfuscation, rely
on a static assumption of the problem of security. It is expected that security is respon-
sible only for delaying attacks, or for making it harder for the system to get attacked by
an adversary. These countermeasures do not discuss the impact of an attack or possible
recovery mechanisms, after a system is attacked. These works themselves demonstrate that
increasing adversarial effort/budget will eventually lead to an attack. Since no system is
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Figure 5.4: Illustration of exploratory attacks on defender’s classifier C. Green- Legitimate
training samples, yellow - Malicious training samples, red - Adversarial attack samples at
test time.
truly secure, these countermeasures only discuss one aspect of the attack, which is the sit-
uation before the onset of attacks. It is important to consider the dynamics of the system,
to truly understand its vulnerabilities and the effectiveness of proposed security measures.
The dynamic aspects of security are illustrated in Figure 5.1, where static measures are
shown to focus on preventing onset of attacks, while dynamic measures are seen to focus
on detection and recovery from attacks.
Ideas and motivation regarding the dynamics of the machine learning security, were
proposed in [114]. It was proposed that for a system to be of any practical use, it should
evolve over time and engage with human experts beyond feature engineering and labeling.
A new taxonomy of exploratory attacks was presented in [114], based on their effects on a
dynamic data mining process. The attacks are illustrated in Figure 5.4, and are classified as:
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a) Distribution Shift attacks, b) Feature Invalidation attacks and the c) Data Nullification
attacks. Distribution shift attacks are a results of attacks where the samples move to a
new region of space to avoid detection. These can be fixed by collecting the new attack
samples and retraining the original model using the already defined set of features. These
attacks are illustrated in Figure 5.4b), where the model C ′ represents the newly trained
model, in response to attacks. Feature Invalidation attacks are a result of indiscriminate
attacks on a subset of the features, in a denial of service (DOS) attack fashion, causing
the feature to be unusable for future prediction tasks. This is illustrated in Figure 5.4c),
where the attacker launches indiscriminate attack on feature x, making it unusable for the
prediction task. However, these attacks can be fixed by retraining models on the other
set of informative orthogonal features (here, feature y), collected from the data. The Data
Nullification attacks (Figure 5.4d)) are the most severe category of attack, as they leave the
training data completely useless, due to overlapping attack and legitimate samples. The
classifier cannot be retrained using the existing set of features, and new analysis and data
collection is needed to redesign the system, which requires tedious examination of samples,
to detect attacks and generate new set of features. From a dynamic machine learning
perspective, the task of the defender should be to ensure that such type of attacks are
avoided, even though evasion might be made slightly easier. Static methods of security, as
discussed earlier the obfuscation and the complex learning strategies, increase vulnerability
to data nullification attacks, in their pursuit to make evasion harder.
Data nullification attacks are a result of an attacker gaining excessive information
about the training data used by the defender. The adversary obtains this information
via probing the black box model of the defender’s model. In case a defender uses all
the informative features from the training data into the deployed model, as is done in
the case of complex learning and randomization approaches, the adversary can reverse
engineer all this information via probing. An overly informative model leaks information
to the adversary, making the defender vulnerable to adversaries equipped with increased
information about the prediction space. This information leverage which the adversary
150
can obtain is especially harmful due to the following reasons: a) The attacker can launch
data nullification attacks, which can make them indistinguishable from the benign samples,
b) Detecting and retraining after such attacks is difficult and labor intensive, c) Data
nullification can lead to loss of privacy, as the adversary can approximate the space of
Legitimate data samples. The loss of privacy was discussed in [100], where experiments on
ML-as-a-service providers of Amazon AWS1 and the Google Cloud Platform2, demonstrated
that overfitting leads to data leakage. Overfitting, due to increased complexity of defender’s
model, leads the attacker to the training space of Legitimate class samples. This causes the
models to leak sensitive information about the internal state of the training data. It was
observed that models which sweep larger generalization areas are more resistant to data
leakages. This was in direct contrast to the robustness strategies advocated by existing
works on security of ML. Recent works in [40], advocate the use of complex hypothesis
class in deploying neural networks and that of adversarial training for defense against large
perturbations, and were also shown to be vulnerable to privacy losses in [47].
The idea of data leakage and data nullification attacks, present a new dimension in
the evaluation of machine learning security, beyond the traditional established metrics of
hardness of evasion [51]. These ideas are a result of a more widespread and practical un-
derstanding of the vulnerabilities of classifiers, resulting from black box and indiscriminate
attacks at test time. These attacks are harder, if not impossible, to completely account for
at the training time, and have to be dealt with in a reactive manner. Existing work on
concept drift approaches this problem as a cyclic one, where data distribution changes are
detected and handled over time [58]. However, concept drift research has hitherto taken a
domain agnostic approach to dealing with distribution shifts. Adversarial characteristics of
the drift and preemptive strategies to mitigate and manage drift, have not been analyzed or
discussed before, to the best of our knowledge. The only mention we found was in [1, 114],
where adversarial drift was understood to be a special type of drift, being a function of the




fier, the choice of the deployed classifier directs the gamut of possible attack on the system,
to a large extent. We analyze this specific aspect of the attacks, and design a preemptive
strategy which benefits the dynamic handling of the attacks at test time. By directing the
adversary to regions of space of easy detect-ability and defense, the defender can control
drift and stay ahead at every step. This chapter analyzes one such solution, based on the
notion of feature importance hiding. This intuition goes against the established ideas of
robustness, which claims that the defender should incorporate maximum information in the
deployed model. The effects of the different classifier designs, on adversarial activity at
text time, are analyzed and the Predict-Detect classifier framework is proposed as a viable
design for usage in a Dynamic Adversarial Environment.
5.3 Adversarial Uncertainty - On the ability to effectively react to attacks in
dynamic adversarial environments
Deployed classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations at test time, which
cause the models to degrade over time. Operating in a dynamic environment requires a
forward thinking and adversarial aware design for classifiers, beyond fitting the model to
the training data. In such scenarios, it is necessary to make classifiers - a) harder to evade,
b) easier to detect changes in the data distribution over time, and c) be able to retrain
and recover from model degradation. While most works in the security of machine learning
has concentrated on the evasion resistance (a) problem, there is little work in the areas of
reacting to attacks (b and c). Although streaming data research concentrates on the ability
to react to changes to the data distribution, they often take an adversarial agnostic view of
the problem. This makes them vulnerable to adversarial activity, which is aimed towards
evading the concept drift detection mechanism itself. Understanding the impact of attacks
and defense in a cyclic environment, where a system is attacked and needs to recover from it
periodically, requires a new viewpoint on the problem and the metrics used for evaluating the
different design strategies. The metric of attack evasion rate [51] is sufficient for evaluating
robustness of models to the onset of exploratory attacks, but it does not provide intuition
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about the effectiveness of strategies which are designed for reacting to attacks in a dynamic
environment. In this case, we need a metric which can convey information about the ability
to react to attacks and continue operations, following the onset of attacks.
In this section, the idea of Adversarial Uncertainty is introduced, to understand the
impact of different classifier design strategies on the ability to react to attacks, once they
start to impact a system’s performance. The motivation behind adversarial uncertainty
is presented in Section 5.3.1. The impact of the defender’s classifier design on adversar-
ial uncertainty, is presented using an illustrative example of binary feature valued data
in Section 5.3.2. A heuristic method to measure adversarial uncertainty is presented in
Section 5.3.3, by means of introducing the Adversarial Margin Density (AMD) measure.
The ability of adversaries to utilize the available probe-able information, from the defender’s
black box model, in order to launch high confidence attacks, is demonstrated in Section 5.3.4
and Section 5.3.4.1. This is done to analyze the impact of a determined adversary, and to
be able to design secure classifiers to counter them.
5.3.1 Motivation
The defender extracts information about the predictive problem, by analyzing and
learning from the training data. The adversary on the other hand, obtains its informa-
tion by probing the deployed black box model of the defender. As such, there is a gap
between the information held by the two players. This is not a significant concern when
the adversary is aiming to only evade the deployed model, as complete understanding of
the feature space is often not needed to evade most robust classifier models. However, this
information deficit/gap is necessary to evaluate the impact an adversary can have on the
reactive capabilities of a defender. Adversarial uncertainty refers to the uncertainty on the
part of the adversary, due to the unavailability of the original training data.
To understand the impact of adversarial uncertainty, consider the following toy ex-
ample: a 2-dimensional binary dataset, where the sample L(X1=1, X2=1) represents the
Legitimate class training sample and M(X1=0, X2=0) represents the Malicious class sam-
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Figure 5.5: Illustration of data nullification attacks on the space of legitimate samples
(blue).
ples. A model trained as C : X1∨X2 provides generalization capabilities, by allowing (0,1)
and (1,0) to be considered as legitimate samples at test time. In this case, an adversary
looking to evade C, can pick one of the following three attack samples at test time: (1,0),
(0,1), (1,1). While any of these samples will lead to a successful evasion on the adversary’s
part, only one is truly devastating for a reactive system. The adversarial sample (1,1) will
make the defender’s model ineffective, as it completely mimics the training sample L. How-
ever, in this case, the probability of selecting this sample is 1/3, as an adversary is not
certain about the exact impact of the features X1 and X2, on C. This uncertainty on the
part of the adversary is referred to as adversarial uncertainty. In this example, adversarial
uncertainty will enable the defender to recover from attacks 2/3 times, as the attack sample
(1,0) can be thwarted by an updated model C ′ : X2, and the sample (0,1) can be thwarted
by the model C ′ : X1.
The attack sample (1,1) is an example of a data nullification attack [114]. Data
nullification leaves the defender unable to use the same training data, to continue operating
in a dynamic environment. An illustration of data nullification attacks on numerical data
spaces is shown in Figure 5.5. In this figure, the attacks samples generated, overlap with
the original space of legitimate data samples. As such, the defender will be unable to train
a high quality classification model, which can effectively separate the two class of samples,
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while using the existing set of features. Recovering from data nullification attacks will
require the defender to generate additional features and collect new training data, both of
which are time taking and expensive operations. Also, such attacks will be harder to detect
via unsupervised techniques (such as the margin density drift detection (MD3) methodology
of Chapter 4), because the legitimate and the attack samples have a high degree of similarity
and proximity, in the feature space. It is therefore required to ward of data nullification
attacks, to be able to effectively detect and recover from attacks. Adversarial uncertainty
provides a rough indication of the inability of the adversary, to deduce with confidence
the exact impact of the various features on the prediction problem. A high adversarial
uncertainty will lead to a lower probability of a data nullification attack.
From a streaming data perspective, the ability to detect attacks and being able to
retrain the classifier, are important characteristics of the system. This is possible only if
the original legitimate training data is not corrupted by an adversary at test time (i.e., data
nullification attacks are prevented). Data nullification attacks are possible if an adversary
is able to simultaneously and successfully reverse engineer the impact of the entire feature
set, on the defender’s classification model. This is a result of an adversary’s confidence in
the impact of the different features on the prediction task, which it obtains via exploration
of the deployed black box model. A highly confident adversary can not only evade the
deployed classifier, but can also avoid detection by unsupervised methodologies. Thus, it is
essential to evaluate the impact of the various defender strategies, on their ability to ensure
that they do not leak excessive information to an adversary (i.e., their ability to ensure high
adversarial uncertainty).
5.3.2 Impact of classifier design on adversarial uncertainty
Adversarial activity and capabilities are a function of the deployed black box classi-
fier, which is being evaded. The adversary’s perception of the prediction space is directed by
the feedback on probes submitted to the defender’s model. As such, the defender’s classifier
design has a certain degree of control in defining the range of attacks, that can be launched
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against it. Classifier design strategies range from restrictive one class classifiers [189, 190],
to robust majority voted classifier [83,84], and randomization based feature bagged ensem-
bles [91, 98]. From an adversarial perspective, the selection of classifier learning strategies
can have a significant impact on adversarial uncertainty and on the hardness of evasion.
The impact of popular classifier design strategies, based on research directions in security
of machine learning, is illustrated here using an example of a N -dimensional binary feature
space. We consider the training dataset to be comprised of one Legitimate class sample
L(1,1,...(N features),1) and one Malicious class sample M(0,0, ....(N features),0). As such,
the features 1 to N are all informative in discriminating between the two classes of samples.
The effective usage of this orthogonal information, leads to the various design strategies,
as shown in Table 5.1. Since this is meant to be an illustrative example, we consider the
impact of these designs against a random probing based attack strategy, where the attacker
tries different permutations of the N binary variables, to understand the behavior of the
black box classifier.
The Simple model strategy of Table 5.1, represents a classifier design which em-
phasizes feature reduction in its learning phase. An example of such a classifier is a C4.5
Decision tree or a Linear SVM with L1-regularization penalty, which gravitate towards sim-
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pler model representations. A representative model in this case, is given by C : Xi = 1, as
the learned classification rule. The probability that a randomly generated N -dimensional
probe sample will evade C is 0.5, as the prediction space is divided into two halves, on this
feature Xi. The adversarial certainty (Table 5.1) refers to the confidence that an adversary
has about the defender’s training data, given that an attack sample is successful in evading
C. In the case of the simple model, the adversary is fairly uncertain, as the training data
sample L could be any one of the 2N−1 probe samples, which provide successful evasion.
The Complex models rely on aggregating feature information, to make the learned
models more complex (i.e., have more coefficients and important features). The one class
classifier strategy is a complex model and comes in two flavors: a restrictive boundary
around the legitimate training data samples, and a restrictive boundary around the mali-
cious training data samples. In the former case, the model is the hardest to evade, as an
adversary will need to simultaneously evade all N features, to gain access to the system.
This provides additional security from attack onset, by reducing evasion probability to 1 in
2N . However, it also leads to an adversarial certainty of 100%, implying that any successful
attack will lead to a data nullification and subsequent inability of the defender to recover
from such attacks. Thus, as opposed to common belief in cybersecurity [190], a more re-
strictive classifiers could be a bad strategy, when considering a dynamic and adversarial
environment. The one class model on the set of malicious training data, represents the
other end of the spectrum, where a boundary is drawn around the malicious class samples.
This model makes evasion easier, but ensures high adversarial uncertainty. This is also un-
desirable, as evasion can be performed by changing any of the N features. It could however
benefit defenders facing multiple disjoint adversaries [3, 114].
A popular design strategy in adversarial domains, focuses on integrating multiple
orthogonal feature space information to make a complex model, which is robust to changes
in a subset of the features. A feature bagging ensemble, which uses majority voting on
its component model’s predictions, is a popular choice in this category. This model is
resilient to attacks which affect only a few features at any given time. Most robust learning
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strategies were evaluated against a targeted exploration attack, where the adversary starts
with a predetermined attack sample and aims to minimally alter it, so as to evade the
classifier C. By measuring adversarial cost in terms of the number of features which need
evasion, the efficacy of feature bagged models was demonstrated [51], as robust models
by design will require a majority of the features to be modified, for a successful evasion.
This reasoning is not valid for the case of an indiscriminate exploratory attack, where an
adversary is interested in generating any sample which evades C (as presented using the
Seed-Explore-Exploit attack framework of Chapter 3), without any predefined set of attack
samples. In such cases, an adversary is able to generate any attack sample at the same cost.
In this setting, the impact of feature bagged ensemble is similar to that of a simple model,
as seen from the evasion probability and adversarial certainty computations of Table 5.1.
An additional design strategy, relies on randomness to provide protection. By train-
ing models on multiple different subspace of the data and then randomly choosing one of
the models to provide the prediction at any given time, these model aims to mislead at-
tackers, by obscuring the feedback from the black box model C. Although this strategy has
a higher perceived evasion resistance (Table 5.1), security through obscurity has shown to
be ineffective when faced with indiscriminate probing based attacks [76].
5.3.3 Using Adversarial Margin Density (AMD) to approximate adversarial
uncertainty
The use of adversarial certainty in Table 5.1, was illustrated by using a random
probing attack on a binary feature space. Here, the idea of adversarial uncertainty is
expanded and a methodology for its computation and usage is presented, for empirical
evaluation.
Adversarial uncertainty is essentially the uncertainty on the adversary’s part, due
to the non availability of the original training dataset. For the task of classification, this
uncertainty refers to the inability of the adversary to successfully reverse engineer the impact
of all the important features, on the prediction task. The notion of partial evasion of
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the feature space is employed, in defining the margin density drift detection algorithm
in Chapter 4. The MD3 approach, defines regions of uncertainty (margin/blindspots) for
a classifier and then uses it to detect concept drift in the data. The intuition behind
this approach was that drifts seldom affect all informative features simultaneously, in real
world applications. This same intuition can be used in defining adversarial uncertainty,
as we are trying to measure the impact of an attack, based on their ability to impact the
available features. An attacker that impacts only a minimal set of feature, so as to be
sufficient to evade the defender’s classifier C, will lead to a large margin density. This is
due to the increased disagreement between orthogonal models, trained from the original
training dataset. Conversely, an attacker with a low margin density is indicative of one
who was successful in evading a large set of informative features. To this end, the notion of
Adversarial Margin Density (AMD) is defined here, to capture adversarial uncertainty on
the set of evaded features.
Definition 5.3.1. Adversarial Margin Density (AMD): The expected number of suc-
cessful attack samples (attack samples classified by the defender as Legitimate), which fall
within the defender’s margin (i.e., the region of critical uncertainty), defined by a robust
classifier (one that distributes feature weights) on the training data.
The definition of AMD highlights the following two concepts: a) The AMD is com-
puted only on the attack samples which successfully evade the classifier C, and b) We mea-
sure only the region of critical uncertainty (margin/blindspots), predefined for a classifier
trained on the original training data. The AMD measures the uncertainty by quantifying
the attack samples which evade the classifier C, but do not have high certainty about the
entire feature space. This is demonstrated in Figure 5.6, where the adversarial margin is
given by the region of space where the defender C is evaded, but the feature X2 is still
not successfully reverse engineered by the adversary. This causes the attacks to fall within
blindspots of a robust classifier (i.e., one that distributes feature weights). For an attack
to have a low uncertainty, it will have to avoid falling in the blindspots, which is possible
only if an attacker can successfully evade a significant portion of the feature space (given
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Figure 5.6: Illustration of adversarial margin. It is given by the region of space which leads
to evasion of defender’s classifier C, but does not lead to evasion of all the informative
features.
by critical uncertainty), simultaneously.
The idea behind the AMD is presented in Definition 5.3.1. An implementation
methodology which can be used to compute AMD is presented next. A random subspace
ensemble is considered for defining the robust classifier, over the training dataset, as this
classifier is general in its design and does not make assumptions about usage of any specific





; ∀x ∈ XAttack : C(x) is Legitimate
where, SE(x) =

1, if |pE(yLegitimate|x)− pE(yMalicious|x)| ≤ θMargin
0, otherwise
(5.1)
The AMD is measured only on the attack samples (XAttack) which successfully evade
the defender’s classifier C, at test time. These set of samples are evaluated to determine
if they fall within the region of critical uncertainty given by the parameter θMargin. By
adjusting the parameter, the sensitivity of measurements and tolerance for adversarial ac-
tivity, can be tuned. A value of 0.5 is typically considered effective for most scenarios.
Samples falling in this region of high disagreement (given by parameter θMargin) are con-
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sidered to be cases where there is critical uncertainty between the constituent models of
the ensemble. Since the ensemble is trained as a feature bagged model, this disagreement
is due to different feature value distributions, than the benign training samples, caused by
adversarial uncertainty. The ensemble E is taken to be a random subspace ensemble. In
the experimentation here, we consider a feature bagged ensemble of 50 base Linear-SVM
models, each with 50% of the total features, randomly picked. In Equation 5.1, pE(y|x) is
obtained via majority voting on the constituent models, and represents disagreement scores
for each sample x. The AMD is always a ratio between 0 and 1, and a higher value indicates
a high adversarial uncertainty. By extension, a higher AMD also indicates an increased ease
of unsupervised detection and subsequent recovery from attacks.
5.3.4 Adversarial evasion using high confidence filter
In Chapter 3, the Seed-Explore-Exploit (SEE) framework was introduced, to simulate
adversarial attacks on black box classifiers at test time. The framework was developed as
a proof of concept, with adversarial goals being: the generation of samples which evade
the defender’s model and at the same time provide high variability, to make blacklisting
based countermeasures ineffective. In this section, the SEE framework is extended further,
to simulate sophisticated attackers, who are capable of using all the probe-able information
to generate attacks of high adversarial certainty. Such adversaries can leverage the probed
information, to launch attacks which can avoid falling in the margin/blindspots of the
defender. Consequently, such an adversary can be harder to detect and stop. This extension
of the SEE framework, will allow for testing against a sophisticated adversary, and will
enable us to better understand the severity of exploratory attacks possible at test time.
Since this extension maintains the original black box assumptions of the defender’s model,
it provides for analyzing the impact of severe exploratory attacks, which are possible to
carry out against a classifier, by an adversary.
The proposed extension to the SEE framework is depicted in Figure 5.7. Specifically,
the filter strategy is developed as an extension to the Anchor Points attacks (AP) of Sec-
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Figure 5.7: SEE based evasion attack framework, with a high confidence filter phase.
tion 3.3.2. The anchor points exploration samples obtained are first sent to a filter phase,
where the low confidence samples are eliminated, before the exploitation phase starts. This
filtering leads to a reduced size of exploration samples, for which the adversary has high
confidence that they do not fall in the defender’s margins. This approach is called the
Anchor Points - High Confidence (AP-HC) strategy, and it is developed as a wrapper over
the SEE framework, making it easy for extension to other data driven attack strategies as
well. The AP-HC strategy will simulate adversaries who are capable of utilizing all the
probe-able information, to launch attacks which generate low Adversarial Margin Density
(AMD), on the defender’s part.
In the filtering phase of the Figure 5.7, the adversary relies on stitching together
information made available by the defender’s black box, to launch attacks which evade a
large number of features simultaneously. The adversary does so by integrating information
learned in the exploration phase, about the impact of different subsets of features, on the
prediction outcome. It then filters out samples which are good for evasion, but only result
in evading a small subset of features. This will result in an attack exploitation, which
would provide to high adversarial certainty. The idea is illustrated in Figure 5.8, on a 2D
synthetic dataset. In this example, there are two sets of features X1 and X2, both of
which are informative for the classification task, as X1 > 0.5 or X2 > 0.5 both lead to the
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Figure 5.8: Reducing adversarial uncertainty via filtering, in anchor points attacks. After
the exploration phase in b), the adversary trains models on individual feature subspaces
(X1 and X2). It then aggregates this information to clean out samples in low confidence
areas (C:X1 6= C:X2). The final set of filtered high confidence samples are shown in d).
high quality defender models. Consider the defender’s model to be ′X1 > 0.5 ∨X2 > 0.5′.
As seen in Section 5.3.2, this leads to an adversarial uncertainty of 1/3, since the training
data could be in any of the 3 quadrants where the samples are perceived as Legitimate.
A naive adversary using the SEE framework, can launch an attack using samples where
atleast one of the two feature X1 or X2 is greater than 0.5. However, an adversary using
the high confidence filter attack will combine this orthogonal information and launch attack
samples only if both conditions are satisfied (i.e., X1 > 0.5 and X2 > 0.5). In doing so,
the adversary is learning the orthogonal information about the prediction landscape and
aggregating this information to avoid detection by the defender. This strategy is illustrated
in Figure 5.8, where the initial explored samples for the AP attacks (b), are filtered using
the aforementioned information aggregation technique, to generate a high confidence set
of exploration samples (c). The adversary does so by using the exploration samples in b),
to train orthogonal models and admit only those samples which have high consensus (low
uncertainty), based on the trained model. The filtered exploration samples are then used
in the exploitation phase, and as can be seen in Figure 5.8, these attacks have an AMD of
0, as none of the attack samples fall inside the margin of the classifier.
In our analysis presented in Table 5.1, it was shown that Complex feature bagged
ensembles models have a low adversarial certainty (1/2N−1, for N dimensional binary fea-
ture space). This made it more secure in dynamic environments, when compared to the
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restrictive one class classifier model, where the adversarial certainty was 1. However, similar
to a one class classifier, the robust ensemble model also makes a majority of the information
available, to be probed by a patient adversary, as demonstrated in Figure 5.8. This infor-
mation is not directly available (as in the case of a one class classifier where evasion leads
to an adversarial uncertainty of 0), and does not directly lead an adversary to the space of
training data. However, the AP-HC filtering step can cause the adversary to stitch together
information made available by such ensemble models, to launch a potent attack which could
leave the defender helpless. A generic approach to extend the intuition of Figure 5.8, to
high dimensional spaces, is presented in the following section.
5.3.4.1 The Anchor Points - High Confidence (AP-HC) approach
The AP-HC attack strategy is presented in Algorithm 5.1. The algorithm receives
the exploration samples from the SEE framework, and then uses the filtering approach of
Figure 5.8, to clear out samples of low confidence. The adversary does so by training a
robust classifier, such as a random subspace ensemble, from the probed exploration sam-
ples. The trained model is then used to identify samples of low confidence, as these are
the ones which have low consensus among the feature bagged ensemble’s models. The re-
sulting set of filtered exploration samples DExplore−HC , from Algorithm 5.1, is then used
in the exploitation phase of the SEE framework, to launch the attacks. This methodology
is implemented completely on the adversary’s side, while maintaining the same black box
assumption about the defender, as presented by the SEE framework and the Anchor Points
attacks in Section 3.3.1. As such, it serves as a methodology for thorough analysis of adver-
sarial capabilities, to better design secure machine learning frameworks. The purpose of the
AP-HC attack approach is to highlight the effects of making excessive information available
to the adversary, and the resulting space of possible attacks which could be launched by it,
using purely data driven methodologies.
The parameter θAdversary confidence, controls the filtering operation in Algorithm 5.1.
Since an adversary is interested only in high confidence attack samples, we consider a high
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Algorithm 5.1: SEE based high confidence filter attacks (SEE-HC).
Input : Exploration Samples from SEE framework - DExplore, Filter
threshold θAdversary confidence
Output: High confidence exploration samples DExplore−HC
1 E ← Train random subspace samples from DExplore
2 DExplore−HC = ∅
3 for sample in DExplore do
4 if |pE(yLegitimate|sample)− pE(yMalicious|sample)| ≥ θAdversary confidence
then
5 DExplore−HC ∪ sample
6 return DExplore−HC
confidence threshold of θAdversary confidence=0.8. A higher confidence threshold will allow for
more stringent filtering of samples. This heuristic filtering approach will be used to demon-
strate the capabilities of an adversary to evade detection, by gaining more certainty about
the location of the training data. This approach will be used to highlight innate vulnerabil-
ities in seemingly secure designs, such as the robust feature bagged ensemble strategy, and
will be used for thorough analysis of the impact of classifier design on adversarial capability.
5.4 Experimental evaluation and analysis
In this section, the impact of different classifier design strategies, on adversarial
capabilities, is evaluated. Moving beyond accuracy, the effects of attacks from a dynamic-
adversarial perspective, is analyzed. The idea of adversarial margin density is considered,
to account for detect-ability and retrain-ability from attacks. The adversary is considered
to be capable of using machine learning to meet its needs. In Section 5.4.1, the protocol and
setup of experiments performed in this section, is presented. Effect of using a restrictive one
class model for the defender is presented in Section 5.4.2. Impact of using a robust feature
bagged ensemble and that of using randomization based models in presented in Section 5.4.3
and Section 5.4.4, respectively. Discussion and analysis is presented in Section 5.4.5.
165
5.4.1 Experimental setup and protocol
The basic Seed-Explore-Exploit framework of Chapter 3, is considered for generat-
ing attacks on the defender’s black box model. In particular, the Anchor Points (AP)
attack algorithm Section 3.3.2 is employed. An adversary starts with an exploration budget
BExplore=1000 probes, and then uses it to generate an attack of 2000 samples, via exploita-
tion. The parameters of the AP attacks are taken without any modifications, to ensure
consistent analysis and extension of the attack paradigms. The defender is considered to
be a black box by the adversary, with no information about its internal working available.
The only interaction the attacker has with the defender, is by means of submitting probe
samples, and receiving tacit Accept/Reject feedback on them.
Adversarial margin density proposed in Section 5.3.3, is used for evaluating uncer-
tainty of the attacks. A θMargin=0.5, for measuring the AMD (as motivated by MD3 in
Chapter 4), is considered. A random subspace model with 50 Linear SVMs (regularization
constant c=1, and 50% of the features in each model), is taken for the AMD computa-
tion. Also, the effects of filtering by an adversary is evaluated in this section, with a
θAdversary confidence=0.8. A random subspace model with 50 Linear SVMs (regularization
constant c=10, and 50% of the features in each model), is chosen for the filtering task.
A high regularization constant ensures that the models do not overfit to the exploration
samples, as the adversary’s goal is not to fit the model to the explored samples, but to learn
from it about the region of high confidence. This also makes it more robust to black box
feedback noise and stray probes.
Description of datasets used for evaluation is presented in Table 5.2. The synthetic
datasets is a 10 dimensional dataset, with two classes. The Legitimate class is normally
distributed with a µ=0.75 and σ=0.05, and the Malicious class is centered at µ=0.25 and
σ=0.05, across all 10 dimensions. This datasets provides for controlled experimentation and
analysis, by exhibiting 10 informative features. The CAPTCHA dataset is taken from [31],
and it represents the task of classifying mouse movement data for humans and bots, for the
task of behavioral authentication. The phishing dataset is taken from [145], and it represents
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TABLE 5.2







characteristics for malicious and benign web pages. The digits dataset [145] was taken to
represent a standard classification task. The multidimensional dataset was reduced to a
binary class problem with the class 1 and 7 taken for the Digits17 dataset, and the class 0
and 8 taken for the Digits08 dataset, respectively. In all datasets, the class 0 was considered
to represent the Legitimate and 1 was taken as the Malicious class. For Digits17, the class
7 is considered to be Legitimate, and for the Digits08, class 0 is considered Legitimate. The
data was normalized to the range of [0,1], using min-max normalization, and the features
were reduced to a numeric/binary type. The records were shuffled, to eliminate stray effects
of concept drifts within them. All experiments are repeated 30 times and average values
are reported. The experiments are performed using python and the scikit-learn machine
learning library [149].
5.4.2 Analyzing effects of using a restrictive one-class classifier for the de-
fender’s model
In adversarial domains, restricting the space of samples classified as Legitimate, is
considered an effective defense strategy [92, 190]. By tightly restricting what data points
are qualified as legitimate, the ability of random probing based attacks is significantly
reduced. This is a consequence of the reduced probe-able feature space area, as shown
in Figure 5.9, where a one class classifier is trained on the set of legitimate training data
points. The feedback obtained from the defender’s model, by probing the feature space
is shown. The significantly smaller area of the blue feedback (Figure 5.9), is what makes
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Figure 5.9: Illustration of prediction landscape of a one-class classifier. Smaller area of the
legitimate samples indicate the resilience against probing based attacks.
one class classifiers harder to probe and reverse engineer. However, the one class classifier
has limitation, which make them unsuitable for an adversarial domain. Firstly, a one
class classifier sacrifices generalization ability and it is not always possible to train an
accurate model over the available training data [92]. Secondly, as seen in our analysis
in Table 5.1, a one class classifier could cause high adversarial certainty, making attack
detection and recovery difficult. Most works on the security of classifiers advocate inclusion
of all orthogonal information, to make the system more restrictive and therefore more
secure [2, 40, 71, 72, 92, 190]. However, these works approach the security of the system
from a static perspective. Evaluating a one class classifier provides valuable insights into
the inefficacy of using restrictive models, in a dynamic adversarial environment. While
recent works present various novel ideas for integrating feature information [4, 92], a one-
class classifier serves as an ideal representative approach, in which all information across all
features is used in securing the system.
In a dynamic environment, it is necessary to maintain adversarial uncertainty, so as
to ensure that attacks can be recovered from. A one-class classifier, being overly restrictive,
leads an attacker directly to the space of the legitimate training data. Although this classifier
design makes the adversary expend greater effort to evade the system, once evaded the
attacks are indistinguishable from the benign traffic entering the system. This is illustrated
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TABLE 5.3
Results of experimentation on one-class and two-class defender models. Training accuracy,
Effective Attack Rate (EAR), Data Leakage (DL) and Adversarial Margin Density (AMD),









Restrictive one class 97.4 0.56 0.67 0
Robust two class 100 0.89 0 0.85
Synthetic
(10 features)
Restrictive one class 97.6 0.04 0.67 0
Robust two class 100 0.99 0.1 0.28
CAPTCHA
Restrictive one class 96.4 0.88 0.23 0
Robust two class 100 0.99 0.01 0.14
in case of a 2D synthetic data in Figure 5.10. Here, the anchor points attack is used
to generate attacks, on two different classifier designs: a) A one class classifier on the
legitimate training data (SVM with parameters: ν=0.1, RBF kernel and γ=0.1), and b) A
two class linear classifier model (Linear SVM with L2-regularization, c=1). The attack used
20 samples for exploration (BExplore) and generated 40 attack samples, in each case. It is
seen in Figure 5.10, that the attack leads to a large number of samples occupying the same
region as that of the legitimate samples, in case of the restrictive one class defender model
(Figure 5.10a)). This will cause problems in a dynamic environment, as retraining to thwart
attacks is close to impossible in this case. Also, detecting such attacks is difficult, due to
the increased similarity with benign input. In case of the two class model (Figure 5.10b)),
a larger data space is perceived as legitimate, due to the generalization provided by these
models, leading to attacks which are farther from the training data space. This illustrates
the ability of classifier model designs, to influence the severity of attacks on the system, and
to cause higher adversarial uncertainty.
Experimental evaluation of the synthetic 2D dataset, and two additional datasets
from Table 5.2, is presented in Table 5.3. Here, the metric of Effective Attack Rate (EAR)
is taken to measure the vulnerability of the the defender’s model, to anchor points attacks.
Additionally the following two metrics are introduced, to measure the effectiveness of attacks
in a dynamic environment - Data Leakage and the Adversarial Margin Density (AMD).
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(a) Use of a one class classifier by the defender causes reduced attack rate, but leads to increased
training data corruption and leakage.
(b) Two class classifiers ensures less data leakage, but makes evasion easier.
Figure 5.10: Illustration of AP attacks on a synthetic 2D dataset, using a restrictive one
class classifier and a generalized two class classifiers, for the defender’s model.
Adversarial margin density was introduced in Section 5.3.3, as a measure for approximating
adversarial uncertainty over the defender’s training data. Data leakage is introduced here
as an adhoc metric for evaluating the loss of private data, in a one class classification
setting. Data leakage is measured by developing a one class classifier on the space of
legitimate training samples, and then measuring the number of attack samples which are
incorrectly classified by this classifier. Data leak is used to measure the proximity of the
attack samples, to the original space of legitimate training samples, with a large value
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indicating the ability of the adversary to closely mimic the legitimate samples. A one class
SVM model (parameters: ν=0.1, RBF kernel, γ=0.1), is used to measure the data leakage
metric. The metrics were computed for the case of the one class and the two class defender’s
model, as shown in Table 5.3.
The Effective Attack Rate (EAR), is significantly lower for the one class classifier
(∆=0.46 on average, from Table 5.3). This is a result of the stricter criterion for inclusion
into the legitimate space, as imposed by the complex and restrictive classifier boundary.
However, this comes at the cost of an increased possibility of data leakage and lower adver-
sarial uncertainty. From Table 5.3, it can be seen that the data leak increases sharply for
the one class classifier (∆=0.49, on average), as the restrictive nature of the classifiers leads
the adversary to the training data samples. This causes problems with retraining, loss of
privacy, loss of clean training data, and issues with unsupervised attack detection. The data
leak metric provides a heuristic way to measure the severity of data nullification attacks.
However, the data leak metrics is difficult to compute for high dimensional datasets, due to
the inability to train an accurate one class classifier, which is needed to measure the data
leakage. For this reason the other datasets of Table 5.2, are not used for the analysis in
this section. Also, these datasets provided low training data accuracy when using a one
class classifier, making it unsuitable as a choice for the defender’s model. Going forward,
the adversarial margin density metric will be used, to indicate the strategic advantage of
the defender over the adversary, in detecting attacks and relearning from them.
The adversarial margin density (AMD) is more general in its applicability, when
compared to the data leak measure, and provides a way to indirectly measure adversarial
uncertainty and the severity of attacks in dynamic environments. From Table 5.3, it is seen
that the AMD is 0 for all 3 datasets, when using a one-class defender model. This is due
to the increased confidence in the location of the training data, once the restrictive model
is evaded. Although the one class classifier is secure, as it ensures a low EAR, it leaves
the defender helpless once an attack starts. As such, designing for a dynamic environment
requires forethought on the defender’s part. The experimentation in this section was pre-
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sented for illustrating the ill effects of using an overly restrictive model for the defender, and
the need to reevaluate the notion of security which relies on generating complex learning
models.
5.4.3 Analyzing effects of using a robust feature bagged ensemble for the de-
fender’s model
Robust models, which advocate complex models involving a large number of infor-
mative features, are considered to be effective in safeguarding against targeted exploratory
attacks [2, 4, 40, 71–73, 87]. In these attacks, the adversary starts with a predefined set
of attack samples, and intends to minimally modify it, so as to evade the defender. Ro-
bust models require that a majority of the feature values be mimicked by the adversary,
increasing the cost and effort needed to carry out attacks. However, in the case of an in-
discriminate exploratory attacks, this same line of reasoning is not valid, as an attacker is
interested in any sample that causes evasion. In these attacks, the ease of evasion is given
by the effective space of prediction, which is recognized as Legitimate by the defender. This
is because an adversary launching indiscriminate attacks, does so by probing the black box
model to find samples which would be classified as legitimate. A robust model, such as
a Linear SVM with L2-regularization, incorporates information conveyed by a majority of
the features, from the training dataset, into the learned model. It does so to make a model
robust to stray changes, and also to generate wide generalization margins, for better test
time predictive performance. In an adversarial environment, the effective area of legitimate
samples conveyed by a robust model, is similar to that of a simple model (which aims at
reducing the number of features in the model), as shown in Figure 5.11. In Figure 5.11, a
non robust linear SVM (with L1-regularization) is considered alongside a robust linear SVM
(with L2-regularization). The effective area of legitimate samples (blue) is the same in both
cases. This makes the two strategies equivalent in terms of securing against indiscriminate
probing based evasion attacks.
The equivalence of robust and non robust models, to indiscriminate probing attacks,
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Figure 5.11: Illustration of prediction landscape using simple and robust models, on 2D
synthetic data. Left- Initial training data, of the defender. Center - L1-regularized linear
SVM model for the defender (Non robust). Right- L2-regularized linear SVM model for the
defender (robust).
is further analyzed by evaluating on 5 datasets in Table 5.4. The anchor points attacks (AP),
are performed on two sets of classifiers: a) A robust classifier - Random subspace ensemble
with 50 linear SVMs (L1-regularized, each with 50% of the features randomly selected), and
b) A non robust classifier- Single linear SVM (with L1-regularization). The effect of these
strategies on the adversarial outcome is presented in Table 5.4. The Effective Attack Rate
(EAR) is seen to be similar for the two cases (∆=0.01, on average). This demonstrates the
equivalence in effects of the two strategies, when it comes to securing against probing based
attacks. The similarity in the diversity metrics of the attacks, measured using diversity
metrics of Section 3.4.1.2 (standard deviation (σ), K-nearest neighbor distance(KNN) and
minimum spanning tree distance (MST)), further indicate that the attacks operate in the
same extent of space for the two models.
Based on the analysis on a binary feature space in Table 5.1, it was deduced that
simple models behave similar to robust models, when attacks are of an indiscriminate nature,
as both result in the same adversarial certainty of 1/2N−1. From the same analysis, it was
deduced that robust models are better than one-class classifiers, in maintaining adversarial
uncertainty. The intuition behind this was that the increased generalization of robust
models will create uncertainty regarding the exact location of the training data, and the
impact of various feature subspaces on the prediction task. However, this intuition relied
on the assumption of a naive adversary, whose primary aim is to evade the system only.
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TABLE 5.4
Results of AP attacks on robust and non-robust defender models.
Dataset Metric Non Robust Model Robust Model
Synthetic




(0.35, 0.30, 0.21) (0.35, 0.29, 0.21)
CAPTCHA




(0.74,0.64,0.21) (0.80, 0.689, 0.22)
Phishing

















The proposed high confidence filtering attack strategy (AP-HC) of Section 5.3.4, provides
a way to simulate a sophisticated adversary, who is capable of utilizing all the probe-able
information to launch attacks of high certainty. The result of using this attack strategy
on the robust classifier model is presented in Table 5.5. It is seen that the AMD for
the robust classifier significantly reduces, when faced with the high confidence attack. In
case of the CAPTCHA dataset and the Synthetic dataset, the adversarial activity will go
totally unnoticed, while in case of other datasets, a significant drop in the AMD is observed
(∆=0.38, on average over all datasets). An important observation comes from the fact
that the filtering operation was performed completely on the adversary’s side, without any
help or information from the defender’s model. The adversary starts off with the goal of
admitting only the most confident exploration samples, and in doing so, it makes it difficult
for the defender to detect or stop it. This result indicates that robust classifiers and the
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TABLE 5.5
Results of Anchor Points (AP) attacks and Anchor Points – High Confidence (AP-HC)













Synthetic 100 0.98 0.999 0.28 0.01
CAPTCHA 100 0.996 0.999 0.19 0.002
Phishing 93.1 0.978 0.999 0.62 0.19
Digits08 97.1 0.928 0.999 0.73 0.22
Digits17 99.5 0.965 0.999 0.66 0.16
margin density approach to attack detection, are both themselves susceptible to adversarial
activity and need to be made secure, to be effective in a dynamic adversarial environment.
The effectiveness of the high confidence attacks, is due to the availability of all
information, to be probed by a sophisticated adversary. The majority voting scheme of the
robust ensemble, is reverse engineered by stitching together orthogonal subsets of feature
information, to generate attacks which closely mimic the legitimate samples. As such, the
robust ensemble methodologies behave similar to one-class classifiers, by being vulnerable
to low adversarial uncertainty. Both design approaches rely on incorporating maximum
extracted information from the training data, thereby conveying excessive information to
an adversary and equipping it with a thorough understanding of the impact of different
features to the classification task.
5.4.4 Analyzing effects of using randomization in the defender’s model
Robustness via complex learning methodologies aims at increasing the adversary’s
effort, by making it reverse engineer a large set of features, as seen in the case of one-class
classifiers and the feature bagged ensemble. The other advocated approach to dealing with
adversarial activity relies on obfuscation via randomization. By randomizing the feedback
presented to the attacker, these methodologies aim to mislead adversarial learning from
probes, leading to less effective attacks. Randomness can be introduced into multiple clas-
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Figure 5.12: Prediction landscape for the randomized feature bagging ensemble. Blindspots
are perceived to be obscured, while high confidence spaces remain consistent across repeated
probing.
sifier systems, particularly the ones using feature bagging. This is done by training multiple
models on subsets of features and then using any one of these models to provide prediction
at any given time [4, 72, 75]. The idea relies on confusing the adversary by constantly pre-
senting it with a moving target. In this section, the impact of randomization is analyzed,
when used with a feature bagged ensemble, against indiscriminate evasion attacks.
Randomization is introduced into the defender’s model, by extending the random
subspace ensemble of Section 5.4.3, to generate feedback based on the posterior probability
for a given sample X. The use of random subspace ensemble allows for the randomness
be caused due to disagreement between orthogonal feature information. Given a sample
X, the defender computes the confidence on it, based on majority voting of its component
models. This confidence is then used as a probability of prediction, to generate the class
label for X. As an example, consider a sample X for which the classifier C predicts with 0.8
probability to be in the Legitimate class. A standard threshold of 0.5, based on majority
voting, will cause the feedback on X to be of class Legitimate. To introduce randomness,
the defender’s model will instead sample number in the range of [0,1] and return feedback
Legitimate, only if the random number is >0.8. As such, randomness is introduced into
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Figure 5.13: Anchor Points attacks against a randomized defender classifier.
the classification scheme, while still maintaining the essential predictive properties of the
classifier. Here, the adversary may not be aware of the internal scoring or the randomness
of the black box model, as it still only experiences the defender as a black box model
providing Legitimate/Malicious feedback on its submitted probe X. The perceived space
of the adversary is shown in Figure 5.12. The regions of uncertainty is heavily influenced
by randomness, due to the disagreement between models trained on the two features.
The effects of randomness is demonstrated over a synthetic 2D dataset in Figure 5.13,
where the anchor points (AP) attacks is used. The misleading feedback from the defender,
causes the exploration phase to be corrupted, due to the naive assumption on the adversary’s
part about the veracity of the defender’s feedback. This is presented in Table 5.6 for the
5 datasets. An average drop of 22.9% in the Effective Attack Rate (EAR), is seen. This
comes at the cost of reduced accuracy for the defender (∆=1.65, on average), because of
randomized response returned by the defender even for a few of the legitimate samples.
This is unavoidable, as attack samples are no different than the regular traffic faced by the
defender, since both use the same input channels to access the system.
The analysis of a naive adversary assumes that the defender always returns the
correct feedback on the submitted probes. This was seen to result in the attacker being
mislead, as seen for the EAR of the naive attacker in Table 5.6. However, an adversary can
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become aware of the randomness, by submitting the same probe multiple times and observ-
ing different responses on it. Such an adversary can account for randomness in designing
its attacks. A simple heuristic strategy is simulated here, to understand the behavior of
such an adversary. In the exploration phase, the adversary makes repeated submission on
every exploration point, to understand the defender’s confidence in the sample. A sample
which is closer to the training data, will generate feedback with more consistency, while
samples falling in blindspots will be more random in their feedback (Figure 5.11). Using
this intuition, the the anchor points (AP) attack strategy is modified, to account for smart
adversaries capable of dealing with randomness. In the exploration phase, the adversary
submits each sample NRetries (taken as 5 in experiments here) times, and accepts the probe
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Figure 5.14: Anchor Points attacks with confidence filtering against a randomized classifier.
Repeated probing of exploration samples is used to weed out samples with inconsistent
feedback.
to belong to the Legitimate class, only if it returns the same feedback for all NRetries times.
All other samples are assumed to belong to the Malicious class. By cleaning samples of low
confidence, the blindspot exploration samples are removed, making the exploitation phase
more potent, as demonstrated in Figure 5.14.
Applying the filtering step allows for simulating an adversary capable of dealing with
randomness. The results of such an adversary is shown in Table 5.6, where an increase in
16.7% in the EAR is seen, for such attackers. After this filtering, the attacks are similar
to that on a robust model, with only a 5.1% difference on average, as seen in Figure 5.15.
This demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the randomization approaches in providing secu-
rity, against probing based attacks. There is increased onus on an adversary to use more
probes to validate the exploration samples, but if a possible adversary makes this additional
investment, incentivized by a high EAR, the randomization approach fails. The reduced
diversity in case of the confident samples, in Table 5.6, is because the space of the actual
confident legitimate samples, is much smaller than the one perceived by the naive adversary.
The inability of Restrictive models, Complex learning models and Randomization
based models, to continue providing security in a dynamic adversarial environment, was
highlighted in these sections. These approaches are advocated by works in the area of
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Figure 5.15: Comparison of Effective Attack Rate (EAR) for Non robust models, Robust
models, Randomization based models, and Randomization models with adversaries capable
of filtering low confidence samples.
machine learning security, as effective ways to ensure security against targeted exploratory
attacks. However, when faced with an adversary capable of launching indiscriminate evasion
attacks, these methodologies provide no better security than a simple two class classifier.
Also, the overly restrictive or informative models were seen to leak training data information
to the attacker, causing them to launch attacks, which are difficult to attack and recover
from. Additionally, randomness as a strategy was seen to be ineffective, based on a simple
repeated probing based modification by the adversary. Randomness is detect-able and
manageable, on the adversary’s end. It makes getting the information difficult, but like
complex learning models they also reveal excessive information about the importance of
features to the prediction task.
5.4.5 Why informative models are ill suited for adversarial environments?
The evaluation of classifier design from the perspective of adversarial uncertainty
provides new insights into their vulnerabilities, when applied in a dynamic adversarial
environment. The model design strategies of one-class classifiers, robust feature bagging
models, randomized feature bagging models and even the dynamic margin density based
drift detection technique (MD3), are all susceptible to attacks which can leave detection
and retraining, intractable. All these methodologies try to include the maximum informa-
tion from the training data, into the learned model, in order to maintain an information
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advantage over the adversary. This is seen to be the general trend in the adversarial ma-
chine learning research community [40, 66, 72], where including more information into the
models is believed to make it more secure. However, incorporating more information into
the learned model means that the adversary will be able to reverse engineer and learn more
of this information from the deployed model, via probing. In case of a one-class classi-
fier, which advocates using maximal information to develop a tight boundary around the
training data, it was seen that an attacker is led straight to the space of the legitimate
data (Section 5.4.2). In case of Robustness and Randomization, information available is
made harder to mimic/extract. In robustness, more features need to be mimicked to gain
access, while randomization aims to mislead the adversary’s learning. It is seen that both
fail against a determined adversary, who given time/resources can learn and leverage all the
available information.
Robust models are also seen to fail at detection, when faced with an adversary
who is capable of generating high confidence attacks. These also stems from the increased
availability of probe-able information, to be used by an adversary. These defense strategies
relies of unrealistic assumption on the adversary’s part, to ensure safety. It is generally
assumed that if an attack is too expensive (i.e., requires many probes or the modification
of many features), the adversary will give up. While this assumption is the basis of security
against targeted evasion attacks, it does not hold in case of indiscriminate exploratory
attacks. This section aimed to highlight some of the issues with incorporating excessive
information into the defender’s model. In an adversarial domain, the attack is a function
of the deployed model. A highly informative model will lead to a highly confident attack.
It is necessary to reevaluate this central idea of overly informative defender models, and
analyze the effects of causing an information gap between the defender and the attacker,
for improving security.
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5.5 Hidden classifier design for dynamic adversarial environments - the Predict
- Detect classifier framework
In this section, the idea of hiding feature importance from being probed and learned
by an adversary, as a classifier design strategy for dynamic adversarial environments, is
proposed. By limiting the amount of probe-able information in the defender’s model, the
ability to ensure adversarial uncertainty is emphasized. In Section 5.5.1, the motivation
for the strategy of hiding feature importance, is presented. Section 5.5.2 develops this idea
into the Predict - Detect classifier design. Potential benefits of this design are presented in
Section 5.5.3.
5.5.1 Motivation - The effect of hiding feature importance
The approaches of Complex learning and Randomization, rely on including maximum
information from the training dataset, into the learned model. As such, they are vulnerable
to information leakage via adversarial probing and reverse engineering. Experimentation in
Section 5.4, demonstrated that a classifier which exposes excessive information about the
feature importance is susceptible to high confidence attacks. The increased confidence in
attacks leads to issues with adversarial detect-ability, data leakage and retrain-ability. As
such, the impact and ability to hide the importance of some of the features, to ensure that
the model is shielded from total reverse engineering, is evaluated here.
The idea behind feature importance hiding relies on eliminating a few of the impor-
tant features from the classification training phase, so as to intentionally misrepresent their
importance to an external adversary. By eliminating these features from the classification
model, the adversary is made to believe that they are not important for the prediction task.
No amount of probing will help the adversary to ascertain the importance of the hidden
features, as their importance and informativeness is shielded from the classification task.
Although, this does not provide any direct benefits against the onset of evasion attacks, they
help in maintaining adversarial uncertainty. An attacker will not be able to completely re-
verse engineer the importance of all features, no matter the resources/time used by it, as
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they are not available in the black box model. This idea of feature importance hiding, is
illustrated in Figure 5.16. The prediction landscapes of the following classifiers are depicted:
a) A restrictive classifier aggregating all feature information (X1 ∧X2), b) A randomiza-
tion based classifier which picks its output based on either feature’s prediction (X1 ∨X2),
and c) The hidden feature classifier where feature X2’s influence is hidden. The choice of
these designs affects the adversarial uncertainty, at test time. Based on experimentation
in Section 5.4.2 and Section 5.4.4, we see that restrictive models (a)) and randomization
models (b)) are ineffective, as an intelligent adversary can reverse engineer them to generate
high confidence attacks. The robust model of Figure 5.16 a) reduces the effective space of
legitimate samples, but in doing so it leaks information about the importance of features X1
and X2. The randomized model of Figure 5.16 b), aims to mislead the adversarial probing,
but is vulnerable to repeated probing attacks, as demonstrated in Section 5.4.4. In case of
the hidden feature importance design of Figure 5.16 c), an adversary sees a misrepresented
view of the prediction landscape. The adversary is led to believe that only feature X1 is
important to the defender’s model. Since C2 is kept hidden, the attacker has information
about only half the feature space and no amount of probing will help it understand the im-
portance of feature X2 to the prediction problem. Attacks generated at test time, will fall
under the blue region to make them effective, and when they do so, they have 50% chance
of falling under the blindspot B2. B2 serves as a honeypot in the learned model, which
helps capture attacks. An important distinction between the robustness and randomization
approaches, in comparison to the hidden classifier approach, is that in the former case the
defender expects the adversary to be dissuaded by the increased cost of evasion (in terms
of probing budget), while in the latter case, the defender is making it unfeasible for an
attacker to probe and obtain information necessary to generate a high confidence attack.
It should be noted that, the idea of hiding feature importance is not in direct violation
of the Kerckhoffs’s security principle [95, 96], which states that security should not rely
solely on the unavailability of information, on the part of the adversary. This is because
the defender is not using hidden features, but only misleading the adversary into believing
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Figure 5.16: Prediction landscapes as perceived by probing on the defender models. a):
Defender model is given as C1 ∧ C2. b): Defender model given by randomly selecting
C1∨C2, to perform prediction. c): Defender model is given by C1 (trained on feature X1),
while C2 is kept hidden to detect adversarial activity.
that a few of the features are not important to the prediction task. As in Figure 5.16,
the attacker is aware of features X1 and X2, but infers that only X1 is important to the
classification task. All features are included in the classification model, but by intentionally
hiding the importance of a subset of the features, the adversary is misled into generating
attacks of partial confidence only (partially mimics the training legitimate data).
In order to demonstrate the effect of hiding feature importance, experimentation is
presented on a classifier model with 50% of the features intentionally eliminated from the
classification process, in Table 5.7. A random subspace model is chosen as the defender’s
model (50 Linear SVM, 50% of features per model). A random subset of 50% of the features
are considered to be eliminated from the classification process. This is done by eliminating
the features from the training dataset, and then training the defender’s model on the reduced
set of features. Any incoming probe is first truncated to the reduced feature set and then
evaluated on the model. This makes the feature reduction strategy opaque to the external
users. The results of the Anchor Points - High Attacks (AP - HC) attacks on this classifier
is presented in Table 5.7. The Effective Attack Rate (EAR) and the Adversarial Margin
Density (AMD), are evaluated on this hidden feature classifier design and also a baseline
classifier which uses all features in its model, as presented in Figure 5.16.
It can be seen that the training accuracy is only marginally affected (<5% difference
at max), by the reduction of features from the models. This is a result of the presence of
184
TABLE 5.7
Training Accuracy, Effective attack rate (EAR) and Adversarial Margin Density (AMD)






All Features Hidden Features All Features Hidden Features All Features Hidden Features
Synthetic 100 100 1 0.99 0.01 0.172
CAPTCHA 100 100 0.99 0.99 0.002 0.075
Phishing 93.1 89.4 0.99 0.99 0.19 0.562
Digits08 97.1 95.1 0.99 0.99 0.22 0.648
Digits17 99.5 94.9 0.98 0.99 0.16 0.517
orthogonal information in the features of the training data. In case of a robust ensemble
design, which incorporates all information in the model, the AMD is seen to drop as the at-
tacks leverage the orthogonal information from the probes, to avoid regions of low certainty.
However, for the hidden features approach, a significantly higher AMD value is seen in all
cases (0.28, on average). This is because no amount of probing and cleansing will help the
adversary in determining that the hidden features are important to the classification, and
what exact values of the features they need to mimic. The EAR of all attacks is comparable
to that of the robust classifier (Table 5.7). However, the increased AMD ensures that the
defender has an upper hand in the attack-defense cycle, as it can detect attacks and keep
the training data clean for future retraining. This makes hiding of feature importance an
effective strategy in providing reactive security to adversarial drift. The notion of hiding
feature importance suggests that not all information available at the training phase should
be used at the same time, to ensure leverage over the adversary. An improved mechanism
to employ this intuition in the defender’s classifier design will be discussed next, as the
coupled Predict - Detect classifier strategy.
5.5.2 The Predict - Detect classifier design
The Predict - Detect classifier framework is proposed here, to leverage the benefits
of feature importance hiding, as presented in Section 5.5.1. The proposed design is depicted
in Figure 5.17. In this framework, the available set of features are divided into two subsets.
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Figure 5.17: The Predict-Detect classifier design.
The first subset of features is used to form the defender’s black box model, to perform
prediction on the input samples. This classifier is called the Prediction model, as its primary
purpose is to perform prediction on the input samples, submitted by either the benign users
or the adversary. Since this forms the black box model, it is vulnerable to probing based
attacks by an adversary. The Prediction model is expected to get attacked at some point,
after deployment, due to the nature of the adversarial environment. The second subset of
features is used to train a classifier, called the Detection model. This classifier is not used
for any of the prediction task and as such is shielded from external adversarial probes. This
model represents information known by the defender, based on the original training data,
but not accessible via probing by an adversary. The purpose of the Detection model is to
indicate adversarial activity, based on disagreement with the Prediction model. Since an
adversary launches an attack based on information learned from the black box, an attack is
characterized by evasion of the Prediction model, but only partial evasion of the Detection
model. It should be noted that this division of features is opaque to the adversary, who
still submits probes on the entire feature set. The division of features is done internally
by the framework. Thus, no additional information is leaked to an adversary. Also, this
framework does not advocate feature hiding, but instead relies on misrepresentation of the
importance of the features, to the classification task.
This design has several advantages. Firstly, the separation of features between the
hidden and the prediction model ensures that the hidden features are not reverse engi-
neered or mimicked, thereby ensuring that total corruption of the training data features is
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prevented. Secondly, the hidden features ensures that adversarial uncertainty is preserved,
because of the inability of attacker to avoid the margin of detection. Lastly, the hidden
features model provides a set of untarnished features for retraining and deploying in the
event of an attack.
The Predict-Detect classifier is illustrated on a 2D dataset in Figure 5.18, where the
defenders model provides the prediction, as the black box, and the hidden model is known
by the defender only. Under such a setting, the adversary is made to believe that only
Feature X2 is important to the classification (by reverse engineering using probes) and that
feature X1 has no significance. This is made possible, as the defender indeed does not use
the feature X1 in its black box. No amount of probing can help the adversary to determine
any information about X1’s importance to the classifier. Consequently, the attacks are
generated by the adversary and this leads to a large number of samples being captured at
the Detection Region. This detection region is the classifier’s adversarial margin/blindspot,
and it is the region where the Prediction and the Detection models disagree. A large number
of samples in this area indicates an attack, as an adversary exhibits a lack of knowledge
imposed by such a classification design. The Detection Region serves as a honeypot to
detect adversarial activity, and as such can be used in dynamic environments to detect and
relearn from attacks. This preemptive classifier design ensures adversarial uncertainty, and
benefits future unlabeled drift detection. It is an ideal example of the Dynamic Adversarial
Mining principle, where defenders prepare not only for the attacks, but also for recovery
and continuity of operation.
The effects of the coupled classifier approach is presented in Table 5.8, where a
random subspace ensemble (50 linear SVM, 50% of features in each model), is used to
train the prediction and the detection models. The feature set is divided such that 50%
of the features are chosen to be part of the Prediction model and the rest are chosen to
be a part of the Detection model, at random. It is seen that the training accuracy of the
Prediction model is not significantly affected (<6%, at max) due to the loss of 50% of
the predictive features. This is a result of orthogonal informative in the training dataset.
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Figure 5.18: Illustration of the Predict-Detect classifier on 2D synthetic data. Samples are
captured by the ensemble blindspot, shown as the Detection Region.
There is no significant improvement in the evasion rate either, indicating the equivalence
of the two approaches in a static environment. However, in a dynamic environment, the
classifier using all features, does not lead to significant adversarial uncertainty. This is
a result of the adversary utilizing the probed information, to generate high confidence
attacks. However, the disagreement computed by the Predict - Detect classifier shows
a strong indication of attacks, as attack samples are captured by the feature honeypot
created by the classifier design. The large number of samples being detected by this setup
(<50% in 3 cases), indicates that the setup will ensure that adversarial samples will be
easier to recognize, isolate and thwart. Also, when compared to the AMD computation of
the hidden classifier design of Section 5.5.1, the Predict - Detect classifier’s disagreement
computation provides a higher indication of adversarial activity, as shown in Figure 5.19.
This figure demonstrates the increased information captured in the disagreement between
the two models, and emphasizes the advantages of using the Predict-Detect design as an
implementation strategy of hidden feature importance paradigm
5.5.3 Benefits of the Predict - Detect classifier design
Using a hidden model allows for several advantages in a dynamic adversarial envi-
ronment. As seen in the previous section, the hidden model allows for better detect-ability
of attacks, with increased number of samples falling within the adversarial margin. Addi-
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TABLE 5.8
Training Accuracy, Effective attack rate (EAR), Adversarial Margin Density (AMD) and
Disagreement metrics under AP-HC attacks, for defender using the Predict - Detect Clas-














Synthetic 100 100 1 0.99 0.01 0.172
CAPTCHA 100 99.3 0.99 0.99 0.002 0.075
Phishing 93.1 90.5 0.99 0.99 0.19 0.562
Digits08 97.1 93.4 0.99 0.99 0.22 0.648
Digits17 99.5 94.2 0.98 0.99 0.16 0.517
Figure 5.19: Comparison of AMD values for defender using all features, defender with 50%
of features hidden from prediction task, and disagreement values for the Predict-Detect
classifier.
tionally, the lack of complete information by an adversary ensures that only partial reverse
engineering is possible, and that the training data is not completely corrupted by overlap-
ping attack samples. By preventing training data nullification, this design ensures that data
privacy is ensured, and that the same set of features can be used for retraining after attacks
occur. This can be seen from the Table 5.9, which demonstrates the effect of the AP-HC
attacks on the Predict-Detect classifier. While the Prediction model is evaded due to the
attacks, the Detection model is still relatively unaffected. This demonstrates the inability
of the adversary to launch a high confidence attack, which evades a majority of the informa-
tive features of the data, simultaneously. The detection model features, not evaded by the
adversary in this cycle, can now be used to train additional models for protection against
189
TABLE 5.9













the current attack cycle. Also, the already trained Detection model, can be immediately
deployed to serve as a temporary replacement model for the vulnerable black box model,
while additional labeled information is gathered to retrain the classifier.
The disagreement between the hidden model and the prediction model can also be
used for active learning, to selectively label only a few samples to determine the new attack
characteristics. Since a majority of the samples falling in the adversarial margin are a result
of an adversary, labeling them will ensure high informativeness in semi supervised settings.
This is a more efficient strategy than random labeling of samples. In an adversarial domain
this is especially important, as attacks are generally a minority class, and identifying and
labeling them can be costly and inefficient. By naturally defining regions where adversarial
activity is expected, the Predict-Detect classifier allows for effective allocation of labeling
budget for detecting and verifying attacks.
The essence of the Predict-Detect approach is to have an information leverage over
the adversary at all times. This leads to misleading of the adversary, who even though
aware of the presence of the features in the data, is unable to probe and ascertain their
importance. Even if an adversary is aware of the hidden model strategy, it cannot probe
the model to try and mimic these features, as no feedback is presented on those set of
features, by the prediction black box classifier model. The generic design of the framework
leaves it open for extension and usage with other security mechanisms. The robustness and
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randomization strategies can be applied to the features of the prediction model, to increase
the effort required by an adversary, to evade it. As long as a set of informative features are
hidden from the black box model, the attacks can be detected and recovered from.
5.6 Chapter summary
In this chapter, the effect of different classifier design strategies, on the ability to
provide long term security benefits, is analyzed. In particular, we evaluate the shortcomings
of existing classifier security designs of Restrictive one-class classifiers, Complex learning
methodologies and Randomized classifiers. All these strategies fail to account for dynamic
aspects of the system, as they lead to limited defender options, post attacks. The reason for
their vulnerability, is the fundamental idea behind integrating more information into the
learned model. Although this strategy works in the case of targeted exploratory attacks,
they do not work against indiscriminate probing based attacks, which are common on
black box classifier models. We propose a classifier design counter-intuitive to the ideas of
robustness in existing works, and demonstrate that using a reduced feature space is more
beneficial to maintaining adversarial uncertainty over the training data. This uncertainty
on the adversary’s part, is essential to allow for easy detection and retraining from attacks.
The proposed Predict-Detect classifier design is able to detect adversarial activity and allows
for recovery, even when faced with an intelligent and determined adversary. It does so by
misrepresenting feature importance, to prevent incessant probing from learning the complete
internal state of the system. The following claims were evaluated in this chapter:
• Claim a: Restrictive one-class classifiers, Complex Learning and Randomization, are
not effective as long term security measures.
The notion of adversarial uncertainty demonstrates that the above mentioned classi-
fiers lead to attacks of high confidence, which makes their dynamic handling difficult.
They cause problems of undetect-ability and can cause data nullification in the ex-
treme case. The developed Anchor Points High Confidence (AP-HC) filter attacks,
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shows that adversary can generate high confidence attacks against robust classifiers,
without any additional information about the black box system.
• Claim b: Unsupervised Drift Detection (particularly MD3), can be actively evaded
by an adversary at test time.
Unsupervised margin based drift detection relies on the ability to capture changes
which affect only a few important features of the data space (Chapter 4). However, the
AP-HC attacks demonstrates that, in the presence of multiple orthogonal information,
the adversary can leverage all of this information, by probing the system and training
robust classifiers from the probes. By filtering out low confidence exploration samples,
the adversary can cause exploitation which falls outside the critical margins of the
defender, leading to the reduction of the margin density based detection capabilities.
As such, an adversarial agnostic view of the problem can lead to evasion of the drift
detection capabilities of the defender.
• Claim c: Using a reduced feature set in the defender’s model can improve the detect-
ability of attacks and prevents information leakage to the adversary.
The proposed Predict - Detect classifier, was shown to provide defense against the AP-
HC attacks, as they prevent the reduction in adversarial uncertainty. When tested
on 5 datasets, the adversarial margin density was found to be significantly higher for
the proposed model (∆=0.43, on average, when compared to robust model using all
features). The Effective Attack Rate (EAR) of the Detection model was also found to
be 50.6% lower than the Prediction model, indicating adversarial uncertainty over the
hidden features and, by extension, the ability of the defender to train future classifier
models, using the new attack data.
The Predict - Detect classifier was shown to provide benefits of unsupervised adver-
sarial detection, data nullification prevention, and was also shown to be capable of providing
benefits for retraining. We will use this motivation and analysis, in developing a streaming
algorithm capable of dealing with adversarial drift. By extending the idea of adversarial
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awareness, to margin based drift detection of Chapter 4, we can develop a model capa-
ble of reacting to adversarial drift, in an efficient and timely manner, while still retaining
the labeling efficiency and reliability, of the drift detection mechanism. Also, experimental
evaluation of the active learning benefits of the Predict-Detect classifier, when faced with a
minority attack class, needs to be evaluated.
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CHAPTER 6
HANDLING ADVERSARIAL CONCEPT DRIFT - The PREDICT - DETECT
STREAMING CLASSIFICATION FRAMEWORK
In this chapter, we develop an adversary-aware drift detection and handling system,
for streaming data environments. The SEE framework of Chapter 3 is extend for simulating
data streams with adversarial drifts. The need for an adversarial aware design is empha-
sized, by analyzing the margin density drift detection (MD3) algorithm of Chapter 4, on
adversarial drifting data streams. The idea of feature information hiding from Chapter 5,
in conjunction with the reliability of the MD3 drift detection methodology, is used to de-
velop the proposed streaming data framework. The proposed framework demonstrates the
advantages of an adversarial aware drift handling system, setting it apart from traditional
concept drift handling methodologies.
6.1 Adversarial concept drift
Data in dynamic real world environments is characterized by non-stationarity. The
changes in the distribution of the data, called concept drift, can cause the learned model
to drop in predictive performance, over time. It is therefore essential to detect and handle
drifts swiftly, to continue using the predictive capabilities of the model. Adversarial drift is a
special kind of concept drift, where the changes in the data distribution is targeted towards
changing the characteristics of one class of samples (i.e., the Malicious class). The adversary
starts by learning the behavior of the defender’s classifier model, using crafted probes, and
then exploits this information to generate attack samples, to evade classification. These
attacks leads to a change in the distribution of the data and also leads to a drop in the
prediction capabilities of the defender’s model. From the perspective of streaming data
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of Adversarial Drift, as a function of the defender’s classifier model
C.
mining, we refer to such changes in the data distribution at test time, as Adversarial Drifts.
The main characteristics of adversarial drift which distinguishes it from traditional concept
drift are: a) The drift is a result of changes to the malicious class samples only, b) The drift
is a function of the deployed classifier model, as the adversary learns and gains information
about it, before trying to evade it, and c) The drift is always targeted towards subverting
the deployed classifier (i.e., it is relevant only if it leads to a drop in the performance of the
deployed model). The dependent nature of adversarial drift is shown in Figure 6.1, where
the deployed classifier C, dictates the possibility of adversarial drifts in the data space. The
figures b) and c) demonstrate adversarial drifts, which are caused by an attacker trying
to subvert C. The two scenarios are a result of the different defender models, which the
adversary is trying to learn and circumvent. The nature of the drift is dependent on the
choice for C, and as such the defender has a certain degree of control over the possible space
of drifts, at test time.
The detection of drifts is often carried out by supervised approaches [63], which con-
tinuously monitor the predictive performance of the stream of data, flowing into the system.
However, this is not a practical solution, as human expertise in the form of labeled data,
is often expensive and time taking to obtain. There have been proposed unsupervised drift
detection methodologies [102, 156–158, 170, 174], which directly monitor the feature distri-
bution of the data, to indicate drifts. These approaches suffer from excessive pessimism, as
they cannot differentiate between drifts which affect the classifier’s performance and those
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Figure 6.2: Drifts in adversarial environments will avoid low confidence regions, to avoid
detection.
which do not. This leads to false alarms and the unreliability of unsupervised drift detection
methodologies. The Margin Density Drift Detection (MD3) approach of Chapter 4, provides
reliability in the unsupervised detection of drift, by explicitly tracking the distribution of
the samples in the uncertain regions of a robust classifier. MD3 tracks the density of the
samples which are found to be uncertain by the deployed model, to determine if a significant
drift has occurred. MD3 was shown to be a domain independent, model independent and
reliable indicator of drift. MD3’s reliability in unsupervised drift detection, stems from its
inclusion of the deployed classifier, in the drift detection process. However, the domain
agnostic nature of the MD3 approach causes it to disregard the specific nature and char-
acteristics of the drifts. In adversarial domains, the drift is characterized by an attacker
continuously trying to hide its trail, by learning about the behavior of the detection system
first. As such, the MD3 can itself be vulnerable to adversarial evasion at test time.
The MD3 was designed as an adversarial agnostic approach, where it considers drift
to be independent of the deployed classifier. In an adversarial domain, the relation between
the type of drift and the choice of the classifier C, is strongly coupled. An adversary
aware of the presence of a drift detection scheme, can design attacks of high confidence
(as shown in Section 5.3.4), to avoid detection. This is illustrated in Figure 6.2, where
attacks intentionally avoid low confidence areas of the feature space. The MD3 relies on
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tracking samples in the SVM margins (Figure 6.2a)), or in the blindspots of feature bagged
ensembles (Figure 6.2b)). An adversary realizing this, can launch high confidence attacks,
which are designed to fall outside the uncertain regions of space. This is possible even when
the feedback received from the black box classifier (C), is a binary Accept/Reject feedback.
By ignoring the adversarial nature of the drift, the MD3 is left vulnerable to such drifts in
the data distribution.
An adversarial aware unsupervised drift detection approach, will take preemptive
steps at the design of the classifier model, to ensure that future detection and retraining is
made easier. In this chapter, one such framework is proposed: the Predict-Detect framework.
This framework misrepresents feature importance information to an adversary, to mislead
adversaries into getting detected at test time. The ability to use attack foresight and
integrate it into a preemptive design, provides long term benefits for reactive security. In this
chapter, the design of the Predict-Detect framework, for dealing with adversarial concept
drift in streaming data, is presented. Specifically, the following claims are evaluated in this
chapter: a) Adversarial agnostic drift detection is vulnerable to evasion, b) The design of the
classification model at training time, can provide benefits for handling test time drifts, and
c) Hiding feature importance, can provide long term security benefits in terms of detection
and recovering from attacks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 presents the proposed
Predict-Detect classifier framework, for handling adversarial drifts. Section 6.3 presents a
framework for simulating adversarial drift on black box classifiers, from real world datasets.
Experimental analysis of the framework is presented in Section 6.4. Extending the frame-
work, to active learning over imbalanced drifting streams is presented in Section 6.5. Sec-
tion 6.6 presents additional suggestions and guidelines for system designers, to use and
extend the proposed Predict-Detect framework. Summary of important results and take-
aways is presented in Section 6.7.
197
6.2 Proposed Predict-Detect framework for classification in Dynamic-Adversarial
environments
The proposed Predict-Detect framework is developed as a streaming incremental
framework for detecting and handling adversarial drifts. The overview of the framework is
presented in Section 6.2.1. Detailed design of the framework and its major components, is
presented in Section 6.2.2.
6.2.1 The streaming Predict-Detect classification framework
The nature of adversarial drifts, makes it dependent on the characteristics of the
deployed classifier model, which it is trying to evade. As such, preemptive measures taken
during the training of a classifier model can benefit dynamic test time detection and handling
of such drifts. The Predict-Detect framework uses this intuition to develop classifier models
which are able to detect adversarial activity at test time; reliably and with limited labeled
data.
The overview of the Predict-Detect streaming framework is presented in Figure 6.3.
The input stream of unlabeled data samples X is processed, leading to the output predicted
label stream Y . In this process, the framework has an unsupervised drift indication com-
ponent, which processes X to detect if there is any significant drifts which could cause the
predictive performance to drop. Upon signaling a drift, the framework request additional
labels (NLabels), from an external oracle, often at a price (financial and time resources).
These labeled samples are used for confirmation of the earlier signaled drift (by the unsu-
pervised component). If a significant drop in predictive performance (accuracy/f-measure)
is seen over the labeled samples, the framework confirms the occurrence of an adversarial
drift. In the event of a confirmed drift, the labeled samples are used to retrain the predictive
model, to ensure the continued efficacy of predictive performance of the system. Since the
labeled samples are requested only when a drift is first suspected, using unlabeled data, this
framework prevents wastage of labeling effort, which results from continuous monitoring of
the stream. In the event of infrequent drifts and long periods of stationarity, the framework
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Figure 6.3: Overview of the Predict-Detect framework.
will not indicate drifts, and thereby no labeling will be wasted.
The core design aspect of the framework, which makes it effective in an adversarial
environment, is the development of the Predict-Detect classifier model, as seen in Figure 6.3
as the CP−D model. The design is motivated by our analysis in Chapter 5, where it was seen
that overly informative models result in attacks which are harder to detect and recover from.
As such, the design of the Predict-Detect classifier was proposed, as a novel mechanism to
hide feature importance information from the adversary. The classifier relies on a coupled
model strategy, where two orthogonal models are trained from the training data DTrain.
The first model is called the Prediction model (CP ), and it is trained on one disjoint subset
of features of the original training dataset. The other subset of features, not used in (CP ), is
used to train the Detection model (CD). The Prediction model is the defacto model of the
framework, used for classifying the input unlabeled stream X, to produce output labels Y .
Since this is the prediction model facing the input stream of data, this model is susceptible
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to adversarial activity, at test time. This forward facing model is expected to be attacked, by
an adversary using probing based exploratory attacks and observing the feedback provided
by the framework. As such, the model’s performance is expected to drop over time. The
Detection model is shielded from the probes of the adversary, as it is kept hidden and away
from the prediction process. As seen in Figure 6.3, the feedback of the model CD is not
presented to the outside world. This model is used for the detection of adversarial activity.
An adversary, using probes to understand the behavior of the black box model CP , will
fail to successfully reverse engineer CD. As such, an increase in the disagreement between
the predictions of the two models, will be indicative of adversarial activity. The adversary
is oblivious to the internal split of the two classifiers, as the framework provides a unified
black box representation to the outside world. Input data stream X is split between the
two models, vertically based on the features used to train the respective model, and the
prediction by CP , is presented as the output of the framework. No amount of probing will
enable the adversary to understand the significance of features held by CD, as they are not
a part of the prediction process of the framework. The misrepresentation of these feature
importance, in an adversarial domain, is the core of what makes the framework effective.
6.2.2 Design and major components of the Predict-Detect framework
The design of various components of the framework is presented in this section. The
development of the Predict-Detect classifier model (CP−D), from the training data DTrain, is
presented in Section 6.2.2.1. Section 6.2.2.2 presents the development of the unsupervised
drift detection algorithm, which uses the disagreement between the two models, as an
indication for adversarial drift. Design strategies for the regeneration of the CP−D models,
after a drift is confirmed, is presented in Section 6.2.2.3.
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6.2.2.1 Generating the Prediction and the Detection models from the training
data
The training dataset containing F features, is divided into two subsets (vertically
based on features), to train the Prediction and the Detection models. Experimentation in
Chapter 5, has shown that such splits are feasible without significant compromise on the
predictive performance, in cybersecurity domains. This is due to the presence of multi-
modal and orthogonal informative features, in high dimensional datasets. We intend to
define a division of the feature space, such that each of the trained models has high predictive
performance. Such divisions are naturally defined when the training dataset is aggregated
from multiple sources, with clearly defined boundaries. An example of such a system is
a multi-modal biometric system [127], which uses both face recognition and fingerprint
scanners, to provide the final authentication. In such a system, it is easy to split the
features into two disjoint subsets, one for the face recognition and the other for fingerprint
data.
In the absence of domain specific knowledge of the features, random partitioning is
usually resorted to. However, this is not optimal, as a majority of the informative features
can end up clumped together in the same partition. We propose a feature ranking based
approach, which considers dividing the features uniformly based on their importance to the
classification task. We use feature ranking to rank the initial set of F features, based on
the training data. We then distribute the features in a round robin fashion, to form the
two subsets: FP , used to train the Prediction model, and FD, for training the Detection
model. While several feature ranking approaches are available, the F-value from ANOVA
is considered here for experimentation purposes, as the methodology for measuring feature
importance1, without loss of generality.
The splitting of features and generation of orthogonal trained models, is done ac-
cording to Algorithm 6.1. The set of F features (1..k), is divided to form multiple disjoint
1Using scikit-learn’s [149] sklearn.feature selection.SelectKBest function to score all features using
sklearn.feature selection.f classif.
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Algorithm 6.1: Generating multiple models from training data, by splitting
features.
Input : Training data (DTrain) with features F (1..k), Number of splits N
(For the CP−D classifier, N=2.)
Output: Trained models MTrained
1 FSplits = [[]]
2 MTrained = []
3 Fsort importance = RankByFeatureImportance(F )
4 for i = 1 .. N do
5 FSplits[i%N].add(Fsort importance[i])
6 . Round robin split of ranked features
7 for i = 1 .. N do
8 DTrain split = DTrain
9 for feature in F do
10 if feature not in FSplits[i] then
11 Blank out DTrain split, by replacing with default value
12 . ‘blanking-out’ non associated features
13 MTrained[i] ← Train model on DTrain split
14 return MTrained
subsets, based on their informativeness to the prediction task, obtained from the training
data. For the Predict-Detect classifier, two subsets are needed: FP for the Prediction model
(CP ), and FD for the Detection model (CD) (F = FP ∪ FD). As such, each model has
an associated subset of features, which it deems important. The original training data is
modified, such that only the associated features are used in training a model. This is done
by the ‘blank-out’ process, given in Line 10. This process takes the original training dataset,
and replaces all non model associated features with a predefined default value. An example
of this process is depicted in Figure 6.4. The original set of 5 features is divided into 2 dis-
joint subsets. The Prediction model is associated with Features 1, 3 and 5 (FP = {1, 3, 5}).
As such these features are retained in the training data and the remaining are filled with
default values, for all data samples. This process nullifies the discriminatory information of
the Features 2 and 4, thereby barring them from being included in the Prediction model.
Similarly, for the Detection model, Features 2 and 4 are included in the model (FD = {2, 4}),
while Features 1,3 and 5 are blanked out. Once the two models are trained on the modified
training data, they can each receive unlabeled stream samples of |F | features. The ability
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Figure 6.4: Illustration of feature splitting between the Prediction and the Detection model.
The blanked out features of each model are highlighted.
to disregard features is built into the training of the two models. The advantage of this
‘blank-out’ process, as opposed to splitting each incoming sample into two subsets based
on features, is that now each of these models operate on the entire feature space F and
can receive the same input sample X. The training of the models has equipped it with the
ability to assign importance to their required feature set only. The Algorithm 6.1 is general
in its presentation, as it allows the training of N disjoint models. For the Predict-Detect
classifier, we take N=2, and use one of the trained models for prediction, while the other
for detection.
In the absence of domain specific knowledge and correlation information, we can
ensure that important features are evenly distributed among the two sets of models, us-
ing Algorithm 6.1. In real world systems, where correlation between features can cause
attributes to change in tandem, more sophisticated feature splitting techniques can be em-
ployed. The feature subset ensemble techniques of [192], combined with the cluster based
feature splitting of [193], could be used to form multiple classifiers with uncorrelated fea-
tures within them. For the effective usage of the Predict-Detect framework, we only need
to ensure that the generated splits of features are disjoint and result in good predictive
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performance for each of the models.
6.2.2.2 Detecting adversarial drift from unlabeled data
The proposed framework relies on detection of drifts from the unlabeled data stream,
to save expenditure of labeling budget on validation of the prediction model. This is made
possible by the setup of the Prediction and the Detection models. An increased disagree-
ment in the predictions of the two models, on new incoming samples, is suspicious and
indicates a possible drift. The tracking of this disagreement, over time, in a streaming en-
vironment is used for adversarial drift detection. This is presented in Algorithm 6.2, which
is motivated in setup by the margin density drift detection algorithm (MD3) of Chapter 4.
The MD3 algorithm tracks the number of samples falling in a robust classifier’s margin, in a
streaming environment, to indicate the possibility of a drift. The Predict-Detect provides an
adversarial aware drift detection mechanism over unsupervised streams, by causing attacks
to be detected, based on disagreement with the hidden classifier Detection model.
The unsupervised drift detection mechanism is presented in Algorithm 6.2. The
prediction and the detection models (CP and CD), generated from the initial training data,
are used for the detection of drifts from the unlabeled data stream X. Also, the training
data is used to learn the expected disagreement and acceptable deviation (PDRef and
σRef ), along with the expected prediction performance (measured in accuracy for balanced
streams), given by AccRef and σAcc. This information is learned via 10-fold cross validation,
and is used to characterize the normal behavior of the stream. This is done by dividing the
training data into 10 bands, and generating the CP and CD models on 9 bands at a time,
and then computing the disagreement of the 10th band. This value is obtained 10 times,
and the reference distribution is learned from it. This serves as a basis for establishing
normal expected behavior, from which drift can be detected based on deviation. Sensitivity
is controlled using the parameter θ, which provides a user friendly way to specify acceptable
deviation of the stream, in terms of reference characteristics learned from the initial training
data. As such, the framework allows specifying data independent parameters, making it
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Algorithm 6.2: Unsupervised drift detection in the Predict-Detect framework.
Input : Unlabeled stream X, Predict - Detect models CP , CD, Reference
distribution (PDRef , σRef , AccRef , σAcc). Parameters: Sensitivity θ,
Stream progression λ = (N − 1)/N(where N is the chunk size),
Ntrain(= N by default), Nunlabeled(= N by default)
Output: Predicted label stream Y
1 PD0 = PDRef
2 currently drifting = False
3 for t= 1,2,3,...: do
4 Compute disagreement score - Dis(x = Xt) =
{
1, if CP (x)! = CD(x)
0, otherwise
5 Update PDt = λ * PDt−1 + (1− λ) ∗Dis(Xt)
6 if |PDt − PDRef |>θ * σRef and not currently drifting then
7 currently drifting = True . Drift Suspected
8 Collected unlabeled samples=0
9 DUnlabeled = ∅
10 DLabeled = ∅
11 if currently drifting and Collected unlabeled samples < Nunlabeled then
12 DUnlabeled ∪ Xt . Collect samples to be labeled
13 Collected unlabeled samples ++
14 else if currently drifting then
15 . Enough samples to make decision
16 DLabeled ← Label samples from DUnlabeled, using Oracle, upto Ntrain
17 . Active learning can be used in case |DUnlabeled| > Ntrain
18 if (AccRef -AccDLabeled)>θ * σAcc then
19 Retrain CP , CD with DLabeled
20 . Drift Confirmed
21 Update Reference distribution (MDRef , σRef , AccRef , σRef )
22 currently drifting = False
23 return CP (x)
intuitive to the end user.
For each incoming samples x, the disagreement in predictions between the CP and
the CD, is computed as the signal Dis. This disagreement is aggregated over time, to
form the PDt metric, as computed in Line 5. The computation uses a time decaying
incremental tracking of the metric PD, dictated by the chunk size N . A sudden increase
in the disagreement metric PD, is indicative of an adversarial drift. This indication is
controlled by the sensitivity parameter θ, specified by the user based on its tolerance for
deviation. The initial indication of drift, given by Line 6, is the unsupervised drift indicator
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component of the framework. It goads the system administrator to examine the data for
potential attacks. Attacks are confirmed by collecting NUnlabeled samples, and labeling
them to form the labeled dataset (DLabeled). This DLabeled set of labeled samples is used to
confirm drifts, and to retrain the models of the framework in case a drift is confirmed. A
drift is confirmed if the predictive performance (measured as accuracy here) on the labeled
samples is seen to fall significantly. This fall is measured in terms of deviation from the
reference accuracy (AccRef ), which was obtained from the training data.
Once a drift is confirmed by testing the predictive performance on the obtained
labeled data, the models (Prediction and Detection) need to be retrained, to represent the
new distribution of the stream. Relearning is performed using the obtained labeled samples
DLabeled. Additional samples may be requested by an application, by querying the Oracle.
Querying the Oracle is expensive, as it requires time/effort to obtain expert feedback on
the unlabeled samples. In Algorithm 6.2, the labeling of samples is seen to follow a naive
strategy, where the N subsequent samples after a drift indication are requested to be labeled
by the Oracle, to form the labeled set DLabeled. However, this can be extended to integrate
active learning methodologies into the framework. In case of NUnlabeled > Ntrain, active
learning methodologies can be employed to effectively choose the DLabeled set of samples.
The exact mechanism for retraining and labeling of collected samples is not discussed in
Algorithm 6.2. This has been done intentionally, to allow for a generic presentation the
algorithm, which allows for ease of extension with other active learning strategies and
retraining policies.
The entire drift handling process is kept internal to the black box system, and the
end-user/adversary is agnostic to the adaptive mechanism of the framework. The end-
user/adversary is provided prediction on the input samples x, using the prediction model
CP (x). Since additional labels are only requested when an attack is suspected, the frame-
work works in an unsupervised manner for the majority of the stream, without the need for
constant labeled validation. Only when drifts are suspected and retraining may be needed,
are labeled samples requested. This makes the framework attractive for usage in dynamic
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adversarial drifting environments, where labeling is expensive and time taking.
6.2.2.3 Retraining the Predict-Detect models - Drift Recovery
In order to recover from the effects of an adversarial drift, the classifier models of the
framework need to be retrained, using the obtained labeled data. The following strategies
and their impact on the dynamic learning process are discussed, as potential retraining
options.
• Using the existing feature split (PD-NoShuffle): In this strategy, the existing feature
splits of the Prediction and the Detection models, are retained. The models are trained
on the new labeled data, based on the same set of features already assigned to them.
This strategy has the advantage to keep features in the Detection model hidden from
an adversary, throughout the progression of the stream. However, this strategy does
not account for the changes in the feature ranking, and can lead to poorly trained
classifier models, which are a result of changes in the importance of features over time,
following drifts in data.
• Re-splitting features (PD-Shuffle): Here, the framework uses the labeled data to re-
generate feature splits based on Algorithm 6.1. The newly split models are then used
for deploying the Prediction and the Detection models. This strategy assumes every
drift recovery to be an independent start of a new attack-defense cycle. This is espe-
cially true when a system is faced with multiple independent adversaries, over time.
This strategy is assumed to provide better trained models than the PD-NoShuffle , as
it has the opportunity to re-calibrate feature ranking and generate new splits of the
features, after every attack cycle.
While both strategies have their shortcomings and advantages, a defender can also
resort to a combined approach while applying this framework. First the defender can check
to see if it is able to use the existing feature splits to retrain the model and receive sufficient
predictive performance, using cross validation on the training dataset. If the features are
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rendered unusable due to a sophisticated attack, the features can be re-split. Delaying the
shuffling of features is advantageous, as shuffling transfers information about the hidden
features onto the prediction forefront. An adversary could use this information, over time,
to generate a high confidence attack, by aggregating information from multiple cycles of
attacks. While we have not found any documentation for such a category of attacks, it is
a possibility and as such we should avoid shuffling of features whenever possible. In either
case, the adversary is devoid of complete information, which makes it unable to launch a high
confidence attack or a data nullification attack [114]. This ensures that adversarial activity
will be detected and that retraining will be possible, for continued operation in streaming
domains. By constantly gaming the adversary and responding quickly to attacks, the attacks
are rendered expensive and futile, making this reactive system an attractive defense strategy
for securing against adversarial data drifts.
6.3 Generating adversarial concept drift on real world datasets - Extending
the Seed-Explore-Exploit framework to streaming domain (SEE-Stream)
Concept drift refers to the change in the distribution of data over time. Adversarial
concept drift is a special type of concept drift, as the data distribution changes are intro-
duced by an adversary aiming to subvert the performance of the deployed classifier. As
such, these distribution changes are dependent on the classifier trained and deployed by the
defender. An adversary begins the attack cycle, by probing the deployed black box model
of the defender, and then uses this information to generate samples which evade detection.
This characteristic of adversarial drift makes it a special category of concept drifts, which
needs to be analyzed and dealt with differently, than regular concept drift. Adversarial drift
is a function of the deployed classifier and as such is directed by the design of the deployed
classifier. It is not possible to evaluate these drifts on existing datasets (which are popularly
used for concept drift research), as these drifts are specific to the type of classifier models,
which they are trying to evade. We present here, a strategy to simulate adversarial drifts
using real world datasets. We do this by extending the Seed-Explore-Exploit (SEE) attack
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Figure 6.5: The SEE-Stream framework for simulating adversarial concept drift.
framework of Chapter 3. The SEE framework was developed for simulating data driven
exploratory attacks, on black box classifier models. The framework was developed for static
evaluation, as the attack samples were only evaluated for the purposes of demonstrating
the possibility of classifier evasion, by an adversary. We extend the SEE framework, to be
used in a streaming environment, under the SEE-Stream framework, presented here.
The SEE-Stream framework is presented in Figure 6.5. The framework provides a
wrapper over the data driven attack framework of SEE. As such, it operates under the same
assumptions of a black box defenders model, where the only access to the system’s model is
via submitting probes and observing the feedback on them. The SEE-Stream framework re-
ceives samples from the attack simulation on the defender’s black box, and it converts these
samples into a stream of data for adversarial analysis. The initial training data, from the
real world dataset, is split into two parts: the Legitimate class samples and the Malicious
class samples. These splits are used to form the initial distribution of the stream, before
the drift starts. The training dataset is also used to train the defender’s model (f(x)). The
defender’s model is then attacked using the SEE framework, and the resulting exploration
and exploitation samples are stored in the corresponding buffers (BUFE and BUFA, re-
spectively), as shown in Figure 6.5. These are results obtained from static evaluation of the
data, and we will use this data to generate a stream of adversarial samples.
Data stream samples are generated by random sampling from the 4 different data
buffers of Figure 6.5. At any given time, the legitimate class samples are obtained from
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sampling the buffer BUFL, and the adversary’s samples are sampled from one of BUFM ,
BUFE or BUFA. The parameter λImbalance is used to control the amount of imbalance
between the legitimate and adversarial class samples, in the stream. Since we assume that
the legitimate class does not drift over the course of the stream, we draw the regular class
samples by always sampling from the initial pool of legitimate class data (BUFL), obtained
from the training dataset. However, for the adversarial class samples, the samples are drawn
from the three different buffers, over the course of the stream. Initially, till time tExplore,
samples are drawn from the original pool of the malicious class training samples (BUFM ).
This is the time period where an adversary has not yet started the attack process. After
tExplore, we draw samples from both the Malicious class training samples (BUFM ) and the
pool of exploration samples (BUFE). The rate at which the samples are drawn from each
of these buffers is controlled by the parameter λBlend, called the blending rate. By blending
exploration samples with the original set of malicious samples, an adversary avoids detection
in the exploration phase. Consequently, it takes a long time for an adversary to obtain the
required number of exploration samples, but as is assumed, the adversary wants to avoid
detection at this stage. After the adversary obtains enough information about the black
box model (upto the exploration budget BExplore), it starts the exploitation phase, which
is the attack payload for this adversarial cycle. This is done after time tExploit, by sampling
from the pool of exploitation samples (BUFA). The time values tExploit and tExplore, enable
the user to set up the profile of the stream, that they want to simulate. It provides greater
flexibility about length of stream and location of the adversarial drift, for more fine-tuned
analysis. It should be noted that this proposed framework serves only the purpose of
simulating an adversarial drifting stream, as all the exploration and exploitation samples
are generated statically using the SEE framework. Nevertheless, this provides a simple
and effective wrapper, to convert existing datasets to data streams exhibiting adversarial
concept drift. After the completion of an attack cycle, the same framework can be used
to generate additional attacks, by regenerating the data buffers with samples from a new
launch of the SEE framework, on the retrained defender’s model.
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6.3.1 Simulating adversarial concept drift on the phishing dataset
In this section, we demonstrate the use of the SEE-Stream framework, for simulating
adversarial concept drift on the phishing dataset [145]. The dataset is pre-processed by
normalizing it to the range of [0,1]. The defender uses a random subspace ensemble (50
Linear SVM models, 50% features per model), to train a model on the dataset. Anchor
points attacks of the SEE framework (Section 3.3.2), is used to generate adversarial samples
on the defender’s model.
The simulation of adversarial drift on the phishing dataset, is shown in Figure 6.6.
The stream demonstrates an exploration phase till tExplore=10,000 samples, and the attack
phase starts at tExploit=30,000 samples. The data is taken to be balanced (λImbalance = 0.5)
and the blend rate is taken to be λBlend = 0.05 (i.e., 5% of the sample in the exploration
phase are drawn from the exploration buffer). From the figure, the effects of adversarial
drift can be seen starting at t=30,000, as the accuracy starts to rapidly drop. This is a
result of the adversarial manipulation of samples, to evade the deployed black box model.
In this sense, this generated adversarial drift is different from a traditional concept drift, as
this drift is dependent on the type of model deployed originally. In order for a model to be
usable, it is necessary to detect and fix the effects of this adversarial drift. The detection
of drifts, the learning of additional new information, and the retraining of the defender’s
model, are the main aspects of consideration in designing reactive security measures for
adversarial drift. The drop in accuracy at the exploration phase is minimal, and can go
undetected, as is intended by the adversary. In case of an overly sensitive detection system,
the adversary over time can learn to use a lower blend ratio, to cover its tracks.
The effect of using different blend rates λBlend is shown in Figure 6.7. In the simula-
tion of Figure 6.7, the exploration continues till 1000 samples are obtained at the specified
blending rate. Smaller blend ratios, lead to longer exploration time periods, causing the
attack phase to get delayed. However, a higher ratio causes a drastic fall in the accuracy
and causes the defender to become cautious and thwart the attacks even before the start.
In case of the blend ratio of 0.05, it is seen that it takes close to 40,000 samples in the
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Figure 6.6: Simulation of adversarial concept drift using the phishing dataset.
Figure 6.7: Effect of varying blend ratio on the detect-ability of the exploration phase.
Lower blend ratios cause attacker reconnaissance to go unnoticed, while delaying onset of
attacks.
exploration phase to reach 1000 explored samples. However, this ensures that the drop in
accuracy (< 3%), is small enough to go unnoticed. As such, the introduction of the λBlend
parameter allows for more realistic simulation of an adversary’s behavior, for better analysis
of adversarial concept drift streams.
Using the proposed SEE-Stream framework, we can simulate the SEE framework to
work in a temporal environment, and can adjust the characteristics of the stream to analyze
particular aspects of our security measures. The stream generated by SEE-Stream, repre-
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sents the essential characteristics of the original SEE framework, while making it amenable
for experimentation in a streaming environment.
6.4 Experimental evaluation of the Predict-Detect framework on adversarial
drifting streams
In this section we presents experimental evaluation of the Predict-Detect classifier
framework, on streaming data exhibiting adversarial drift. Adversarial drift is simulated on
real world datasets, using the SEE-Stream framework. Section 6.4.1 presents experimental
setup and methods used for comparing the efficacy of the proposed framework. Experi-
mental analysis on 4 datasets, in the presence of a single adversarial drift, is presented in
Section 6.4.2. Experimental analysis on streams exhibiting multiple subsequent drifts is
presented in Section 6.4.3.
6.4.1 Experimental methods and setup
6.4.1.1 Methodologies used for comparative analysis
The effects of the adversarial drift, on the classification performance over time, is
demonstrated by experimentally comparing the following drift handling methods.
1. Static Baseline Model (NoChange): This methodology is overly optimistic, as it
assumes that the data will never drift, and that the initial trained model is suffi-
cient to retain performance over time. This is an unrealistic assumption, but this
serves as a lower baseline for evaluating other drift handling strategies. Any proposed
methodology should be atleast as good as this strategy, to be of any real use.
2. Fully Labeled Accuracy Tracking (AccTr): This serves as an upper baseline for our
evaluations, as it represents an optimal case, where all the data is labeled and the
labels are immediately available after the prediction is made on an input sample.
This model tracks the classifier’s predictive performance (e.g., Accuracy), to signal
drift. An unsupervised technique is considered effective, if it provides performance
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close to the AccTr approach, while reducing labeling requirements. The accuracy is
tracked incrementally by using the EWMA [165] formulation of change tracking, using
the same stream updating equation as Algorithm 6.2, but using the prediction error,
instead of the disagreement score.
3. Margin Density Drift Detection (MD3-RS): The MD3 methodology was proposed
in Chapter 4, as an alternate to traditional unsupervised drift detectors. MD3 was
shown to be more reliable than traditional distribution tracking methodologies, as it
tacitly involves the classifier’s notion of uncertainty into drift detection. The MD3-
RS methodology uses a random subspace ensemble for the detection purposes. A
sudden increase in the number of samples in the ensemble’s margin (i.e., region of
disagreement), is considered to be indicative of a drift. Comparing with MD3 provides
us with insights into the need for adversarial awareness in drift detection. In our
experiments, we consider a random subspace ensemble of 50 linear SVMs, with 50%
of the features in each base model. The threshold for the certainty margin is taken to
be as 0.5.
4. The Predict-Detect framework without feature shuffling for retraining (PD-NoShuffle):
This is the proposed Predict-Detect classifier framework. With 50% of the features
belonging to the Prediction model and the other 50% belonging to the hidden De-
tection model. The drift is detected based on tracking the disagreement between the
two models. Upon drift confirmation, the individual models are retrained without
regenerating the feature splits. This methodology evaluates the ability and effects
of continuing to use the same set of initially split features, so as to ensure feature
importance hiding, for a longer period of time.
5. The Predict-Detect framework with feature shuffling for retraining (PD-Shuffle):
This is the proposed framework similar to PD-NoShuffle, except for the fact that
retraining involves reshuffling all features and then regenerating the two separate pre-
diction and detection models. This model evaluates the impact of ignoring temporal
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information gained by an adversary, and focuses on impact against multiple indepen-
dent adversaries over time.
The Prediction and the Detection model in the proposed methodology, are comprised
of a random subspace ensemble of 50 linear SVMs (L1 penalty, regularization constant
c=1), each with 50% of the features allocated to them (randomly chosen). We use the same
ensemble framework for the MD3 classification model, as well as for the prediction model
for the AccTr and the NoChange model, to ensure consistency in evaluating the methods.
6.4.1.2 Description of datasets and experimental setup
The datasets of Table 6.1, are used for the generation of the adversarial drifts.
All data was normalized to the range of [0,1], and data was converted to numeric/binary
features type only. The synthetic datasets is a 10 dimensional dataset, with two classes. The
Legitimate class is normally distributed with a µ-0.75 and σ=0.05, and the Malicious class
is centered at µ-0.25 and σ=0.05, across all 10 dimensions. The CAPTCHA dataset is taken
from [31], and it represents a problem concerned with the classification of mouse movement
data for humans and bots, for the task of behavioral authentication. The phishing dataset
is taken from [145], and it represents classification between malicious and benign web pages.
The digits dataset [145] was taken to represent a standard classification task. Only classes
0 and 8 were considered, so as to convert it to a binary classification task. In all datasets,
the class 0 was considered to be the Legitimate class. After the dataset is prepared, it is
used in the SEE-Stream framework, to generate the adversarial stream. The data stream
is considered balanced with a λImbalance=0.5 (unless otherwise specified), and the blending
ratio λBlend is taken as 0.05, to avoid triggering drifts in the exploration phase. Detection
uses a threshold of θ=3. The parameters of labeling and retraining Ntrain, and the profile
of the stream are discussed at the beginning of every following subsections.
The generation of adversarial drift is based on real world datasets, which are used in
the SEE-Stream framework to simulate a streaming environment. The attacks considered
are the Anchor Points (AP) attacks of Section 3.3.2 and the Anchor Points - High Confidence
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TABLE 6.1






(AP-HC) attacks of Section 5.3.4.1. Anchor points attacks is based on radial search in the
exploration phase, to find regions of the data space which is recognized as Legitimate by the
defender’s model. The AP-HC attacks are an extension of the anchor points attacks, where
an attacker filters out low confidence exploration samples before starting the exploitation
attack phase. The high confidence attacks are representative of a sophisticated adversary,
which uses all available probe-able information to launch an attack, which avoids falling
in the regions of uncertainty of the defender’s classifier. The experiments in this section,
will evaluate the effect of these attacks in a streaming environment, by encapsulating them
in the SEE-Stream framework. The exploration budget (BExplore) for the attacks is taken
as 1000 samples and the attack exploitation payload is taken to be 2000. For the High
Confidence attacks (AP-HC), the generated exploration samples are filtered to remove the
low confidence samples. This filtering is done by using a random subspace model (50 Linear
SVM, 50% of features in each model), with a high regularization constant c=10 (to ensure
robustness against stray probes). Samples with confidence less than the confidence threshold
of θAdversary confidence=0.8 are eliminated, before exploitation starts. This is done based on
recommendation from Section 5.3.4.1, which shows that drift detection can be vulnerable
to such filtering. We use the same parameter configurations as in the SEE framework, to
extend its evaluation to a streaming domain, without changing its core behavior.
In all experiments in this section, averages are reported over 10 runs of the experi-
ments. The experiments are performed using Python and the scikit-learn machine learning
library [149]. Experimental analysis with a single simulated adversarial drift in the stream
is presented in Section 6.4.2 and experiments with multiple consecutive adversarial drifts is
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presented in Section 6.4.3.
6.4.2 Analysis on data streams with a single simulated adversarial drift
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the different drift handling method-
ologies, on a data stream with a single adversarial drift. Drift is simulated using the
SEE-Stream framework, with a stream length of 20,000 samples and a tExplore=1000 and
tExploit=10,000. The chunk size is taken to be N=500, and retraining/confirmation is per-
formed by considering Ntrain = N additional labeled samples, after drift indication. We
will first evaluate the impact of the Anchor Points (AP) attack strategy in streaming do-
main, and then move on to the Anchor Points High Confidence (AP-HC) attacks, which
represents an adversary determined to avoid detection.
The results of the Anchor Points (AP) attacks are shown in Figure 6.8. It can be
seen that the AP attacks when used in the SEE-Stream simulator, leads to a concept drift,
which causes the performance to drop after tExploit=10,000. This is visible from the sudden
drop in accuracy in the performance of the NoChange methodology, which assumes that
the data will be static throughout. The drop in accuracy during the exploration phase
(t=1,000-10,000) is minimal, in accordance with out simulation goals, as an adversary tries
to hide its tracks while performing reconnaissance of the system. The need for drift detection
and retraining is highlighted by the decreasing performance of the NoChange model, which
rapidly becomes unusable after the drift. The fully labeled AccTr approach is able to
effectively and quickly detect changes in the stream, allowing it to fix itself and maintain
high accuracy, in all cases. This however comes at an unrealistic assumption of all labels
being available immediately. Nevertheless, these two methodologies provide the upper and
the lower baseline, for our comparative analysis.
The MD3 approach is able to detect the Anchor Points attacks, by recognizing drift
in the margin density, and as such is able to maintain accuracy over the course of the stream.
The drift detected and the period when retraining starts is highlighted in Figure 6.8. In
all the 4 streams, the MD3 approach is seen to detect drifts swiftly after they start, and
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(a) synthetic (b) CAPTCHA
(c) phishing (d) digits08
Figure 6.8: Accuracy over time for streams with single adversarial drift, based on Anchor
Points (AP) attacks.
as such maintains accuracy close to the fully labeled AccTr approaches. This is done at
a low labeling rate of 2.5% on average, as seen in Table 6.2. The performance of the
MD3 approach is better than the Predict-Detect(PD) approaches, as seen by the higher
accuracy (2.25% on average), in Table 6.2. This is because the MD3 approach uses all
its available feature set, to train models and provide prediction at every step. The PD-
Shuffle outperforms the PD-NoShuffle (∆ = 1.15% on average), as the shuffling allows for
re-calibrating the feature importance of the models in the two ensembles. However using
either method, we obtain accuracy within 5% of the fully labeled AccTr approach. The
PD models, like the MD3 model, uses labels only when the drifts are first signaled by
the unsupervised tracking mechanism. As seen in Table 6.2, all three unsupervised drift
detectors use only 2.5% labeling, as opposed to 100% in the AccTr approach, to provide
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TABLE 6.2
Accuracy and Labeling% of the NoChange, AccTr, MD3, PD-NoShuffle and PD-Shuffle
methodologies, over streams with a single adversarial drift.
Dataset Methodology
Anchor Points Attack
Anchor Points - High
Confidence Attack
Accuracy Labeling% Accuracy Labeling%
synthetic
NoChange 74.7 0 74.2 0
AccTr 97.4 100 95.7 100
MD3 96.9 2.5 74.2 0
PD-NoShuffle 92.5 2.5 85.4 5
PD-Shuffle 94.2 2.5 93.7 2.5
CAPTCHA
NoChange 74.1 0 74.3 0
AccTr 97.6 100 97.7 100
MD3 97.2 2.5 73.9 0
PD-NoShuffle 97.4 2.5 97.4 2.5
PD-Shuffle 97.2 2.5 96.5 2.5
phishing
NoChange 68.9 0 68.9 0
AccTr 93.9 100 93.8 100
MD3 92.5 2.5 68.5 0
PD-NoShuffle 90.1 2.5 90.1 4.18
PD-Shuffle 91.2 2.5 91.3 2.5
digits08
NoChange 73.5 0 71.9 0
AccTr 94.9 100 95.6 100
MD3 95.5 2.5 71.7 0
PD-NoShuffle 90.8 2.5 91.8 2.5
PD-Shuffle 92.8 2.5 92.9 2.5
sufficiently high performance, over time.
The results of applying the Anchor Points - High Confidence (AP-HC) attacks, for
generating adversarial drift is presented in Figure 6.9. This attack is based on a sophisti-
cated adversary, who uses all available probe-able information to launch an attack oh high
confidence (one that evades a majority of feature vectors simultaneously) (Section 5.3.4.1).
Robust classifiers which integrate many of the informative features into the learned model,
are susceptible to these high confidence attacks, which can make adversarial detection and
recovery difficult.
The results of Figure 6.9 demonstrate that the MD3 approach fails to detect these
attacks, as the accuracy of the MD3 approach is seen to be no better than the NoChange
approach. Both approaches fail at detecting any drift. The high confidence attack samples,
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Figure 6.9: Accuracy over time for streams with single adversarial drift, based on Anchor
Points-High Confidence (AP-HC) attacks.
evade several of the features simultaneously, causing the margin density based detection,
to be circumvented. Margin density relies on having a few informative features drifting,
while the other remain static (Section 4.3.1). This condition is intentionally violated by
an adversary seeking to go undetected for a long time (Figure 6.2). An adversary begins
by probing the black box model, in its attack exploration phase, and then weeding out
low confidence samples from the exploration set. The exploitation phase will then generate
samples which simultaneously evade a majority of the discriminatory features, obtained
from the training data by the deployed classifier. This causes the samples to fall outside
the regions of uncertainty (margins), of the defender, leading to failed unsupervised attack
detection. The PD approach was developed to address this issue, by using an adversarial
aware design. It does so by hiding feature importance, thereby shielding them from probing
220
(a) synthetic (b) CAPTCHA
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Figure 6.10: Metrics being tracked by the different drift handling techniques, for the AP
attacks. AccTr tracks error rate based on fully labeled data. MD3 tracks margin density
from unlabeled data. The PD-Shuffle and the PD-NoShuffle, track the disagreement between
the prediction model and the hidden detection model.
based attacks. This ensures that the adversary will have a misguided notion of confidence,
as it will not be able to obtain information about the exact influence of a subset of feature,
no matter how high its exploration probing budget gets. By tracking the successful reverse
engineering and evasion of a subset of exposed features, with an increased uncertainty over
the other set of features, the PD methodology aims to detect adversarial activity. This
detection will allow for an unsupervised early indicator of attacks, enabling the defender to
take effective countermeasures, suited to their application.
The Predict-Detect framework is able to detect these drifts caused by the high confi-
dence attacks, shown by high performance after attacks, in Figure 6.9. The drift detection
is prompt, and close to the AccTr approaches (∆ = 3.3%, on average). The difference in
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Figure 6.11: Metrics being tracked by the different drift handling techniques, for the AP-HC
attacks. AccTr tracks error rate based on fully labeled data. MD3 tracks margin density
from unlabeled data. The PD-Shuffle and the PD-NoShuffle, track the disagreement between
the prediction model and the hidden detection model.
performance, between the two PD approaches, is seen in case of the final accuracy, due to
the different retraining approaches used. The PD-Shuffle outperforms PD-NoShuffle, due
to reassessment and re-splitting of feature importance, possible in the retraining phase.
However, the PD-NoShuffle approach provides security against possible temporal attacks,
in which an adversary might be able to collect information about different features over
time, to cause a more potent data nullification attack. It does so with a compromise in
the accuracy (<2.5% on average), compared to the PD-Shuffle methodology, which is a
reasonable trade off. In either case, the PD methodologies is able to detect drifts with <5%
labeling, and is able to maintain classifier performance over time, as seen in Table 6.2. The
higher labeling budget for the PD-NoShuffle case, is due to the increase in false alarms,
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which leads to requesting of labeled data, which are eventually discarded, as they indicate
no significant drop in the accuracy.
The progression of the metrics tracked by the different drift detectors is shown in
Figure 6.10, for the Anchor Points (AP) attacks, and Figure 6.11, for the Anchor Points -
High Confidence (AP-HC) attacks. AccTr tracks the error rate (or Accuracy), MD3 tracks
the margin density, PD track the disagreement between the Prediction and the Detection
models. It can be seen that all 4 metrics depict a significant jump at the attack exploitation
phase, and remain relatively stable before and after the drift, in case of the AP attacks in
Figure 6.10. This indicates a high signal-to-noise ratio for these information metrics, and
their effectiveness in detecting drifts, which are caused by anchor points attacks. The effect
of the metrics tracked over time for the AP-HC attacks is shown in Figure 6.11, where
it is seen that the margin density metric is unable to detect any changes in the face of a
high confidence attack, leading to its inefficacy. The adversarial aware PD approaches, are
able to detect attacks similar to the AccTr approach. This demonstrates the importance
of accounting for an adversarial aware design in the training phase of a classifier, and the
effectiveness of simple solutions implemented in the design of a classifier, leading to long
term security benefits. The preemptive strategy of hiding feature importance, leads to
benefits in terms of better attack detection, lower dependence on labeled data and effective
responsiveness to attacks, for higher availability and security, of the machine learning based
system.
6.4.2.1 Effects of varying the number of hidden features
In the experiments so far, the available set of features are considered to be split
equally split between the Prediction and the Detection model, based on the feature impor-
tance based splitting methodology of Section 6.2.2.1. This was motivated by the intuition
to equally consider prediction on incoming samples and detection of adversarial drifts, as
important tasks, over the course of the stream. The main reason for the effectiveness of the
Predict-Detect design, is its ability to hide the feature importance of some of the features,
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TABLE 6.3
Effects of varying the percentage of important hidden features, on the accuracy over the
adversarial data stream.
Dataset /
% of hidden features →
PD-NoShuffle PD-Shuffle
10% 25% 50% 10% 25% 50%
synthetic 0.96 0.91 0.88 0.96 0.95 0.95
CAPTCHA 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.97
phishing 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.91
digits08 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.94
TABLE 6.4
Effects of varying the percentage of important hidden features, on the number of drifts
signaled.
Dataset /
% of hidden features →
PD-NoShuffle PD-Shuffle
10% 25% 50% 10% 25% 50%
synthetic 1 1 1 1 1 1
CAPTCHA 1 1 1 1 1 1
phishing 2 1 1 2 1 1
digits08 3 1 1 3 1 1
from being probed and reverse engineered by an adversary. As such, it should be sufficient
to hide fewer important features, in case they are sufficient to represent a high accuracy
orthogonal representation of the training data. Generally, it is expected to have more fea-
tures in the Prediction model, as this will enable better predictive performance for normal
functioning of the ML based service, and at the same time delay the onset of attacks. Here,
we evaluate the effects of reducing the number of features included in the hidden detection
classifier, and its impact on the detection and prediction capabilities of the framework.
Table 6.3 and Table 6.4, present the effects of reducing the number of hidden features
from 50% to 10% and 25%. Reducing features in the hidden model is done by blanking
out additional features, in accordance to the methodology of Section 6.2.2.1. The features
are still distributed round robin, based on their informativeness to the classification task.
From Table 6.3, it can be seen that the accuracy of the stream is not significantly affected
by reduction in the number of the hidden features, for both the PD-Shuffle and the PD-
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NoShuffle scenarios. The number of drifts detected are also seen to be similar, as seen in
Table 6.4. Additional false alarms are seen in case of 10% hidden features. However, the
effects of these false alarms are minimal, compared to the savings in the labeling obtained
by using this unsupervised drift detector. As a guideline, 25%-50% is suggested for the
number of important features in the hidden model.
An important consideration for the applicability of the Predict-Detect framework,
is the presence of multiple orthogonal features in the training dataset, which can result in
disjoint classifiers each with high accuracy of prediction. In such a scenario, the prediction
and the detection models form a self monitoring scheme, for detecting adversarial activity.
So long as the two models can be trained to be disjoint (feature wise) and have high
prediction performance, the number of hidden features, the type of the individual models
and the training mechanism used, does not have a significant impact on the effectiveness of
the framework.
6.4.3 Analysis on data streams with multiple subsequent adversarial drifts
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the different drift handling techniques
in a streaming environment with multiple subsequent adversarial drifts. This stream repre-
sents a scenario where the system gets attacked, the defender adapts and then the adversary
relaunches an attack on the newly deployed system. This represents a real world scenario,
where protecting against the onset of attacks is not sufficient. Instead, the ability to detect
attacks, fix them and continue to provide services, is paramount. This emphasizes a reac-
tive approach to security, with an understanding of the adversarial nature of the problem,
leading to long term benefits.
Multiple adversarial drifts are simulated using the SEE-Stream framework. The
Anchor Points - High Confidence (AP-HC) attacks is used, as it was seen to be more
dangerous to the integrity of a reactive system, as shown in Section 6.4.2. We generate 5
subsequent adversarial drifts, to simulate 5 attack-defense cycles, each of 20,000 samples.
Exploration occurs from (1000 + 20000 ∗ i) to (10000 + 20000 ∗ i) samples, where i = 0, 1, , 4
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TABLE 6.5
Results of drift handling, on multiple adversarial drift data streams.
Dataset Methodology Accuracy Labeling% Drifts Detected
synthetic
NoChange 55.10 0 0
AccTr 94.80 100 5
MD3 54.90 0 0
PD-NoShuffle 87.68 5 5
PD-Shuffle 90.54 5 5
CAPTCHA
NoChange 54.78 0 0
AccTr 97.57 100 4
MD3 54.88 0 0
PD-NoShuffle 96.48 6 6
PD-Shuffle 96.77 5 5
phishing
NoChange 50.70 0 0
AccTr 95.66 100 5
MD3 62.41 2 2
PD-NoShuffle 93.08 6 6
PD-Shuffle 94.65 5 5
digits08
NoChange 52.89 0 0
AccTr 95.03 100 5
MD3 72.99 2 2
PD-NoShuffle 91.49 7 7
PD-Shuffle 93.53 5 5
represents the cycle number. In each cycle, the adversary learns about the defender, using
probes, and then launches a high confidence evasion attack on the defender’s classifier. The
defender is responsible for detecting the onset of the attacks, and retraining in the event
of a confirmed attack. After 10,000 samples (of the previous attack exploitation step), the
adversary is perceptive of the inefficacy of its attacks, due to the updated defender’s model,
and as such it relaunches its attack on the defender. This launch starts the new adversarial
cycle, by probing the updated defender model, and launching evasion attacks against it. We
do not emphasize details about how an adversary detects that the defender has retrained
itself. Instead, it is assumed that an adversary gets perceptive of this change, as it receives
Accept/Reject feedback on its submitted probe samples. The focus of experimentation is on
the defender’s ability to detect and retrain, in the face of multiple subsequent adversarial
drifts.
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Figure 6.12: Accuracy over time for streams with multiple subsequent adversarial drift,
based on Anchor Points - High Confidence attacks.
The results over 5 cycles of the attack-defense cycle are presented in Table 6.5, and
the accuracy over the stream is depicted in Figure 6.12. We consider a chunk size ofN=1000,
for all streams here, due to the increased size of the stream and the need for smoother anal-
ysis of the drift detection behavior. The progression of the streams in Figure 6.12, indicates
that the drift detection behavior of the methodologies is consistent with our observation
for the single drift case. The MD3 approach fails to effectively detect and adapt to drifts,
this is seen by the reduced accuracy of this approach when compared to the fully labeled
drift detector AccTr (34.5% lower accuracy on average). This is a result of the inefficacy
of the MD3 approach, to track high confidence attacks. The MD3 detection methodology
is evaded at test time, by an adversary using the AP-HC attacks. This results in the MD3
approach being similar in performance to the NoChange methodology (∆=7.9%).
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Figure 6.13: Metrics being tracked by the different drift handling techniques, for the streams
with multiple subsequent adversarial drifts. AccTr tracks error rate based on fully labeled
data. MD3 tracks margin density from unlabeled data. The PD-Shuffle and the PD-
NoShuffle track the disagreement between the prediction model and the hidden detection
model.
The PD methods provide performance similar to the fully labeled AccTr approach
(∆=1.9 for PD-Shuffle and ∆=3.6 for PD-NoShuffle). This is achieved at a low labeling rate
of 6% for the PD-NoShuffle and 5% for the PD-Shuffle. This is because the Predict-Detect
framework provides a natural, adversarial-aware, unsupervised mechanism for detecting
drifts. This minimum required labeling is needed, for drift confirmation and retraining.
The drift detection metrics are depicted in Figure 6.13. It is seen that the disagreement
score for the PD serves as an effective surrogate to the fully labeled AccTr approach, as
both the signals changes concurrently and with minimal lag, in the event of an attack. The
high peak at the exploitation stage of attacks; indicates the high signal to noise ratio of
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the disagreement tracking signal and its effectiveness in detecting attacks. This makes the
detectors resilient to stray changes, reserving labeling budget and model retraining only for
cases where the adversarial attack can lead to serious degradation in the performance. The
margin density signal is seen to be ineffective for detecting attacks, as it misses a majority of
the drift scenarios in these experiments. This further highlights the need for an adversarial
aware design, when implementing streaming data algorithms for security applications.
The PD-Shuffle performs marginally better than the PD-NoShuffle methodology,
with an average improvement of 2% in the accuracy of the stream. However, the PD-
NoShuffle provides better protection by hiding features importance from an adversary, over
time. The drift detection and retraining lag is similar for the PD and the AccTr cases,
indicating the effectiveness of the detection capabilities of the proposed framework. This
makes the Predict-Detect framework effective for usage in an unsupervised, adversarial-
aware, streaming environment.
6.4.4 Discussion
The results of experimentation on single and multiple adversarial drift streams, are
summarized in Table 6.6. The average number of drifts detected by each of the drift
detection methodologies, is presented. The NoChange methodology, owing to its static
assumption over the data stream, does not detect any drifts in any of the streams. The
fully labeled drift detector, the AccTr, detects drifts in all cases. The same is observed
for the Predict-Detect classifier. This indicates the efficacy of the proposed framework,
to be used as a surrogate for fully labeled drift detector. The proposed methodology is
able to detect drifts from unlabeled data, and as such is practical for usage in a streaming
environment, where labeling is time consuming and expensive.
The margin density drift detector (MD3), is able to detect drifts in case of the Anchor
Points attack (AP), but fails to detect the required drifts in case of a high confidence attack
(AP-HC). This is because of the adversarial agnostic design of the MD3 framework. An ad-
versary is able to probe the deployed classifier and is then able to aggregate all the obtained
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TABLE 6.6
Summary of adversarial drift detection results. Average number of drifts detected/Total
simulated drifts, are presented for each methodology.
Methodology
Single adversarial drift Multiple adversarial drifts
AP attacks AP-HC attacks AP-HC attacks (5 attacks)
NoChange 0/1 0/1 0/5
AccTr 1/1 1/1 4.75/5
MD3 1/1 0/1 1/5
PD-NoShuffle 1/1 1/1 6/5 (1 False alarm on average)
PD-Shuffle 1/1 1/1 5/5
information, to launch high confidence attacks which fall outside the margin/blindspot of
the defender’s classifier model. Thus, an adversary can be sophisticated to avoid detection
by the MD3 approach. The Predict-Detect classifier, relies on misrepresenting feature im-
portance to the adversary at test time. As such, even if an adversary is sophisticated and
uses a large number of probes, it will not be able to reverse engineer the importance of the
hidden Detection model, to the classification task. The preemptive design of the framework
makes it better prepared for dealing with adversarial activity, by enabling reliable unsuper-
vised detection, and also preventing the onset of high confidence attacks, by a sophisticated
adversary.
6.5 Disagreement based active learning on imbalanced adversarial data streams
The analysis thus far, has focused on the ability of the Predict-Detect framework
to detect drifts from unlabeled data. After a drift is indicated by the framework, labeling
additional samples for drift confirmation and for retraining of models, is considered to follow
naive strategies. More specifically, 100% of samples from a chunk of NUnlabeled subsequent
samples are requested to be labeled, and these samples are then used to confirm drifts
and retrain the model. Although this approach is effective for a balanced stream, with
near equal probability of occurrence of the Legitimate and the Malicious class samples, it
is not an efficient strategy for imbalanced data streams. This is especially pertinent in
adversarial environments, as the adversarial attacks are expected to be a smaller minority
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class, in comparison the majority of benign traffic entering the system. To improve the
labeling process, we analyze the effect of selecting Ntrain samples (Ntrain < NUnlabeled)
to label, for drift confirmation and retraining, after the framework indicates a drift using
unlabeled data. In our proposed active learning strategy, we use the motivation that samples
falling in the disagreement region of the two classifiers have higher probability of being of
the adversarial class. Section 6.5.1 presents the proposed active learning methodology,
based on the disagreement information between the prediction and the detection models.
Experimental analysis is presented in Section 6.5.2.
6.5.1 Active learning using disagreement information - Disagreement Sam-
pling
Adversarial drifts are detected by the Predict-Detect framework, by tracking the
disagreement between the two component models, over time. The efficacy of the detection
mechanism relies on the inability of an adversary to successfully reverse engineer all of the
feature information, due to the hidden inaccessible detection model. This causes adversarial
samples to fall in the disagreement regions of the two classifier models. We extend this
motivation to the domain of active learning, for selecting samples for labeling, after a drift
is indicated.
The active learning based on disagreement is performed on the collected NUnlabeled
samples, after the drift is indicated by the PD model. The proposed active learning process
is shown in Figure 6.14. The initial set of collected NUnlabeled unlabeled samples, after
drift indication, are processed and Ntrain samples are selected (Ntrain <= NUnlabeled), to
be labeled by the Oracle. The active learning methodology aims to embody maximum
informativeness into the selected Ntrain samples, about the new drifted stream distribution.
A large number of adversarial class samples are aimed to be selected, as this is the drifting
class and is often the minority in most real world applications. A good number of adversarial
class samples selected, will lead to more balanced datasets, for better drift confirmation and
retraining of models.
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Figure 6.14: Disagreement based active learning methodology.
The active learning methodology is presented in Figure 6.14. The set of unlabeled
data samples NUnlabeled, collected after drift is indicated, is split into two pools: DAgree
and DDisagree, based on the predicted class labels by the Prediction model (CP ) and the
Detection model (CD). Samples to be labeled are first obtained by random sampling on
the pool of disagreeing samples DDisagree, until the samples in this pool are exhausted or
we reach 50% of our labeling budget (Ntrain). This ensures that we allocate more priority
to the disagreement region, where we have a higher chance of obtaining the samples of the
adversary class. The remaining samples are obtained by random selection on the samples
which fall outside the disagreement region (i.e., by sampling from DAgree). Since the data is
predominantly assumed to be of the Legitimate class, this sampling will allow us to receive
balanced samples for better retraining on the attack samples, while providing secondary
validation on the static nature of the legitimate class samples. The final set of Ntrain
samples are sent to the Oracle for labeling. By integrating the disagreement information
into the labeling process, this methodology aims to achieve a more representative set of
labeled samples, for better detection and retraining over imbalanced adversarial streams.
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6.5.2 Experimental analysis on imbalanced data streams with limited labeling
Identifying and labeling samples of the adversarial class, in a streaming environment,
is an important concern especially when the data stream is imbalanced. This is because,
in a streaming data with drift in the minority class, the changes are harder to track and
detect in the data space [112]. In an adversarial environment, the attack class is often the
minority class [3], as opposed to the vast majority of legitimate samples being submitted
to the system. As such, the adversarial class’s impact could be shadowed by the legitimate
class, causing the attacks to go unnoticed. We present experiments in this section, to
provide an initial motivation into the usage of the disagreement samples, for better labeling
and retraining of the models.
To demonstrate the effects of the proposed disagreement based active learning method-
ology, we first perform experiments on the synthetic dataset, using the same parameters and
stream profile as in Section 6.4.2 (20000 samples, exploration starts at 1000 and exploitation
starts at 10000), and by using the AP-HC attacks. The detection model is taken to be the
PD model with shuffling of features for retraining (PD-Shuffle). The focus of this analysis
is on the efficacy of the active learning approach based on the disagreement information, on
the retrain-ability and overall quality, following the drift detection. Since the data stream
is considered to be imbalanced, we update the Algorithm 6.2, to use f-measure for the con-
firmation of the drift, instead of accuracy. The size of the NUnlabeled samples after drift
detection is taken to be 500, and the detection threshold is kept at θ =1.5, to account for
imbalance in the data stream. The simulation of adversarial drifts in imbalanced streams is
possible in the SEE-Stream framework, by usage of the λImbalance parameter. The effect of
varying the stream imbalance rate λImbalance and the labeling rate, is analyzed. Labeling
rate is the fraction of samples in the set of NUnlabeled samples (buffered after drift indica-
tion), which will be labeled to form the set of Ntrain samples, which are ultimately used for
drift confirmation and retraining.
The effect of varying the labeling rate and the imbalance in the data stream, is shown
in Table 6.8. The f-measure of the final stream and the percentage of malicious samples, in
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TABLE 6.7
Effects of Random Sampling, on the classifier performance and the balance of the obtained
re-training set, on the synthetic dataset. Italicized values indicate critical regions of evalu-




f-measure Malicious% f-measure Malicious% f-measure Malicious%
0.5 0.93 51.20% 0.92 52% 0.89 36%
0.1 0.91 11.40% 0.72 10% 0.65 8%
0.05 0.89 6.20% 0.78 4% 0.66 4%
TABLE 6.8
Effects of Disagreement Sampling, on the classifier performance and the balance of the
obtained re-training set, on the synthetic dataset. Italicized values indicate critical regions




f-measure Malicious% f-measure Malicious% f-measure Malicious%
0.5 0.92 51.60% 0.89 56% 0.91 61%
0.1 0.90 9.00% 0.86 43% 0.86 48%
0.05 0.94 5.20% 0.88 33% 0.84 48%
the labeled Ntrain samples, is shown in the table. High values on both metrics are desirable.
As a baseline, the result of using random sampling (without replacement) is also presented
in Table 6.7. From Table 6.7 and Table 6.8, we can observe that for imbalanced stream with
limited labeling, the disagreement based active learning leads to a more balanced dataset for
retraining. This results in a better f-measure for the stream, as more malicious samples are
detected and retrained on. This is more pertinent in the case of reduced labeling (shown by
emphasized values in both tables). Even for a 95% imbalanced stream, and a budget of only
5% of the NUnlabeled samples (=25 samples in this case), a f-measure of 0.84 is seen across
the stream for the Disagreement Sampling. This is beneficial, as the inability to detect the
adversarial samples and train from them effectively, leads the random sampling approach
to fall drastically in performance after attacks (with f-score of 0.66). The proposed PD
model can detect drifts from imbalanced stream, and innately provides an active learning
mechanism to further improve on labeling and retraining. This makes it attractive for usage
in imbalanced streaming environments, where labeling is time consuming and expensive.
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(a) Effect of sampling, on f-measure of stream. (b) Effect of sampling, on the percentage of
malicious samples obtained for retraining.
Figure 6.15: : Effect of Random Sampling and Disagreement Sampling, at an imbalance
rate of λImbalance=0.1 and a labeling rate of 10% (i.e., Ntrain=0.1 * NUnlabeled).
The results of the proposed active learning methodology, on imbalanced streams
with λImbalance of 0.1 and at a labeling budget of 10% on the set of unlabeled training
data, is shown in Figure 6.15. Across the 4 datasets, it can be seen that the active learning
method outperforms the random labeling strategy, by providing better f-measure and a
more balanced labeled training dataset. While several active learning algorithms have been
proposed in literature for streaming data [105], the focus here is on the innate availability
of information, due to the disagreement between the two model of the defender. This
information is leveraged for drift detection from unlabeled data, and also for the task of
active learning. The hidden classifier serves as a honeypot to capture adversarial samples,
for our task of active learning and retraining. This design embodies the principle of dynamic
adversarial learning, where forethought and adversarial awareness, leads to advantages in
the detection and the retraining process.
6.6 Towards a generalized and extensible Predict-Detect classifier framework
The developed Predict-Detect framework, is used to demonstrate the importance
of feature importance hiding, in a streaming adversarial environment. The information
leverage on the defender’s part, allows for advantages in reactive security, mainly for bet-
ter attack detect-ability and recovery. In this section, we provide additional ideas, which
motivate the extensibility and customize-ability of the framework, to suit different appli-
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TABLE 6.9
Results of splitting datasets, vertically, into orthogonal feature subsets. Number of splits is
given as K. Splits possible within 5% and 10% accuracy loss, are italicized.
Dataset CAPTCHA Phishing Spam Spamassassin Nsl-Kdd
#Instances 1885 11055 6213 9324 37041
#Attributes 26 46 499 499 122
Monolithic Model
Accuracy% (K=1)
99.9 96.3 96.2 97.5 98.1
Min Accuracy% at K = 2 99.8 92.1 95.9 96.7 97.1
Min Accuracy% at K = 3 99.6 88.2 95.4 96.2 92.1
Max Partitions within
5% accuracy drop (K@5%)
5 2 6 7 2
Model performance at K@5%












10% accuracy drop (K@10%)
9 3 10 10 4
Model performance at,K@10%











cation needs. The ideas presented, can be used for designing and deploying classifiers in
Dynamic - Adversarial domains. Section 6.6.1 presents motivation for developing a gener-
alized Predict-Detect framework. An ensemble based multiple classifier system formulation
of the framework is presented in Section 6.6.2.
6.6.1 Motivation - Orthogonal informative feature subsets
Most cybersecurity datasets tend to be high dimensional, and also tend to include
multiple orthogonal subsets of informative features. This is demonstrated in the experi-
mental results of Table 6.9, where experiments are performed on 5 datasets from the cy-
bersecurity domain, namely: CAPTCHA [31], phishing [145], spam, spamassassin [183,184]
and nsl-kdd [185] dataset. The datasets were split vertically (based on features, with each
feature containing all instances of the dataset), based on the feature ranking criterion of
Algorithm 6.1. Each model in the table is a Linear SVM. Accuracy was computed using
10-fold cross validation over the entire dataset and is reported in Table 6.9.
In Table 6.9, effects of splitting a dataset, based on features, into K orthogonal
subsets, is demonstrated. For K=1, there is no split in the feature space and the learned
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model is trained on the entire original dataset. For K > 1, the minimum accuracy of the K
trained models is reported. Additionally, the number of splits- K possible at a 5% and 10%
loss in the minimum accuracy, is also reported. From the results, it can be seen that it is
reasonable to divide the dataset’s features into K > 3 sets of independent disjoint subsets,
such that the minimum accuracy over any feature subset is within an acceptable range
(<10%), when compared to a monolithic classifier trained on the entire set of features. For
the high dimensional datasets of spam and spamassassin, it is seen that 10 partitions are
possible within 10% accuracy of the monolithic classifier.
We use minimum accuracy of the models for evaluation, as we are interested in
feature set partitions, such that all splits have a high information content. Consequently,
we want to train multiple orthogonal models of high quality, from the original training
dataset. The extensibility of the Predict-Detect framework, is motivated by the presence
of this orthogonal information, and the ability to train models on disjoint feature subsets.
This will allow the development of the framework as a modular multiple classifier system
(MCS), which effectively leverages the orthogonal trained models.
6.6.2 Using the Predict-Detect framework as a multiple classifier system (MCS)
The design of a classifier system, relies on effectively utilizing the set of orthogonal
information, to meet the system’s prediction and security needs. In Complex learning based
design [66,72,73,75], the orthogonal information is utilized by training multiple classifiers,
and then using a consensus based mechanism to determine if a given sample should be
admitted to the system as a legitimate sample. This in turn leads to an increased effort
on the adversary’s part, to modify its attack payload, by mimicking multiple features of
the legitimate class. In Randomization based techniques [74, 76, 91, 98], a set of models
are randomly chosen to provide the prediction at any given time. This serves to confuse
the adversary about the true state of the classifier’s learned boundary, making reverse
engineering difficult. Based on analysis in Section 5.4, we observe that Randomization
and Complex learning are ineffective in providing long term security, as they tend to cause
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Figure 6.16: Generalized design of the Predict-Detect Ensemble framework, as a multiple
classifier system.
attacks of high confidence, making their detection and recovery difficult. The proposed
Predict-Detect classifier was shown to be more advantageous to a reactive system, as it
misrepresents feature importance and as such is able to cause adversaries to have high
attack uncertainty. We extend the proposed Predict-Detect design to a multiple classifier
framework, which provides for flexibility and modular extensibility for better long term
security and usage.
The generalized multiple classifier system (MCS) view of the Predict-Detect frame-
work, is presented in Figure 6.16. The initial set of m features is split into K subsets, based
on the feature splitting methodology of Algorithm 6.1. The value of K is chosen based on
acceptable drop in prediction accuracy, by the system’s designer. A larger K value provides
for greater flexibility in the design of the framework. It is possible to have high K values
for most high dimensional cybersecurity datasets, at a reasonable compromise in accuracy,
as seen in Table 6.9 (average K=7 for <10% drop in accuracy). The K subsets can be
obtained based on: a) Domain specific information, such as in the case of multi-modal bio-
metric systems, b) Correlation based extraction of features, such as described in [192,193],
or by c) Feature ranking based division as described in Algorithm 6.1, in the absence of
any specific information about the domain. The obtained set of K feature subsets can then
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be used to generate K models M1 to MK , which represent the trained model pool for the
training dataset. The models can be homogeneous or heterogeneous, so long as they provide
a good fit to the obtained set of features, as determined by cross validation on the training
data. These pool of classifiers form the basis of the multiple classifier system, from which
different policies can be implemented by selectively aggregating model results.
To integrated the benefits of the Predict-Detect framework, into a MCS formulation,
the obtained pool of K models are split between the Prediction Ensemble (PE) and the
Detection Ensemble (DE). It is not necessary for this split to be uniform and it is suggested
to have a higher number of classifier in PE, to ensure delay in the onset of attacks and
high prediction performance, before attacks. The set of models in the Prediction Ensemble
are at the adversarial forefront, susceptible to probing based attacks. As such these can
be made more secure using the static security mechanisms of Complex learning and Ran-
domization, as proposed in literature. A set of models in PE can be randomly selected,
and their results aggregated in a conjunctive formulation, to form the final prediction on
a given input samples. This will ensure a majority voted based approach in conjunction
to randomness, to secure against evasion and reverse engineering attacks. The modular
setup of the framework in Figure 6.16, allows for extensibility of the proposed approach to
include existing mature work in the area of evasion security of classifiers [40,66], by allowing
for their usage in the development of the Prediction Ensemble. The reactive component of
the attack-defense cycle is handled by the design of the hidden Detection Ensemble (DE).
By hiding the set of model from the Prediction Ensemble, they are shielded from probing
based attack and mimicking. This is developed in line with the Predict-Detect framework,
and as such it aims to provides the same benefits of detect-ability and retrain-ability in
Dynamic-Adversarial environments. The models in the Detection Ensemble, are used to
perform detection based on their disagreement with the Prediction Ensemble (PE). For the
purposes of the detection, each model in the detection ensemble is considered as an inde-
pendent expert with an orthogonal view of the data. As such, disagreement between any
models of the DE, with the overall prediction of the PE, is indicative of drift. The presence
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of multiple orthogonal models, also allows for fine grained active learning, where we can
prioritize choosing of samples, which are disagree with a majority of the models in the DE.
Once a drift is confirmed and a new training dataset is obtained, the set of models
need to be retrained. It was suggested in Section 6.2.2.3, that retraining be done on the
entire set of features and that new splits of the models be used to develop the Predict-
Detect models. However, this design can be susceptible to possible temporal attacks, where
an adversary can learn from multiple attack campaigns, to eventually reverse engineer all
features of the training data, leading to data nullification attacks over time. To safeguard
against this possibility of attacks, we propose the division of the detection ensemble’s models
into the following two sub sets: a) The Dynamic Models (DE-DM) and the b) Permanently
Hidden Models (DE-PM). The Dynamic Models are the set of models, which can crossover to
the Prediction Ensemble, if the new training data requires additional features (than available
in PE), for the next defense cycle. This is especially the case when certain features of the
PE model become uninformative over time for the prediction task, leading to un-usability
of the same features for future classification of samples. In such a scenario, we can recognize
low performing models in the PE (by evaluating on newly obtained labeled samples), and
then replace them with a few models of the DE-DM set of models. The evaded models can
be held in the system, to test if they become effective at a later attack cycle, to protect
against recurring adversarial drifts. The Permanently hidden Models (DE-PM), are only
used for detection, while never being included in the Prediction Ensemble. This ensures
that the adversary at no time will have access to all the set of feature information, even if
it aggregates information from past attack cycles. Inclusion of a few models in the DE-PM
ensures long term insurance against attacks. The division of the models in the detection
ensemble, into a permanently hidden category and a set for dynamic substitution, allows
for the ability to recover from attacks and provide effective reactive security, while still
maintaining long term benefits of feature importance hiding.
The blueprint of the Predict-Detect ensemble framework, is a proposed framework
for integrating the idea of feature importance hiding into the design of reactive secure
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systems. It allows developers and system designers, to integrate the core ideas of this
design, while still providing flexibility of using their existing model designs and system
architectures. This framework allows for modular extension and testing with several existing
and proposed techniques, to best suit one’s needs and data characteristics. The Prediction
Ensemble provides for the ability to apply robust learning methodologies of [6, 71, 72, 98].
While the Detection Ensemble provides for the ability to maintain strategies advantages in a
reactive environment. Together, the Predict-Detect ensemble provides for better security for
a Dynamic Adversarial Environment, where attacks are expected, and the system is capable
of reacting to them efficiently and swiftly. By including considerations for unsupervised drift
indication, selective labeling of samples, and misleading attackers to launch low confidence
attacks, the proposed framework provides for a generalized way for developers and data
scientist, to design for long term security, in adversarial environments. The framework can
be made automated, where the feature splitting, retraining and replacing models, can be
done dynamically by the system, and the system is capable of requesting human intervention
when it deems necessary. This makes it an intelligent dynamic system, which is capable
of reacting to adversarial activity, and provides a domain agnostic framework for security.
This also allows the framework to be applied as a black box extension to classification
models, enabled to provide ‘security by design’. The design of the framework is domain
agnostic and assumes a black box view of the defender, further allowing for application
specific customization, by system designers.
6.7 Chapter summary
In this chapter, the Predict-Detect streaming classifier framework was presented,
which is capable of detecting and handling adversarial drifts from streaming data. The
framework used a coupled classifier design, where a set of features are shielded from adver-
sarial evasion. This in turn enables an unsupervised mechanism for drift detection and also
provides benefits for active learning, in a streaming environment. Experimental evaluation
of the framework on 4 datasets, demonstrates that the frameworks is able to indicate drifts
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from unlabeled data, and provides performance similar to that of a fully labeled drift de-
tection approach (<5% difference, on average). This detection was possible even when a
high confidence attack is launched against the classifier. This demonstrates the advantage
of an adversarial aware design, where preemptive design strategies in the design phase,
leads to better dynamic security of the system. The inability of traditional drift detection
techniques, to account for the adversarial nature of the drifts, causes them to be ineffective
and unusable in such environments. This was shown experimentally, specifically for the
Margin Density Drift Detection (MD3) algorithm of Chapter 4. The ability to hide feature
importance, was seen as an effective extension of the margin based approach of MD3, to
dynamic adversarial environments. The proposed framework was shown to provide better
unsupervised attack detection, better selection of adversarial samples in imbalanced stream-
ing data, and the ability to perform continuous retraining and usage of the models. The
following claims were tested in this chapter:
• Claim a: Adversarial agnostic drift detection is vulnerable to evasion.
The margin density drift detection algorithm (MD3), was seen to be a reliable indicator
of drift from streaming unlabeled data, in Chapter 4. However, since MD3 does
not account for adversarial nature of drifts, it is vulnerable in dynamic adversarial
domains. The attacker was able to use the information presented by the random
subspace ensemble, to launch a high confidence attacks, which avoided the margin and
thereby detection from MD3. Therefore, to deal with adversarial drift it is necessary
to account for the specific characteristics of this drift.
• Claim b: The design of the classification model at training time, can provide benefits
for handling test time drifts.
In the design of the Predict-Detect classifier, it was seen that hiding of the Detection
model, caused the attacks to fall in the disagreement region of the two classifiers. This
allowed for unsupervised detection and also for detection of the minority adversarial
samples in imbalanced streams. On the other hand, the presence of all information in
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case of the MD3 methodology, caused the attacker to fall outside the margin region,
which was undesirable. By changing the space of probe-able information, the proposed
framework was able to direct drifts to manageable and detectable regions of space.
• Claim c: Hiding feature importance, can provide long term security benefits in terms
of detection and recovering from attacks.
This was seen for the Predict-Detect classifier framework, where adversarial drift was
detected on simulated streams, without the need for labeled data. This allowed for
an overall reduction in >94% of labeled data, on average. Also, by experimenting on
data streams with multiple drift cycles, it was shown that the proposed methodology
is able to recover from subsequent drifts and remain effective over time. The ability
to use disagreement as an active learning signal, also demonstrated the added benefits
of hiding features, in labeling and recovering from attacks.
This chapter established the foundation and provides initial experimental evaluation,
for future works in the area of adversarial drift handling systems. It is shown that accounting
for the adversarial nature of the problem, is important in designing system to be more
effective and efficient. The principles of Dynamic Adversarial Mining are embodied by
the Predict-Detect framework, and it is aimed to serve as a blueprint for designing future
systems in its spirit.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND POTENTIAL FUTURE WORK
7.1 Conclusion
The naive usage of machine learning in adversarial environments has made it vul-
nerable to a new gamut of attacks, which are themselves data driven. A static view of the
data mining system, where models are learned from the obtained training data and then
deployed to provide prediction, is not suitable in an adversarial environment. Such domains
present a dynamic landscape, with an ongoing arms race between the system designer and
the attackers. Any solution designed for such a domain, needs to take into account an active
adversary and be able to evolve over time in the face of emerging threats. In this disserta-
tion, we studied this problem of Dynamic Adversarial Mining, to highlight the need for a
new paradigm in applying machine learning in the domain of cybersecurity. Existing work
on the security of machine learning was shown to be divided into two schools of thought:
a) Proactive security measures and b) Reactive security measures. Proactive measures con-
centrate on delaying the attacks on a system, by bolstering defenses. While, the Reactive
security measures focus on handling attacks swiftly, after they occur. An integration of
Proactive and Reactive measures was emphasized, for a dynamic view of the security of
a system. This integrated view was proposed under the canopy of Dynamic Adversarial
Mining, where attacks need to be prevented, easily detected and recovered from; to ensure
continuous long term security. The major contributions of the dissertation are summarized
in the following sections.
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7.1.1 White hat analysis of the vulnerabilities of classifiers
Starting with an adversary’s view of the machine learning system, the developed work
provides an analysis of vulnerabilities of binary classifiers, to probing based exploratory at-
tacks. A data driven framework, called the Seed-Explore-Exploit framework, was developed
as a white hat analysis of the system’s security, to characterize attackers and their ca-
pabilities, in Chapter 3. Attacks were modeled, ranging from simple random attacks, to
sophisticated reverse engineering of the defender’s classifier model. It was seen that, having
information only about the feature space, was sufficient to launch an attack, with over 90%
accuracy of evasion. This attack was launched without any specific domain information,
information about classifiers or about training datasets of defender, on 10 different classifi-
cation datasets. This highlighted the vulnerability of traditional machine learning systems,
in environments where adversaries constantly try to evade the learned model, leading to
non-stationarity in the data distribution. Here, the accuracy of the learned model leads to
a false sense of security, as it has little meaning if the classifier can be easily evaded. Vul-
nerability of commercial black box based cloud prediction services, particularly the Google
Cloud Platform’s prediction service, to probing based attacks, was also demonstrated.
7.1.2 Reliable detection of drifts from unlabeled streaming data
The non-stationarity of data distribution leads to concept drift, which needs to de-
tected in a timely manner, to ensure the effectiveness of the deployed models. However,
detecting these changes requires labeled data, which is scarce and expensive in real world
streaming data applications. As such, an unsupervised drift detection scheme was intro-
duced in Chapter 4, called the Margin Density Drift Detection (MD3) framework, which
detects drifts from unlabeled data and has a low false alarm rate. The MD3 framework
monitors changes in the density of uncertain regions (margins), to detect drifts which can
cause the performance of a model to degrade. This framework was developed as a model in-
dependent, streaming, unlabeled, distribution independent and robust change detector. The
MD3 framework, when compared to a fully labeled drift detector, was shown to provide a
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comparable performance with 88.3% less labeled data. Also, comparisons with a traditional
unlabeled change detector, showed an increased robustness to changes which do not affect
classification performance, and a reduced dependence on labeling by 8.3%. This ability of
the MD3 framework to incorporate the classification process in the change detection, led to
fewer false alarms. This makes it particularly attractive for usage in cybersecurity domains,
where labeling is expensive and false alarms can cause trust in the system to deteriorate.
The MD3 algorithm addresses a very important issue with unsupervised drift detectors:
Reliability. Automatic curation of insignificant data distribution changes are performed, in
a domain agnostic manner. This ensures applicability to a wide variety of applications, in
dynamic environments.
7.1.3 Characterizing effects of classifier design on dynamic adversarial capa-
bilities
Analysis was performed on the impact of the different classifier design strategies,
on the adversarial capabilities at test time, in Chapter 5. In dynamic environments, the
ability to safeguard training data information was highlighted as the primary objective. Use
of excessively informative models were shown to leak information about the training data,
which made subsequent retraining and detection of attacks, intractable. Data nullification
attacks were presented, where an adversary uses the available probe-able information to
launch sophisticated attacks, causing them to become indistinguishable from benign traf-
fic. The vulnerability of existing security mechanisms of - Restrictive one class models,
Robust feature bagged models and Randomization based classifier, was demonstrated. The
ability to hide feature importance information, as a mechanism to mislead adversaries at
test time, was demonstrated to provide long term security benefits in dynamic adversarial
environments.
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7.1.4 Handling adversarial concept drift from streaming data
Adversarial concept drift was introduced in Chapter 6, as a special case of Concept
Drift. The uniqueness and characteristics of this category of drifts was established and
a framework was developed for simulating adversarial drifts on real world datasets (SEE-
Stream framework). The ability of an adversary to evade drift detection was demonstrated.
Based on an understanding of the adversarial capabilities (Chapter 3) and reliability re-
quirements of streaming data (Chapter 4), an adversarial aware drift handling framework
was presented. This framework, called the Predict-Detect classifier framework provides
unsupervised drift detection, active learning and maintains retrain-ability, in adversarial
domains. The modular design and extensibility of the framework was presented, for easy
extension and customization to suit different application needs.
7.2 Potential future work
Our understanding of the capabilities and applicability of machine learning, is still in
its budding stages. While early results shows the immense potential of artificial intelligence
and data driven learning, it is important to adopt a principled approach in the development
of the field, without getting carried away with the hype that surrounds it. Taking into
consideration the requirements of a domain and the goals that a machine learning based
system hopes to achieve, will lead to better tailored solutions, with greater respect for the
user requirements. In this dissertation, we presented the development of machine learning
classification paradigms, in dynamic and adversarial environments. We incorporate the
adversarial aspects of real world environments into the design of machine learning models,
to better analyze its vulnerabilities and possible solutions which can make it more secure
and usable. This analysis warrants a new paradigm in the application of machine learning,
where the never ending and active nature of an adversary is taken into consideration while
designing defensive measures. This work is introduced under a new interdisciplinary field of
Dynamic Adversarial Mining, which we hope will bring together the research in the fields of
Machine Learning, Streaming Data and Cybersecurity, towards a more integrated solution
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for secure and life-long learning. Directions for extension and future work, is presented in
the following sections.
7.2.1 Extending utility of margin density in streaming data environments
The developed margin density based drift detection algorithm (MD3) provides a
mechanism for utilizing the margin density information, to reliably indicate distribution
changes in the data. This information can be extended to benefit active learning over im-
balanced streaming data, to better recover from drifts. Additionally, selective replacement
of classifiers in the robust classifier ensemble can be evaluated for better fine grained re-
sponse to drifts. The MD3 approach, demonstrated the ability to use the hitherto ignored
margin information, intrinsic to the classifier deployed in the streaming environment. In-
cluding context of the classification task was seen to benefit drift detection. This paradigm
can be extended to benefit other streaming data tasks, such as outlier detection, clustering
and active learning. Describing the change to users of the framework, can also be a direction
which can benefit from the analysis of the margin characteristics of the drifting data, to
increase the adoption of reactive approaches, in the real world.
7.2.2 Handling adversarial activity by preemptive classifier designs
The ability to account for adversarial activity, during the training of the classifier
model, was shown to benefit the dynamic aspects of the machine learning based system.
While, the Predict-Detect classifier design provides one way to improve dynamic response
of a system, by hiding feature importance, other approaches can be analyzed in the same
spirit. The ability to include randomness into the classification model, to prevent reverse
engineering attacks, and to include feature honeypots, to detect evasion of the system, can
be included into the system to differentially deal with varied adversarial capabilities, at
test time. Prevention of causative attacks, by robust learning methodologies, can also be
included in the design of the classifier.
248
7.2.3 Designing dynamic adversarial aware machine learning frameworks
To account for a holistic view of the adversarial landscape in which machine learn-
ing models operate, it is necessary to integrate adversarial awareness into the design of the
system. This work primarily focused on the attack detection component of the framework.
Effects of causative attacks, to mislead the retraining of the streaming data models, war-
rants further research. Also, the ability of an adversary to influence the labeling component
of the framework, needs analysis. Ideas along the work of Adversarial drift [114] and Ad-
versarial active learning [115], are initial steps towards a comprehensive solution. Dealing
with multiple simultaneous adversaries, could also be analyzed. An ensemble framework
which integrates clustering with classification, such as the GC3 framework of [102], could be
beneficial for such scenarios. Additionally, the extension of the framework to machine learn-
ing tasks beyond classification, to tasks such as - unsupervised clustering, recommendation
systems, outlier detection, rule induction and data pre-processing, needs to be analyzed
using an adversarial aware approach.
7.2.4 Applying dynamic adversarial mining to real world applications
The developed methodologies and strategies, have been presented from a data driven
perspective, being agnostic of the domain of application. This generic design makes them
applicable for usage in a wide variety of systems. However, submitting probes and getting
feedback from the defender’s model, is domain dependent. The domain specific implemen-
tation characteristics need to be further analyzed, to motivate the ubiquitous inclusion of
adversarial awareness in the design of machine learning based systems. Application of the
Predict-Detect framework, as an automated self adjusting dynamic system, will enable the
seamless integration of the approach in most black box machine learning services. Re-
mote black box prediction services, such as Amazon AWS Machine Learning1 and Google




Predict-Detect framework, to provide for a black box secured classifier capable of dealing
with dynamic and adversarial changes. This will ensure that security is provided, with-
out any extra onus to the developer, as a part of the black box service. Developing black
box classifier models with feature importance hiding, and deploying as a predictive service
with application specific modifications, would make for interesting research for motivating
a Dynamic Adversarial Mining approach to the development of predictive systems. The
domains of cybersecurity can see immediate benefits from such a design, but eventually all
systems using machine learning at their core need to be made adversarial aware, so that
they are not helpless when faced with nefarious activity, after being deployed in the real
world.
The new paradigm of Dynamic Adversarial Mining, requires input from several in-
terdisciplinary areas of research, including machine learning, cybersecurity, stream data
mining, and human-computer interaction. A combined holistic approach will provide for
improved and secure systems, which are ‘secure by design’ and are able to continuously
operate effectively in the real world.
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